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Abstract 
Digital technologies and social media networks have the potential to open 
new platforms for women in the public domain.  During the 2011 Arab Spring 
revolutions, female cyberactivists used digital technologies to participate in and 
at times led protests.  This thesis examines how Tunisian, Egyptian, and 
Moroccan female cyberactivists deployed social media networks to write a new 
body politic online.  It argues throughout that female activists turned to online 
activism to disrupt gender relations in their countries and demand social, 
religious, economic, and political gender parity.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam1 
Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam 
 
The People Want to Bring Down the Regime 
The People Want to Bring Down the Regime 
 
 
On January 18, 2011, Egyptian female activist Asmaa Mahfouz posted a 
video blog (vlog) on Facebook urging Egyptian citizens to protest in Tahrir 
Square for Egyptian dignity.  A founding member of the Egyptian April 6th 
protest movement, Mahfouz was well-versed in social networking and media 
sites.  She blogged, tweeted, and posted on Facebook daily.  In the video, a veiled 
Mahfouz directed her message at Egyptian citizens—specifically male citizens.  
She attacked Egyptian masculinity and challenged the men, stating, “If you think 
yourself a man, come with me on January 25th.  Whoever said women shouldn’t 
go to protests because they’ll be beaten, let him have some honor and manhood 
and come with me on January 25th.”  Posted one month after protests erupted in 
Tunisia, Mahfouz’s video has been credited with inspiring Egyptian citizens to 
mobilize and protest in Tahrir Square on Friday, January 25th, for what has come 
to be known as the ‘Day of Rage.’  She connected her activism with the Tunisian 
protests and the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi 
on December 17, 2011:  
Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire, to protest the 
humiliation and hunger and poverty and degradation they had to 
live with for 30 years.  Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire, 
                                                        
1 Due to technological constraints, I was unable to post Arabic text in this thesis.  Microsoft Word 
for Mac does not support right to left languages and distorts the words.  Thus, I tried to include 
transliterated Arabic words when possible.   
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thinking maybe we can have a revolution like Tunisia, maybe we 
can have freedom, justice, honor, and human dignity. 
 
In the days following her post, Egyptians, many of whom supported or 
participated in the April 6 movement, responded to her Facebook post with 
comments, reshares and likes2.  Mahfouz issued another vlog on Thursday, 
January 24, the night before the scheduled protest, reiterating her message to 
protest.   
Since January 25th, numerous news sites have uploaded and translated 
Asmaa Mahfouz’s vlog, extending its reach through thousands of like, reposts, 
and shares.  Her message articulated multiple identities, resisting both President 
Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian regime and Egyptian and Islamic gender roles.  
She claimed the right to stand in the streets next to her fellow Egyptian citizens—
male and female—transgressing the boundary between cyberspace and physical 
space.   By using YouTube and Facebook to upload a vlog, she signified that her 
body was a symbol to rally around.  This revolutionary embodiment mirrored the 
symbolic images of Khaled Said’s battered and bloodied body on the “We are all 
Khaled Said3” Facebook page and the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor 
Mohamed Bouazizi memorialized in a viral YouTube clip.  However, unlike the 
symbols of male martyrs expressed in the previous examples, Asmaa Mahfouz 
                                                        
2 On Facebook and other blogging platforms, a “like” button is a feature that allows users to show 
their support for specific comments, pictures, wall posts, statuses, or fan pages.  Added to 
Facebook in 2009, it has since expanded to other websites and allows users to show their 
appreciation for content without writing a comment.   
3 The We are all Khaled Said movement began when images of Khaled Mohamed Said’s death at 
the hands of Egyptian police disseminated online, inspiring Egyptian Google executive Wael 
Ghonim to anonymously create the page.  He posted as an anonymous Egyptian using the 
universal ‘we’ to symbolize that Khaled Said’s death was an injustice to all Egyptian citizens.  This 
movement was instrumental in organizing the #Jan25 protests that began the Egyptian uprising 
in January 2011.   
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performed as a female symbol, calling herself the ‘daughter of Egypt’ (binat al 
masri).      
This thesis examines a subset of Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female 
cyberactivists who participated in the so-called Arab Spring revolutions.  Asmaa 
Mahfouz exemplifies the integral role these female cyberactivists played in the 
protests that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread across the Middle 
East and North Africa into late 2011.  When the dust settled, three presidents for 
life—Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Tunisian Preisdent Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali, and Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi—had fallen and new 
governments and constitutions allegedly granting greater freedoms rose in their 
place.  The reverberations of these revolutionary movements continue to be felt 
today in ongoing protest movements throughout the region.  Female 
cyberactivists such as Asmaa Mahfouz inhabited virtual and physical space 
simultaneously during the Arab Spring revolutions, demonstrating the 
importance of digital media for articulating multiple, conflicting identities and 
remaking the self. This thesis proposes the term female reverberations to 
encompass the influence and scope of Arab women online during the height of 
the protests in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco from December 2010 to late 2011.  In 
renowned feminist scholar Joan Wallach Scott’s recent book The Fantasy of 
Feminist History, she writes that the word reverberation “carries a sense both of 
infinite regression,” thus female reverberations are“—subsequent echoes, 
succession of echoes—and of effect—reverberations are also repercussions” 
(Scott, 2011: 79).  Inspired by her work, I substitute the digital media theoretical 
term ‘connectivity’, which maps online networks and measures influence of 
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digital technologies, with the term ‘reverberations,’ gendering my analysis of 
female activism and presence online.  In this way, this thesis explores how the 
revolutionary movements in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco offered opportunities 
for resistance, in particular cyber resistance, to be deployed in new ways and 
spaces.   
The theoretical framework of this thesis works at the intersection of 
feminist critical theory, social movement theory and digital media studies.  Using 
a subset of female cyberactivists from Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, it seeks to 
understand how these protests gave birth to diverse networks of female 
cyberactivists, expanding female reverberations online.  In doing so, these female 
subjects problematized stable categories of ‘women’ ‘citizen’ ‘Arab’ and ‘feminist.’  
Thus, this thesis will investigate the liberating possibilities of digital technologies 
and social media and will examine how these female cyberactivists performed 
their gender and articulated their identities online.     
 Throughout, this thesis poses the question: did digital technologies 
facilitate women’s participation in the Arab Springs in new ways and with greater 
agency than they had previously experienced?  In response to this question, it 
argues four main paints: 1) Flows of information connected female cyberactivism 
with physical protests, allowing female cyberactivists to live blog, tweet, and film 
their participation in street protests and upload these documents online; 2) 
Female cyberactivists deployed different languages (MS, colloquial, English, 
French, etc.) at specific moments to reach select local, regional, and international 
audiences; 3) During and after the protests, female cyberactivsts established new 
networks online to connect with fellow protestors, reach out to international 
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journalists, document their experiences, demand gender equality, and mobilize 
female networks against gender violence; 4) Female cyberactivists performed a 
multiplicity of femininities online, from modern Western constructions of 
femininity practiced by many Tunisian female activists to the intersection of 
Islamic piety with feminist values several Egyptian female cyberactivists 
performed.  Ultimately, this thesis argues that women in the 2010-2011 Tunisian, 
Egyptian, and Moroccan protests used digital technologies in diverse ways to 
participate in and at time lead protests, carving new spaces to articulate claims 
for political, social, and cultural gender parity.     
 The remainder of this introduction locates the analysis of female 
cyberactivism in the political, religious, cultural, socioeconomic and historical 
processes that construct what has been named the ‘Arab Awakening,’ ‘Arab 
Spring and Winter’ or simply, the ‘Arab Spring.’  It begins with a brief description 
of the timeline of protests, which will be expanded upon in the subsequent 
Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan chapters.  From there, it moves to a horizontal 
perspective—looking at the Arab Spring in the context of transnational social 
movements and the rising importance of cyberactivism globally.  In conclusion, 
this introduction uses the theoretical works of feminist theorists Judith Butler 
and Saba Mahmood to address the choice of the term ‘female reverberations’ and 
to answer the question: why gender?  This threefold approach situates the actions 
of the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Morocco female cyberactivists this thesis examines 
within the global context of protest movements, digital activism, and gender 
relations.    
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1.1 The so-called ‘Arab Spring’   
Political analysts and journalists credit Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-
immolation on December 17, 2010 as the match that ignited the Tunisian protests.  
A frustrated and defeated street vendor, suffering abuse at the hands of the police, 
Bouazizi lit himself on fire in front of the governor’s house less than an hour after 
a female Tunisian police officer confiscated his wares.  His martyrdom enraged 
Tunisians and protests spread across the country, organized via mobile phones, 
blogging, Facebook and Twitter.  Female Tunisian bloggers such as Lina Ben 
Mhenni’s A Tunisian Girl encouraged Tunisians to protest and disseminated 
information about the protests throughout the Middle East and North Africa 
region and internationally.  Mhenni’s internationally renowned blog and Asmaa 
Mahfouz’s vlogs demonstrate how female networks online mobilized activists and 
fostered solidarity in the protests.  On December 28, 2010, Tunisian President 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in office since 1987, responded to the Tunisian 
protestors by issuing a proclamation stating that dissent would be severely 
punished (Dabashi, 2012).  After two weeks of prolonged violence and defections 
from the Tunisian military and police, Ben Ali fled for Saudi Arabia on January 14, 
2011.   
  News of Ben Ali’s departure from power spread throughout the Arab world, 
transmitted by digital media when state-run media sources refused to broadcast 
the protests.   In Egypt, a 40-year-old restaurant owner Abdou Abdel-Monaam 
Hamadah set himself on fire on January 17, 2011 in front of parliament.  The 
protest scheduled for Egypt’s national police appreciation holiday on January 
25th organized by members of the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page, the 
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April 6th movement, and the Kefaya (“Enough” in Egyptian colloquial Arabic) 
movement took on greater importance.   January 25th arrived and became known 
as the ‘Day of Rage’ after thousands of Egyptians flooded Tahrir Square and 
chanted “The People Want to Bring Down the Regime.4”  Wael Ghonim, the then 
anonymous creator of the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page, writes in his 
autobiography Revolution 2.0, “The scene at Tahrir was one of the most 
enthralling I had ever seen.  Enormous numbers of protestors—thousands, if not 
tens of thousands—covered most of the ground space in the square” (Ghonim, 
2012).  Protests escalated until February 11th, 2011 when President Hosni 
Mubarak announced he was stepping down and that the army was in charge.  The 
fall of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidin Ben Ali shocked the region and the 
world.  Many Arabs, such as Egyptian feminist activist and writer Nawal El 
Saadawi responded with enthusiasm and optimism.  After Egypt appeared to 
have fallen to the revolutionaries, countries across the Arab region experienced 
various levels of protests, political upheaval, and regime change.  
Protests in Morocco differed from their fellow North African countries.  
These protests did not share in the velocity nor the violence of Egypt and Tunisia 
and left the king in power.  Some scholars argue that this is due to the 
movement’s demographics—it was largely a university student-led, urban protest 
(Salime, 2012).  In addition, King Mohammed VI responded to the protestors’ 
demands rapidly, raising the minimum wage, increasing scholarships for 
students, raising the pay for civil servants and calling for the parliament to revise 
the constitution.  Influenced by the activists in Tunisia and Egypt, Moroccan 
                                                        
4 Asmaa Mahfouz’s vblog January 26, 2011  
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youth first protested against Morocco’s high unemployment rate, government 
corruption, legal gender inequalities, and political oppression in Rabat on 
February 20th, 2011.  King Mohammed VI responded to these protests with 
several concessions, specifically a new constitution that redistributed the 
government’s power and allowed for gender reforms.  In addition, King 
Mohammed VI responded to the protestors’ demands rapidly, raising the 
minimum wage, increasing scholarships for students, raising the pay for civil 
servants and calling for the parliament to revise the constitution.  Protests 
dwindled after the constitutional referendum on June 24, 2011.  Nonetheless, the 
February 20th Movement opened new spaces for Moroccan female activists to 
engender online and offline discourse.  This in turn facilitated the creation of 
SlutWalk Morocco, which later became known as Woman Choufouch5, a 
movement that highlights sexual harassment and gender violence towards 
women.   
While many scholars contest that the origins of the Arab Spring can be 
found in the decades preceding 2010, with the global recession and high 
unemployment of the young, education Arab population, this thesis focuses on 
the role of digital media in organizing, mobilizing and responding to these causes.  
The following paragraphs trace the evolution of social media microblogs such as 
Twitter and Facebook and locate their growing importance in political protests 
preceding the Arab Spring, providing examples from the early 2000s Color 
Revolutions in Eastern Europe and the 2009-2010 Iranian Green Revolution.  
                                                        
5 According to the founders of the movement, “Choufouch” has a range of meanings from ‘what’s 
up’ to ‘look here’ to ‘shouldn’t we try.’  The word is usually used by Moroccan men to accost 
Moroccan and foreign women walking in the streets.   
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Many Egyptian and Tunisian activists learned how to use digital technologies for 
cyberactivism from Eastern European activists in the aftermath of the Color 
Revolutions.  In addition, postcolonial scholar Hamid Dabashi has argued in his 
recent book The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism (2012) that the Iranian 
Green Revolution marked the beginning of the Arab uprisings.  These examples 
reveal the transnational exchange of digital technologies and cyberactivism 
tactics that enabled the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan activists to effectively 
mobilize protests during the Arab Spring.   
  
1.2 The Revolution Will Be Twittered  
 
 Launched in 2006, Twitter founders Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, Biz 
Stone and Noah Glass intended the microblogging6 site to function as a social 
network, similar to Facebook.  To use the site, members post status updates 
limited to 140 characters using various websites, mobile internet devices and 
SMS (i.e. text messages) (Murthy, 2011).  These updates could be anything from 
what someone ate that night to a message to communicating a public emergency, 
for example @MayorRTRyback tweeted on December 4, 2013, “We have 35 crews 
out plowing and treating city streets. Please drive safe, stay clear of the plows & 
follow @MinneapolisSnow for updates.”  Twitter connects to other websites 
through widgets hosted on sites that post directly to Twitter.  Members can also 
                                                        
6 Murthy defines microblogging as, “an internet-based service in which (1) users have a public 
profile in which they broadcast short public messages or updates whether they are directed to 
specific user(s) or not, (2) messages become publicly aggregated together across users, and (3) 
users can decide whose messages they wish to receive, but not necessarily who can receive their 
messages; this is in distinction to most social networks where following each other is bi-
directional” (2012: 1061).   
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add photos, upload videos, and paste links to their messages.  Twitter facilitates 
interaction and connectivity between users through the ‘reply’, ‘retweet’, and 
‘favorite’ buttons.  Thus messages posted by one user, for example 
@BarackObama “I want to wish everybody a Merry Christmas and a joyful 
holiday season—President Obama during the lighting of @TheNationalTree” can 
be retweeted by 1,454 users and favorited by 1,674 users.  These functions extend 
Twitter’s reach far beyond the original member and her/his followers.   
Twitter’s usage soon expanded and transformed into an information 
network instrumental to numerous protests and revolutions throughout the 
world.  In 2009, two so-called revolutions occurred which thrust Twitter and 
social networking into the spotlight.  Civil unrest began in Moldova in April 2009 
as the results of the 2009 Moldova parliamentary election were tallied.  
Protestors claimed election fraud and demanded a recall election.  Dubbed the 
‘Grape Revolution,’ demonstrators used Twitter to organize themselves and 
coordinate protests.   Several months later, in June 2009, disputed Iranian 
elections led to mass youth protests, which came to be known as the ‘Green 
Revolution.’  Both social movements later came to be known as ‘Twitter 
Revolutions.’  The Moldova and Iranian uprisings informed how Tunisian, 
Egyptian, and Moroccan activists would deploy digital technologies and social 
media networks during the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions.     
Moldova’s “Grape Revolution” came on the heels of the revolutions in 
Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine during the early 2000s, termed the ‘color 
revolutions.’  On April 7, 2009, nearly 30,000 people gathered to protest the 
election results, spreading information via Twitter and other online networking 
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services (Mungiu-Pippidi & Munteanu, 2009).  Although the official media 
refused to cover the protests, accounts, pictures, and videos emerged on Twitter 
and YouTube and transmitted to the international arena.  While some scholars 
question the extent of social networking sites’ involvement in the revolution, 
most agree that the Twitter had a role in broadcasting the original protest on 
April 7.  Subsequent tweets and YouTube posts acted as citizen journalism, 
covering the protests and resulting violence when the official media remained 
silent.  Protestors’ actions in Moldova reached international attention and 
informed the actions of Iranian activists just a few months later.   
Iranian demonstrators took to the streets of Tehran after election results 
named incumbent President Ahmadinejad had retained power with 60% of the 
vote despite reported irregularities on June 12, 2009 (Sreberny & Khiabanny, 
2011).   Atlantic reporter and blogger Andrew Sullivan wrote in a June 13 article, 
“You cannot stop people any longer.  You cannot control them any longer.  They 
can bypass your established media; they can broadcast to one another; they can 
organize as never before.”  News pundits and political analysts dubbed this as the 
first ‘social media revolution,’ reiterating the successes of the Obama 2008 
presidential campaign’s social media campaign.  Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, 
YouTube and other social networking and information network sites can be 
understand as a physiological charged space (Naghibi, 2011).  In the Iranian post-
election protests, Twitter acted as a tool to share information, creating a sense of 
belonging and a virtual space perceived as removed from physical violence.  
Twitter organizes information and categorizes themes using a ‘hashtag,’ for 
example Iranian diasporic activists tweeted #green to symbolize their support for 
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the protests.  By searching for the hashtag #green, Iranians could access a stream 
of tweets relaying information about the protests as they unfolded.  During the 
Arab Spring revolutions, protestors employed similar tactics.  They used Twitter 
hashtags such as #sidibouzid, #Jan25, and #Feb20 to create a sense of solidarity 
and momentum and to disseminate information about when and where 
demonstrations would be held.   
As the Iranian government attempted to cut Internet and mobile 
connections, protestors were able to tweet by sending SMS messages to the 
website.  On June 20, twenty-six year old Neda Solton was shot and killed in the 
streets of Tehran.  A cell phone video camera captured her death and posted it on 
the video hosting site YouTube; it was then shared across various media sites—
namely Facebook and Twitter.  Social networking sites (re)inscribed Solton’s 
death as a commemorative symbol for all Iranian women protesting the Iranian 
regime.  In this instance, social network sites can be seen as an enabling space 
that transforms identification and belonging to political action and thought.  
Although the appropriation of Solton’s image is problematic, its use as a symbol 
gives insight into how images of political protest can exist side by side with 
‘Foodstagrams.’  Thus, it is about the user’s interaction with the social networking 
site and the ability to move freely from one virtual site and mentality to the next. 
The commodification of Neda Solton’s image leads to a discussion of what 
role Iranian women held in the protests as well as how do social networks affect 
Iranian women and gender dynamics in Iran.  Some scholars have argued that 
everyday interaction on social networks—beyond using them for social movement 
resistance—provides a space for women to stretch the limits of Iran’s 
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authoritarian control of women (Sreberny & Khiabanny, 2011; Dabashi, 2007; 
Bayat, 2007).  Contemporary female bloggers bring private matters into the 
public domain, transgressing the virtual and physical realms.  They act out of a 
long history of Iranian women’s press, activism, and feminist movements.  Web 
2.0 allows for embodied discussions and, “the articulation of a more abstract 
‘body politics.’” (Sreberny & Khiabanny, 2010) In the post-election protests, 
virtual space directed embodied resistance to the gender politics of the regime, 
voicing a call for gender equality in addition to an election recall.  Similarly, 
Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female cyberactivists have employed digital 
technologies and social media networks to transgress offline gender divides and 
issue claims for gender parity in the new governments.   
Micro-blogging social media sites like Twitter and Facebook serve as 
gateways into other virtual networks hosted on Web 2.0.   In addition to their 
rising importance in political revolutions and protest movements, they have been 
used to advocate for gender equality throughout the world.  Although the impact 
of these technologies depends on the awareness of advocates using them, the 
political, social, and socio-economic circumstances surrounding them, and the 
existence of civil society, these technologies provide unique spaces for 
marginalized populations, such as women, to articulate and transmit oppressed 
ideas and identities.  In Latin America, women’s organizations and movements 
employ information and communication technology (ICTs) to create 
transnational networks that advocate for gender equality (Friedman, 2005).  
These gendered networks sometimes reasserted traditional societal divides along 
race, class, etc.   A closer examination of online gender activism, in Latin America, 
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Spain, etc., leads to questions of whether ICTs have liberating potential.  Does the 
Internet give rise to a ‘nomadic’ subject—capable of transcending digital divides 
and physical boundaries?   
This section has demonstrated the connection between the proliferation of 
digital technologies and cyberactivism with political and social protest 
movements worldwide.  Micro-blogging sites enable citizens to produce user-
generated content that bypasses the biased state media and government censors.  
Using mobile phones to connect to online sites, take photos, and upload videos, 
protestors can challenge the power dynamics in their country and mobilize 
protests along informal, user-generated information networks.  The following 
section argues that these technologies and their usage should be analyzed 
through a gendered perspective, asking does the internet provide liberating 
potentialities for female activists?  Or are gender divides reasserted online?  This 
thesis contends that a gendered perspective of digital activism during the Arab 
Spring revolutions elucidates how Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan women 
used digital technologies and social media networks to participate in and at times 
lead protests, inserting their marginalized bodies and voices into the public 
domain.   
    
1.3 Why Gender? “Nomadic” Subjectivity and Female 
Reverberations  
  
Feminist methodology has taught us to ask about variation, 
difference, and conflict whenever we are presented with neatly 
contained entities—and not only “man” and “woman” (Scott, 78). 
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How does Web 2.0, specifically digital technologies and social media, 
create diverse subjects?  What are the liberating potentialities of digital media 
technologies?  How can we theorize gender activism and agency in virtual spaces?  
This thesis looks at the intersection of protest movements and digital activism in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco.  It applies a gendered analysis in order to unpack 
the intricate processes in which Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female 
cyberactivists construct their subjects online.  By looking at specific instances of 
protest and resistance, this thesis seeks to understand how these women 
strategically deployed their identities through digital media technologies.  Social 
networking and digital technologies enabled Tunisian, Egyptian and Moroccan 
females to participate in political protests in new ways, operating in a virtual 
‘third space.’  Thus, this thesis examines whether these spaces ensured women’s 
safety or exposed them to violence, asking: does cyberactivsm produce new 
modalities of agency?  
Contemporary feminist scholarship finds that Arab women have 
participated in the online and political activities of Arab feminism.  Some, such as 
Sahar Khamis, argue that this prolific engagement contributes “to a new chapter 
of both Arab feminism and the region”  (2011).  Arab women use online activism 
for political engagement and resistance, challenging hegemonic and patriarchal 
norms and political oppression.  Social networking sites such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Wordpress, Blogspot, etc. have opened spaces for women to articulate 
multiple points of resistance.  Activists in Tunisia and Egypt, and Morocco 
employed cyberactivism to connect, organize, and mobilize resistance to the 
authoritarian regimes.  Female activists also used cyberactivism to respond to 
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constructed gender norms, rules, and laws in their society.  To understand how 
feminist reverberations spread online through the Arab Spring, thesis will apply 
Saba Mahmood’s reworking of Judith Butler’s performative theory.    
Employing Saba Mahmood’s theoretical reasoning in Politics of Piety, this 
thesis argues that transgressing gender norms may not only take the form of 
challenging or effecting change in the “system of gender,” (2005), but can also be 
realized by how female cyberactivists inhabit certain norms or gender roles.  
Furthermore, agency can be seen by how these subjects navigate discourses—
appropriating marginalized languages and creating new spaces for diverse forms 
of resistance to flourish.  In particular, this thesis demonstrates how Arab 
bloggers and female cyberactivists embodied resistance online during the Arab 
Spring uprisings.  It is important to note that this thesis does not negate female 
cyberactivists who performed agency through resistance to oppressive gender 
norms; rather, it argues that female cyberactivists from Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco deployed multiple modalities of agency—sometimes inhabiting 
conservative gender roles and sometimes resisting these roles.   
In applying theories of performativity, it is important to remember that 
the performance of gender is also the performance of the political.  When using 
the category of ‘Arab’ ‘woman’ and ‘Islamic’ ‘feminist,’ this thesis brings into play 
certain political theorizations, representations and power dynamics that these 
words signify.  It would be remiss not to mention postcolonial theorist Edward 
Said’s text Orientalism (1978).  Enacting a Foucauldian understanding of how 
power functions through discourse, Said reveals the historical production of 
Western representation of the Arab world.  He unpacks how stereotypical 
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caricatures of Arabs as ‘backwards, ignorant, suppressive’ became constructed as 
‘truth’ and inform scholarly work and political policy today.  In the feminist 
movement, third wave feminist critical theory problematizes the imperial 
emancipatory project of first and second wave feminism that essentialized 
women’s struggles into universal categories.  Thus, speaking of Arab women and 
Islamic feminists brings to the forefront the historical production of their 
subjectivation.  In order to have a more nuanced understanding of how the Arab 
Spring offered an opportunity to articulate new, diverse identities, this thesis 
proposes a theoretical model that does not seek to ‘give’ agency or impose an 
emancipatory narrative on their actions.  Instead, it examines the connection 
between online female activism to offline protests, looking at how they used this 
transition to embody multiple points of resistance.  Viewing internet connectivity 
through a gendered perspective and terming it “reverberations” allows this thesis 
to reveal how the unstable category ‘Arab woman’ is written online in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Morocco.     
This thesis begins in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia where the Arab Spring 
revolutions ignited on December 17, 2010.  The Tunisia chapter will introduce the 
complex historical, political, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural processes that 
influenced the Tunisian revolutions.  It will explore how a thriving cyberactivism 
community and supposedly progressive gender relations within Tunisia 
influenced how Tunisian women participated online and offline during the 
protests.  In particular, the chapter will investigate the role of bridgeblogging and 
citizen journalism, demonstrated by Tunisian cyberactivist Lina Ben Mhenni.  
From Tunisia, this thesis follows female reverberations online to Egypt in 
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January 2011 and Asmaa Mahfouz’s challenge to Egyptian men through YouTube 
and Facebook on January 18, 2011.  The Egyptian chapter is divided into three 
sections, with the bulk of the chapter devoted to in-depth narrative analyses of six 
Egyptian female cyberactivists in this chapter.  It will unpack how these women 
translated online activism to physical protests in the streets despite the presence 
of gender violence.   Finally, this thesis moves to its final country case study—
Morocco and the February 20th movement.  While the Moroccan protests did not 
achieve the same dramatic regime turnovers—King Mohammed VI remained in 
power—they demonstrate how Moroccan women mobilized online and carved out 
new spaces to protest the unequal gender relations in their country.  Moroccan 
female cyberactivists created new networks to mobilize, organize and protest 
gender issues such as sexual harassment, the women’s status in the family legal 
code (the Muduwana) and women’s participation in the government. In 
conclusion, this thesis will reflect on the rich array of female cyberactivists 
surveyed, comparing and contrasting the distinct ways female activists deployed 
digital technologies in Tunisian, Egypt, and Morocco.   
By examining a diverse range of female cyberactivists in the Arab Spring—
from Egyptian activist Mona Seif protesting and tweeting from Tahrir Square 
amidst violent confrontations with the Egyptian police from January 25 to 
February 14 2011, to the Moroccan women speaking in their native, marginalized 
languages online (Berber, Moroccan Colloquial Darija) urging Moroccans to 
protest on February 20—this thesis will unpack how women deployed diverse 
identities and articulated agency through digital technologies.  It will argue that 
female reverberations online expanded and transformed during the Arab Spring 
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protests, increasing Arab women’s participation online.  Beginning with the 
Tunisian protests in December 2010, Tunisian, Egyptian and Moroccan women 
inhabited new spaces online and offline.  This thesis will highlight how these 
women used digital technologies in the Arab Spring protests, creating new spaces 
to perform their gender in the process.  In order to do so, it is necessary to first 
step back and assess the wide range of scholarship informing my understanding 
of social movements, digital technologies and feminist critical theory.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 This literature review is broken into four sections, documenting the 
intersection of scholarship on the Arab Spring revolutions, digital technologies, 
feminist critical theory.  It will begin with an assessment of the diverse 
scholarship attempting to grasp, unpack and theorize the Arab Spring.  These 
articles range from efforts to historicize the movement and compare it to the 
European revolutions of 1848 and the post-cold war democratic transitions in 
Eastern Europe to those that claim it demarcates a ‘fourth wave’ of democracy.  
When reading these accounts, it is important to remember that the Arab Spring is 
not a single event, but a long-term process of political change affecting various 
countries and demographics in diverse ways.  Second, this review will turn to a 
survey of scholarship analyzing cyberactivism and digital media.  These works 
contextualize the role of cyberactivism and digital media, offering insights into 
their effects on the Arab Spring protests.  Third, it will discuss recent evolutions 
in feminist critical theory and scholarship.  This section outlines prominent 
feminist theories, which I will incorporate in my theoretical model.  Finally, this 
literature review will conclude with a brief summary of significant scholarship on 
female cyberactivism in the Middle East and North Africa published in the last 
two years.  Throughout, this literature review contemplates several key questions: 
How do scholars begin to understand the nature, character, and trajectory of the 
Arab Spring revolutions?  What key historical reference points should be used?  
What analytical framework should be applied?  And what political themes 
applied to these protests that can help make sense of the Arab Spring?   
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2.1 Deconstructing the ‘Arab Spring’ 
What are the underlying causes of the Arab Spring?  What economic, 
political, social, and cultural forces prompted Tunisian street vendor Mohamed 
Bouazizi to commit self-immolation?  In a 2012 article, “Why was the Arab World 
Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring,” 
Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor highlight the correlation between the Arab 
Spring protests and education and its connection with the economic environment.  
This article offers both an analysis of the causes of the Arab Spring as well as an 
attempt to understand it through comparisons with other similar episodes of 
political change. 
 The authors’ problematize the positive relationship between higher 
educational opportunities and economic opportunity, arguing that in the Middle 
East and North Africa it led to alienation and instability.  They frame the case 
study as an indicator for political instability and incumbent change at the country 
level.  Deriving data from the World Development Indicators, the authors find 
that the labor market prospects faced by skilled or educated workers in the Arab 
world appear to be especially weak.  They compare this data with results from the 
World Values Survey, linking the, “attractiveness of the labor market returns for 
the skills acquired through education,” with one’s political activities.  In 
conclusion, they find that higher education at the country level shares a positive 
relationship with individual propensity to protest activities and this relationship 
is much more likely when combined with poor labor market conditions.  Their 
economic analysis contextualizes the demographics and environment that 
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triggered the protests, providing insight into why cyber space became a popular 
medium of protest.   
At the surface level, the Arab Spring protests project a familiar narrative 
for Western readers.  Dictatorial authoritarian leaders pulled from power by the 
masses in a call for democratic reforms and rights.  However, beneath this 
common scenario, these protests have generated questions about how to 
interpret the implicit and embedded causes.  Hamid Dabashi, who holds the chair 
of Iranian studies and comparative literature at Columbia University, tackles this 
debate in his wide-ranging theoretical book The Arab Spring: The End of 
Postcolonialism.  Drawing from an extensive background in postcolonial theory 
and comparative literature, he proposes an analysis of the revolts that expands on 
Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism.  His book centers on his concern for what 
he terms the “regime of knowledge production” that has distorted our 
understanding of the world.  He believes that the youth chanting in Tahrir Square 
are calling not just for an overthrow of oppressive dictatorship, but an overthrow 
of conceptual categories, political terminology and intellectual frames of 
reference that are fundamentally Western and a byproduct of colonialism.   While 
the Arab Spring has been commonly referred to as a series of revolutions, 
Dabashi examines the extent to which this is true.  He suggests that the Arab 
Spring, “offers the idea of an ‘open-ended’ revolt” (Dabashi, 2012: 63).  This 
definition allows for a more nuanced analysis of the protests, refusing to 
historicize them as other scholars have done  
His book is less about the Arab Spring than it is a critique of existing 
intellectual paradigms and concepts.  Indeed, he uses it as a platform to attack 
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writers such as Bernard Lewis and Thomas Friedman.  He finds that the Arab 
Spring is an “open-ended” revolution with transnational potential that calls for a 
more inclusive universalism, (de)centering the world from Western and 
Eurocentric geographical thought.  Frequently incomprehensible and filled with 
unnecessary academic language, the text reads more as an enthusiastic embrace 
of revolution.  At times, the influence of Edward Said overshadows Dabashi’s own 
work and theoretical assumptions.  However, his work does provide a provoking 
framework in which to situate the Arab Spring within.   
 In contrast to Dabashi’s text, Peter Burgess and Costas Constantinou’s 
introduction to the October-November 2013 special issue of the journal Security 
Dialogue highlights the limits of liberation geography.  Their article frames the 
articles in the issue, all of which provide diverse analyses of the Arab Spring.  
Security concerns and geopolitical power dynamics inform their article, as they 
ask:  
But to what extent is this move towards an ethical recognition of 
global fragility truly experienced? Can we really say that this region 
or any subregion is no longer the middle of anybody’s East? Whose 
east? Whose strategic and postcolonial legacy is Dabashi brushing 
over with his liberation geography?  Is liberation geography just 
emancipatory or can it also be strategic? Could it not proclaim ethos 
yet serve ethnos? (Burgess & Constantinou, 2013: 369).  
 
While this approach differs from Dabashi’s, it asks a similar question: how do we 
begin to understand the geopolitical changes in the region?  For the authors, the 
Arab Spring represents a challenge to previously conceived norms and 
terminology.   
 They identify several areas wherein the Arab Spring presents a threat.  
These are Islam/Islamism, civil conflict in Syria and Libya, violence in Tahrir 
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Square and the threat of military authoritarianism in Egypt.  Their article also 
highlights the competing pressures and ethos vying for power in the protests.  For 
example, they point out the unlikely partnerships formed in the beginning of the 
protests, challenging Dabashi’s notion of a ‘collective consciousness.’  Thus, for 
the authors and the articles following their introduction, the shifting geography 
of the Middle East as a result of the Arab Spring presents a challenge of how to 
understand and react.   
 One of the articles included in this special edition of Security Dialogue 
applies a gendered framework to the Arab Spring and its aftermath.  Written by 
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, the article focuses on women protestors and 
women’s rights.  Johansson-Nogués analyzes activism through a gendered lens, 
focusing on the participation of Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan women in the 
Arab Spring uprisings.  She distinguishes between activism during the protests 
and the state of women’s rights after the protests apparent conclusion.  While 
acknowledging the role of women from different generations and socioeconomic 
circumstances in the protests, she argues that their call for equal rights have not 
been heard.  She questions the democratic nature of the revolutions in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya, citing gendered violence and a removal of women voices from 
the political transitions, and problematizes the supposed casual relation between 
democratization and greater social equity among citizens.  Working with the 
assumption that gender is socially and culturally constructed, she attributes the 
cause of gendered violence to Arab males reasserting their masculinity in the face 
of shifting gender roles.   
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Her argument locates women in the social and political transformations in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and can be read as a feminist critique of perceived 
democratic transitions in general.  By applying a gendered analysis, she shows 
that even though women were active in the initial stages of protests, gendered 
violence and harassment eventually limited their presence.  Her work within the 
gender binary reveals shifting gender roles inhabited by female protestors 
articulate a new femininity as well as an emerging masculine hegemony.  Thus 
the success of women’s rights depends on this new femininity as well as, “the 
ability of women’s collectives to organize, mobilize, and expose themselves to 
further risks” (Johansson-Nogués, 2013: 406). 
 The above articles depict some of the recent scholarship theorizing, 
historicizing, and attempting to make sense of the causes and impact of the 2011 
Arab Spring revolutions.  Combined, these articles elucidate the complex 
historical, social, political, and economic processes that shaped the revolutions.  
The subsequent section examines an array of scholarship analyzing the rise of 
digital technologies and social media networks globally.  Specifically, these 
articles look at the connection between cyberactivism and protest movements in 
the last decade.   
 
2.2 Theorizing Digital Media and Cyberactivism  
 The 2011 Arab Spring revolutions have been called the ‘social media 
revolution,’ the ‘twitter revolution,’ the ‘cyber revolution,’ etc.  While the presence 
of social media as an organizational tool and meeting place is apparent, few 
scholars have quantified and theorized the effects of cyberactivism on the Arab 
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Spring.  Through a review of contemporary scholarship on the rise of digital 
technologies in protest movements, this section asks: What modes of analysis 
should be applied to cyber protests?  How does socioeconomic status effect 
participation in digital media?  What is the role of cyberactivism in the Arab 
Spring and can comparisons be drawn to other political protests, or is the Arab 
Spring truly ‘revolutionary.’  The following paragraphs offer discursive 
approaches to cyberactivism and digital media, from quantifying twitter to 
theorizing the relationship of digital connectivity and democratic transformation.   
 Created in 2006, Twitter is an online social networking and microblogging 
service modeled off of SMS and Facebook statuses (Lee, 2013).  Members send 
“Tweets” limited to 140 characters, which their followers can then read.  Since its 
launch, Twitter has grown exponentially and members can now access it online, 
via SMS texting or on mobile apps.  It has increased the rate at which news is 
disseminated and transformed into a method of citizen journalism (Howard & 
Hussain, 2013).  Bowdoin College Sociology Professor Dhiraj Murthy examines 
the relationship of citizen journalism and Twitter in several articles.  Written in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring, “Twitter: Microphone for the Masses?” (2011) 
and “Towards a Sociological Understanding of Social Media: Theorizing Twitter” 
(2012) the articles highlight the importance of Twitter in political protests, 
acknowledge it is not fully understand and make the case for further research to 
be done.   
 In “Twitter: Microphone for the Masses?” Murthy compares Twitter with 
previous modes of communication such as the telegram.  By doing so, he 
examines how Twitter’s truncated speech shapes the way in which it is used 
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(Murthy, 2011: 780) in social movements and disasters such as the bomb blasts 
in Mumbai in November 2008.  Twitter categorizes tweets in larger themes, 
specific people and groups through the use of the hashtag (ex: #democratic) and 
tweets can be sent to people using the at-sign (ex: @HillaryClinton) (Lee, 2013).  
These tools allow any member of Twitter to disseminate information quickly, 
transforming citizens into journalists.  However, digital divides exist that prevent 
marginalized populations from benefitting from this shared information.  
Ultimately, Murthy finds that Twitter is not displacing traditional media; rather it 
supplements it (Murthy 2011, 784).  He asks the question, what constitutes 
citizen journalism? And where do we draw boundaries between professional 
journalism and citizen journalism online?   
 Murthy continues his analysis of Twitter in “Towards a Sociological 
Understanding of Social Media: Theorizing Twitter” (2012).  This article provides 
a framework of methodology and literary sources to analyze Twitter with given its 
usage in social movements in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.  Murthy applies a 
sociological approach to theorizing twitter and other emergent social media.  He 
offers a brief description of what Twitter is, distinguishing “social media” from 
“social network” and defines Twitter as a social media microblog.  After offering 
various opinions theorizing Twitter and the construction of the self, Murthy 
moves to a discussion of Twitter as democratizing.  He asks, “whether the 
medium opened up access to the production of selves by tweeting” (Murthy, 
2012: 1063) and discusses the shift of Twitter from an elite form of media to a 
more accessible one that anyone with a phone or Internet can use.  This question 
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refers back to his previous article and whether the democratizing force of Twitter 
has removed the digital divide, which he argues that it has not.  
 Murthy’s main argument examines notions of the ‘self’ and ‘democracy’ 
through modes of production and interaction.  He discusses how the processes of 
tweeting and retweeting blur the boundaries between public and private, space 
and time.  He writes that in Twitter, and an argument can be made for all virtual 
spaces, actors meet in time rather than place (Murthy, 2012: 1068).  Therefore, 
microblogging sites such as Twitter can transcend certain boundaries, such as 
nationalities, cultures, etc. and create an online collective consciousness.  
Murthy’s work offers a framework for further research into the role of social 
media, as well as social networks, in political, social and economic transitions.     
Although political activists used social media and social networks 
extensively before, during, and after the Arab Spring protests, the websites’ 
design and governance often challenged activists.  Communications scholars 
William Lafi Youmans and Jillian C. York highlight the tensions between activists’ 
sociopolitical use of social media and the commercial interests of the site owners 
in “Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests, 
the Information Infrastructure of Modern Social Movements” (2012).  They write 
that, while social media proves the tools for organized dissent, it also constrains 
collective action (Youmans & York, 2012: 316).  In other words, “Code is Law” 
(Lessig, 1999).  Through code, companies both permit and forbid the 
application’s functions (Youmans & York, 2012: 316).   The authors argue that 
how companies structure their code, evolving policies, functionalities and user 
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guidelines affects which social media activists employ, using the Arab Spring as 
an example.  
Egyptian citizens reacted with overwhelming outrage after activist Khaled 
Said was beat to death by Egyptian police after uploading a video that implicated 
the officers who murdered him in a drug deal on June 6, 2010.  This reaction 
demonstrates the tensions between activists, companies, and government actors 
(Youmans & York, 2012: 318).  The “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page 
made Khaled Said an Egyptian martyr.  Former Google executive, Wael Ghonim 
who created it under the pseudonym ‘ElShaheed’, administered the account. 
Youman and York point out how the account was deactivated in November 2010 
because it violated Facebook’s prohibition of the use of pseudonyms (Youmans & 
York, 2012: 318).  However, Egyptian political activists disagreed with this move, 
saying anonymous accounts should be protected (Youmans & York, 2012: 318).  
Anonymity in social action is key point of tension between activists, companies 
and the government.  Tunisian and Egyptian governments both attempted to shut 
down the wireless Internet services and censor online activism in order to 
prevent the protests from escalating (Howard & Hussain, 2013).   
Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain of The Project on 
Information Technology and Political Islam pursue the tensions and effects of 
online activism in Democracy’s Fourth Wave: Digital Media and the Arab 
Spring (2013).  Their research addresses the casual relationship between digital 
connectivity, access to information infrastructure and democratic transformation, 
comparing data from Egypt and Tunisia prior to and during the protests, 
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examining indicators of digital civic engagement and activism in relation to 
physical protests.   
The authors approach the question of democratic reform from its 
intersection with digital media, responding to the assumption that Internet 
freedom indicates higher levels of democracy (Schmidt & Cohen, 2013).  
Therefore, while the Arab Spring is the subject of analysis, their research seeks to 
make broader statements on the usage and effect of digital media, arguing for the 
causal relationship between digital media and democracy.  While other countries 
in the region experienced digital protests and various forms of cyberactivism, the 
authors highlight Tunisia and Egypt because of their ‘wired population’ (Howard 
& Hussain, 2013).  Both Tunisia and Egypt have a history of media usage, which 
is enabled by the widespread accessibility of mobile phones.  Howard and 
Hussain argue that the Arab Spring protests resulted from technological 
proliferation in the area as more citizens are sharing information, exchanging 
SMS text messages, photos, etc. that spread awareness of injustices. 
Technological diffusion built up a cyber civil society, forming public and civic 
awareness that they contend is independent of any particular state authority.  
However, digital divides exist that problematize the notion of Internet freedom 
and online activism as an ‘equalizer’ (Murthy, 2012).   
 Online activism differs from conventional activism by creating a ‘third 
space’ (Newsom & Lengel, 2012) wherein actors from diverse backgrounds can 
interact and connect.  Furthermore, it acts as a space somewhat removed from 
the threat of physical violence.  These spaces offer an opportunity to analyze how 
gendered discourse shifts when the physical body seems removed.  Two articles 
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published in recent years explore how gender inhabits online spaces.  German 
sociologist Tanja Carstensen examines gender relations in social networking sites 
in her article, “Gender Trouble in Web 2.0: Gender Relations in Social Network 
Sites, Wikis and Weblogs” (2009).  Her studies focus on the presentation of social 
networking sites, how their construction undermines or reasserts a gender binary.  
Victoria Newsom, professor of Communications at Olympic College, and Lara 
Lengel, professor of Communication studies at Bowling Green State University, 
build from Carstensen’s work in their article “Arab women, social media, and the 
Arab spring: applying the framework of digital reflexivity to analyze gender and 
online activism” (2012).  The authors apply gender theories to analyze online 
activism as a third space, locating the presence of Arab women activists online in 
the Arab Spring.  
Carstensen investigates the actions of feminist activist using the gendered 
design and use of Web 2.0 as well as the discourses and interventions that Web 
2.0 as points of analysis (Carstensen, 2009: 106).  Employing the notions that 
gender and technology are socially constructed, she argues that they are mutually 
constitutive and construct each other.  She bases this claim by contextualizing the 
evolution of gender theory and Web 2.0, writing that, “[these changes] in 
technology, politics and equality have led to changed conditions for those 
interested in feminist politics” (Carstensen, 2009: 111).  In addition, she gives 
examples of how social networks, wikis and weblogs both reinforce and challenge 
the gender binary.  Popular social networking sites such as LastFM and MySpace 
require male or female gender designations before a member can sign up, forcing 
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a member to abide by gender heteronormativity.  In contrast, queer activists and 
feminists use personal weblogs to construct multiple identities. 
While Carstensen states her purpose is to search for how she searches for 
how social networks, wikis and weblogs present or inhibit agency, her article 
seems to focus more on how Web 2.0 constructs gender.  In particular, she 
examines purported differences between offline gendered bodies and online 
gendered bodies, finding that social networking sites often reinforce gender 
norms and stereotypes.  She introduces the discourse of self-reflection and self-
presentation, but does offer analysis of this discourse.  Newsom and Lengel take 
this topic of analysis further in their essay “Arab women, social media, and the 
Arab spring: applying the framework of digital reflexivity to analyze gender and 
online activism” (2012).     
  The authors apply a schema of what they term digital reflexivity to 
analyze activist engagement and citizen journalism conveys information.  In 
particular, they analyze how various actors consume information through 
multiple stages of transmission and dissemination (Newsom & Lengel, 2012: 31).  
Their research addresses the perceived absence of a ‘gendered revolution’ during 
the Arab Spring as well as the media’s portrayal of online activism. Their article 
reads as an outline for future works, outlining a framework that reveals how 
information flows from local sources to, “global institutions and power brokers 
that act as gatekeepers of information flow”(Newsom & Lengel, 2012: 33). 
However, the theoretical framework of their work creates a space to research the 
intersection of gender, online activism, and the dissemination of power.   
Newsom and Lengel question the ability of online feminist activist spaces to 
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provide voices for marginalized persons, asking whether they re-create digital, 
gender and political divides (Newsom & Lengel, 2012: 32).  They conduct their 
research from the assumption that information and information flow is gendered.  
This approach to theorizing digital media and online activism looks at whether 
digital media bridges divides, creating a ‘social media revolution’ or if it 
reinforces existing power paradigms.  Newsom and Lengel highlight the 
importance of gendering cyberactivism and the Arab Spring revolutions, which 
the subsequent two sections will explore in greater depth.   
 
2.3 Feminist Critical Theory and Performative Actions 
 The following paragraphs surveys notable scholarship on feminist critical 
theory, from landmark texts analyzing the intersection of Western feminism and 
neocolonialism to more contemporary works that pursue different modalities of 
agency for women.  Several feminist scholars and activist have challenged the 
Arab Spring’s impact on promoting women’s rights and gender equality in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Newsom and Lengel, 2012).  They cite as evidence 
street harassment and sexual assault of women protestors and the absence of 
women participating in the political transformations.  In response, the purpose of 
this section is to examine feminist theories on gender relations and performative 
action, using them to contextualize women’s participation in the Arab Spring.  
Specifically, these articles consider questions of agency, noting that transnational 
and feminist scholars must analyze their role in contributing to essentialism to 
have a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the Arab Spring on Arab 
women (Newsom, Cassara, & Lengel, 2011).  Chandra Mohanty addresses the role 
 39
of imperialism of Western feminist thought in her now classic generative text 
“Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses” (1984).   
Mohanty critiques the political project of Western feminism and its 
construction of a hegemonic ‘Third World woman’ in the essay.  She argues that 
feminist scholarship (reading, writing, critical or textual) is inscribed in relations 
of power, “—relations which they counter, resist, or even implicitly support” 
(334).  Her work draws from Michel Foucault’s theories on power and sexuality, 
outlined in The History of Sexuality Volume I (1976).  She writes:  
This mode of defining women primarily in terms of their object 
status (the way in which they are affected or not affected by certain 
institutions and systems) is what characterizes this particular form 
of the use of “women” as a category of analysis (338).  
 
Since Mohanty published this article, feminist scholarship has shifted to 
acknowledge the existence of these reductive, hegemonic categories.  However, 
many in the public sector and media have not followed suit.  For example, within 
the humanitarian and non-governmental organization sectors, the ‘Third World 
woman’ still exists.  In recent years Western powers such as the United States 
have appropriated feminist discourse, using ‘the role of women’ to justify military 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
  Michel Foucault articulated revolutionary theories of sexuality and power 
relations in The History of Sexuality: an Introduction (1976).  In it, he argued 
that the subject is discursively constructed through social practices and 
problematizes the assumption that power exists only in a oppressor/oppressed 
hierarchy (Foucault, 1976).  Feminist theorists have since taken his theories and 
applied them to a diverse array of issues.  Judith Butler, renowned sociologist 
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and Foucauldian scholar reworks Foucault to interrogate the gender binary and 
pursue the processes of biopower and performance theory, arguing gender is 
something that is performed and thus constructed (Butler, 1990).  Recently, Saba 
Mahmood and Allison Weir have engaged Foucault’s and Butler’s work, applying 
their theories to a study of Islamic women’s piety.  Their writings further 
problematize Foucault’s paradox of subjectivation, wherein the subject’s capacity 
to action is enabled and created by specific relations of subordination (Foucault, 
1976; Mahmood, 2005; Weir, 2013).  They explore different modalities of agency, 
unhinging it from an oppressor/oppressed hierarchy.   
Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2005) by 
Saba Mahmood unpacks the motives and practices of Egyptian women 
participating in the mosque or piety movement.7  In the beginning of the text, she 
reflects on the contentious role the piety movement holds in feminist scholarship, 
a position she also held before beginning her research. Islamic women and the 
piety movement has been termed fundamentalist, conservative, and reactionary 
and associated with the subjugation of women.  However, as her writings 
demonstrate, normative liberal assumptions of human nature, in particular the 
unquestioned ideal of individual freedom, must be interrogated and questioned 
when applied to questions of religious and cultural difference.  Engaging 
Foucault’s anaysis of ethical formation and Butler’s work on performance theory, 
she looks at how women in the mosque movement inhabit norms and practices.  
While acknowledging that a lens of resistance to norms can be applied to the 
                                                        
7 Mahmood states the mosque or piety movement is part of the larger Islamic Revival or Islamic 
Awakening that began after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and has swept the Muslim world.  It is 
characterized by Islamic women’s revival of Islamic studies and pious practices, either in a 
mosque or at home.   
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mosque movement, she argues that such a reading is reductive.  Her 
ethnographic interviews demonstrated how women negotiated competing norms 
in their piety, navigating male opposition to their movement and their desire to 
be active in their participation in Islamic studies.  Mahmood’s text lays out a new 
way of approaching agency in assumed marginalized subjects.  Her work provides 
insight into how to study female subjects who adhere to patriarchal norms 
without assuming their freedom is restrained or that they can only exhibit agency 
by resisting these norms.  In particular, this ethnographic and philosophical 
study offers a framework for analyzing agency in terms of the different ways it 
manifests and the conceptual language it employs.      
 Responding to Politics of Piety, Allison Weir critiques Mahmood’s claim 
that feminist scholarship needs to question the ideal of freedom (2013).  A social 
and political philosophy at the University of Western Sydney, Weir’s work focuses 
on the intersection of gender, sexuality, class, ethnicity and religion in the 
development of individual and collective identities and the relation of identity to 
agency, freedom, power and solidarity.  Her article, “Feminism and the Islamic 
Revival: Freedom as a Practice of Belonging” (2013), explores various 
conceptions of freedom, using the framework Mahmood applies to theorize on 
different modalities of agency. She critiques Mahmood for looking at only one 
type of relation: the relation of the self.  In contrast, she argues that the “the 
analytical framework of relation to the self must be supplemented with an 
analytical framework of other kinds of relations, in this case in particular a 
relationship to God” (2013: 328).  Thus, for Weir, freedom can be found in 
submission to God or when experiencing the sacred.  She also examines positive 
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freedom, communitarian freedom, and what she terms a feminist reconception of 
freedom.  Combined, Weir’s and Mahmood’s work challenge existing paradigms 
of liberal-secular thought, arguing for a more diverse and nuanced application of 
feminist critical theory in order to understand the question of the subject’s 
construction posed by Foucault in 1976.   
 Turning from the theoretical writings of feminist scholars, I now look at 
Moroccan sociologist and feminist Zakia Salime’s recent works.  Salime’s work 
examines the feminist movement in Morocco, analyzing its political, social and 
religious influences and its role in the Arab Spring protests.  “The War on 
Terrorism: Appropriation and Subversion by Moroccan Women” (2007) draws 
correlations between Moroccan feminist discourse and neoliberal discourse.  
Using the 2003 Casablanca bombings by an Islamic terrorist group al-Salafiya al-
Jihadiya, she demonstrates that feminist organizations (both liberal-secular and 
Islamist) appropriated the neoliberal agenda to advocate for women’s rights and 
greater equality in the Muduwana, the Moroccan family legal code.  Interestingly, 
Islamist women, rather than liberal-secular groups, faced greater hostility and 
government resistance after the attacks.  They had to fight to prove their 
moderation and religious authority as a defense against Islamic extremism.  This 
article shows an active feminist movement in Morocco, that has influence in 
Morocco’s political, religious and social processes.  
 Salime demonstrates the Moroccan feminist movement’s influence further 
in her article, “A new feminism? Gender dynamics in Morocco’s February 20th 
movement” (2012).  Salime utilizes Butler’s theory of performing gender to argue 
that gender equality demands in Morocco’s February 20th movement exist in the 
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virtual and bodily presence of women at all levels of mobilization and 
organization.  Although feminist organizations were not at the forefront of the 
movement, Salime states that the movement appropriated feminist discourse.  
She cites the equal participation of women and men in the movement articulate a 
new feminism, one that moves out of feminism as a strictly female project.  Her 
analysis of gender demographics in Morocco’s Arab Spring give rise to questions 
of comparison with the movements in other countries.  How does Morocco’s 
movement differ from others?  Do other movements exhibit similar feminist 
thought?  This article provides a framework for similar studies to be applied 
throughout the Arab Spring. 
 The above paragraphs have surveyed recent scholarship analyzing the 
Arab Spring, contemporary works theorizing the rise of digital media 
technologies in protest movements, and questions of agency and subjectivation in 
feminist critical theory.  In conclusion, the final section of this literature review 
will present three authors who have published articles at the intersection of these 
three fields: Courtney Radsch, Sahar Khamis, and Aimy Aisen Kallander.   
 
2.4 Gendering the Arab Spring: Digital technologies and 
female activism  
 This brief section reviews three select authors who have produced or are 
currently producing articles exploring the presence of female cyberactivists in the 
2011 Arab Spring revolutions and the role of Arab women online.  These 
demonstrate the different perspectives and dominant trends a gendered lens to 
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cyberactivism in the Arab Spring reveals.  Courtney Radsch8 and Sahar Khamis 
have published several articles since 2011 reflecting and theorizing on the role of 
female cyberactivists in the Arab Spring.  Their work covers the entire MENA 
region and relies on data collected leading up to and during the protests from 
December 2010 to late 2011.  A doctoral candidate at American University, 
Courtney Radsch argues that women mapped new territories for blogging and 
online activism during the protests.  In an article for Muftah, an open source 
journal online, Radsch notes that digital media technologies empowered women, 
enabling more women to engage in cyberactivism (December 2013).  Her article 
focuses on the actions of female cyberactivists throughout the MENA region, 
brining in cyberactivists from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as well as the Middle 
East.  Another recent article published jointly by Sahar Khamis and Courtney 
Radsch, “In Their Own Voice: Technologically Mediated Empowerment and 
Transformation Among Young Arab Women" expands Radsch’s argument in her 
December 2013 Muftah article.  The authors use in-depth interviews with female 
cyberactivists to posit that these women used social media to express themselves 
freely and enact new forms of agency and empowerment (2013).   
 In opposition to Radsch and Khamis, Amy Aisen Kallander argues that 
scholars need to reconsider the implications of cyberactivism in the Arab Spring 
protests (2013).  Kallendar interrogates the role blogs had during the protests 
and problematizes their reach.  Her article focuses on the role of what she terms 
“tech-savvy, middle- and upper-class, bilingual professionals” bloggers in Tunisia 
                                                        
8 Radsch is currently writing her dissertation on the topic of female cyberactivists in the Arab 
Spring, an excerpt of which she presented at a 2012 conference, “Unveiling the Revolutionaries: 
Cyberactivism and the Role of Women in the Arab Uprisings.”  
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and their effect on the Tunisian uprisings from December 2010 to February 2011.  
Kallander challenges Radsch’s and Khamis’ understanding of the impact of 
digital technologies in the protests, contending that, “an in-depth examination of 
the Tunisian case supports the skeptical position of the limitations of online 
activism” (2013).  The diverse positions of Kallander, Radsch, and Khamis reflect 
the confusion that still surrounds theorizing the connection between digital 
activism and protest movements.  How do we measure the impact of digital 
activism on physical protests?  What is the relationship between social media and 
social networking sites and revolutionary events?  Do digital technologies 
empower women (and all marginalized peoples) or reassert unequal gender 
binaries?  This thesis shares similarities with Radsch’s and Khamis’ arguments, 
refuting Kallander’s main points.  However, it is important to note that this thesis 
does not purport to claim that digital technologies and female cyberactivists 
caused the revolutions; rather, it seeks to understand how the political uprisings 
in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco created new networks of female activists and 
enabled women to translate online activism to offline protests.   
This thesis operates at the intersection of the vast array of scholarship on 
the Arab Spring revolutions, digital media technologies and social media, and 
feminist critical theory presented above.  It applies a gendered lens to the 2011 
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, examining how female activists 
deployed digital technologies to claim greater agency during the protests.  The 
following chapter will present the qualitative research methods that were 
employed throughout the course of this thesis and the process of discerning and 
analyzing examples of Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female cyberactivism.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
This thesis examined a subset of female cyberactivists in the Arab Spring 
from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, defining cyberactivists as those who 
participate online in order to organize, document or participate in political 
protests and social movements.  It focused on female cyberactivists because of 
the discrepancy between their marginalization in the streets and growing 
participation online the Middle East and North Africa.  A gendered analysis of 
activism allowed for a more nuanced understanding of the impact of digital 
media in the protests as well as how female participation in cyberactivism reflects 
or subverts existing gender binaries in these countries.  After performing initial 
research on female participation in the Arab Spring, I narrowed down my 
subjects to cyberactivists from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.  Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Morocco lead the Middle East and North Africa region in internet usage and 
growth.  Furthermore, these countries have a lengthy history of political feminist 
activism and share demographic similarities due to their geographic local and 
previous colonial histories.  Thus, this study is also comparative, examining the 
different ways in which female cyberactivists participated online, what identities 
they articulated, and what role they played in the protests.   
Throughout, this thesis investigated how self-identified female 
cyberactivists used digital technologies to carve out new public spaces to inhabit.  
Therefore, when conducting my initial research, I chose bloggers and 
cyberactivists who specified the female gender, either by their name or in their 
biographic information.  This gender identity was further performed in the 
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subject matter (women’s rights, gender violence) or through the use of gendered 
language.  I used a gendered subset of female activists in order to examine how 
they used the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco to occupy online and 
physical space, challenging the implicit division of public and private space in 
their Islamic Arab countries.  It is important to note that female activists online 
may not be the gender they perform online—and the same for male bloggers.  The 
internet has provided spaces for male and female genders to perform or 
masquerade as the other gender.  The (mis)representation of gender online does 
not affect this thesis because it focuses on why activists identify as female, when 
they do so, and what impact their gender performance carries.   
The research for this thesis began in the summer of 2013, prompted by my 
study abroad experiences in Morocco and the Egyptian protests against President 
Morsi.  Initial research included reading online news articles and scholarly 
articles on the Arab Spring protests.  From these sources, I expanded and began 
researching online for examples of female cyberactivists in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco.   These three countries lead the MENA region in internet usage and 
online development and share certain demographic similarities due to their 
geographic location and previous colonial histories.  In order to find prominent 
female cyberactivists, I first cast a wide net, surveying over a hundred bloggers 
and activists from those countries.  After collecting this data, I used a connective 
process to find highly trafficked and influential female cyberactivists, searching 
prominent bloggers’ ‘blogroll’ ( a list of blogs they follow usually posted in a small 
column on their main page).  In addition, I looked at which bloggers and activists 
garnered international or national media attention, as that indicated their online 
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relevancy.  By the end of November, I had compiled an extensive list of female 
cyberactivists—60 from Egypt, 30 from Morocco and 50 from Tunisia.   
After composing this list, I narrowed down my subjects to prominent 
female subjects from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.  These female cyberactivists 
blogged in Arabic, English, and French, which presented some obstacles that I 
will discuss in greater detail later on in this methodology.  I performed a 
subjective selection of activists, choosing female cyberactivists who had influence 
online (numbering thousands of followers or featured in international and 
national news articles).  The number of followers a blog had, the number of 
comments on their posts, and the activists’ inhabitation of multiple media 
platforms determines high connectivity9 or reverberations.  Often, I worked 
backwards from prominent bloggers to find more obscure, but still important, 
female activists.  Thus, for example, from Tunisian blogger Aya Chebbi’s list of 
followers as well as her blogroll (blogs she follows online), I was able to find other 
Tunisian female bloggers and activists.  I found a disproportionate amount of 
active users in each country.  Egypt contained by far the most female bloggers 
and was the most connected country, with Tunisia and Morocco averaging about 
the same amount of bloggers.  This disproportion may be attributed to Egypt’s 
large population in comparison to Tunisia and Morocco.  Egypt and Tunisia had 
more influential bloggers than Morocco.  For example, Lina Ben Mhenni was 
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for her coverage of the Tunisian protests in 
Arabic, English and French on her blog A Tunisian Girl.  Morocco’s female 
                                                        
9 Internet connectivity is defined as the process of sharing information and interacting with 
others online.   
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cyberactivists preferred Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to mobilize other 
Moroccan citizens during the February 20th movement.   
 Originally, I had planned on accessing Twitter archives from prominent 
activists to quantify how often they tweeted about subjects such as 
#womensrights or #sidibouzid.  I was unable to access the archives due to a 
change in Twitter open access policy as well as lack of computer software to 
process mass quantities of data.  Due to these challenges, I decided to focus on 20 
Egyptian female bloggers, 15 Tunisian female activists, and 10 Moroccan women 
involved in the 20th February movement, analyzing their gender performance and 
activism online.  This analysis is informed by reports conducted before and after 
the Arab Spring, which measured the internet presence in Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Egypt.  I primarily used the Dubai School of Government’s Governance and 
Innovation Program 2013 Arab Social Media Report, Freedom House’s 2008 and 
2012 country profiles, and Howard and Hussain’s research on digital activism 
during the Arab Spring revolutions from November 2010 to May 2011.  I believe 
it is important to contextualize my qualitative analysis of these blogs within 
recent social movements and cyberactivism in these three countries.  In this way, 
I am able to determine whether the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Morocco opened a space for more female activists to protest online or offline, or if 
these networks existed prior to the protests.   A complete list of the blogs I used in 
my analysis is attached in an addendum, including demographic information 
retrieved from their “about” pages.    
I analyzed these female cyberactivists based on the narratives they tell and 
the venues through which they tell their narratives. The samples I took for my 
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analysis stretch from December 2010 to December 201110, but I chose to focus on 
the height of the protests from December 17, 2010 to March 2011.  I included 
blogs that mention the protests as well as blogs that discuss gender rights or 
reflected identity politics. I coded these blogs using several categories, looking at 
how the bloggers self-identify, what their language reveals about their actions 
and identities, what online media they engage in, the extent of their influence and 
reverberations.  From this categorical analysis and demographic information, I 
moved to close readings of several influential bloggers from each country.  As I 
wrote in my introduction, each chapter structure in this thesis reflects the 
particular political events and gender relations for each country subset.  For 
example, in the Egyptian I discussed gender violence at length because this was a 
topic many female cyberactivists ‘tagged’ or posted about in their blogs.   
 
3.1 Categories of Analysis:  
 This thesis analyzed Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female 
cyberactivists using two different frameworks: connectivity and gender 
performance online.  Connectivity measures the female cybeactivists’ influence 
online as well as the function of their blog—whether it was used for citizen 
journalism, political activism, personal reflections, or for all.  When examining 
their gender performance, I looked first at how often they discuss or post about 
gendered issues.  Then, I noted what language they articulated their message and 
identities with.  For example, many Egyptian women employed gendered 
                                                        
10 This date does not indicate the end of the revolutions and protests movements as protests 
continue to this day.  I chose December 2011 as a loose end date to narrow my data collection and 
focus on the actions of feminist activists during the first months of civil unrest.  
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language to indicate their right to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square 
whereas Tunisian women did not as they were already confident in their right to 
protest in the streets.  I determined which categories of analysis to use after 
researching prominent hashtags used to group information, connecting the 
female cyberactivists posts to topics trending on Twitter and Facebook at the time 
of the Arab Spring revolutions.  Theme categorization differed across country.  
Therefore, I used the categories below to conduct an initial analysis of Egyptian, 
Tunisian, and Morocco blogs and followed up with a country-specific analysis.     
• Reasons for blogging 
• Online and offline—gender performance  
• Gender Identity 
• Gendered issues:  
• Connectivity and female reverberations online 
• Political issues/demands 
• Tactics 
 
A detailed breakdown of this research and organization of these female 
cyberactivists is included in Appendixes A and B.  Table A documents the first 
level of categorizations, organizing female cyberactivists according to nationality, 
language, political activity, etc.  Table B documents the second level of 
categorizations and the themes used for the final analysis.   
 
3.2 A note on translation:  
Female cyberactivists have employed several languages in their online 
activity, including Arabic colloquial dialects, Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), 
French and English.  One Tunisian activist also wrote posts in German.  Their 
choice of language revealed what socio-economic position they held and their 
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level of education achieved.  In addition, language often dictated who their 
primary audience was (international or local) and the purpose of their blog.  In 
general, I found that seasoned female cyberactivists wrote in multiple languages, 
often posting the same article in Arabic and English or French or having an 
English language blog and an Arabic language blog.  Similarly, activists tweeted 
and posted on Facebook in several languages.  They switched between MSA, 
colloquial, French and English.  When documenting abuses or performing citizen 
journalism, many chose to use French and English in order to appeal to 
international audiences and hold the government accountable.  They iterated 
expressions of national identity, which peaked when the Tunisian president and 
Egyptian president stepped down, in their colloquial dialect.  In Morocco, female 
cyberactivists used colloquial dialects and Berber to protest the regime and 
subvert the patriarchal authority of French and MSA.   
French, English, Modern Standard Arabic, and Tunisian, Egyptian, and 
Moroccan colloquial Arabic language blogs are included in this data subset.  It 
was important to use both English and Arabic blogs in order to reflect the diverse 
range of blogs female cyberactivists kept.  As a fourth year student of Arabic, I 
have a working proficiency of reading and translating this language.  I gained 
practice translating Arabic last semester in Professor Brett Wilson’s Arabic and 
Translation class and am continuing to study the language this semester.   When 
I could not translate colloquial Arabic dialects, I sought help from native Arabic 
speakers.  Tunisian and Moroccan female cyberactivists posed some challenges to 
translation as they often posted in French and Arabic.  When encountering this 
difficulty, I employed the online translation and dictionary tools Google Translate 
 54
and Wordrefernce to determine what blog posts I wished to translate.  Once I 
gained a rudimentary understanding of the post, I advertised for advanced 
French language speakers from the French department.  However, this subset of 
female cyberactivists is largely limited to Arabic and English speakers, as I could 
conduct a more informed analysis using those languages.  Due to technological 
constraints, I was unable to include Arabic text in this thesis. Microsoft Office for 
Mac does not support right to left languages, so it is almost impossible to type in 
Arabic in Microsoft Word on Apple computers.  Therefore, I tried to include 
transliterations of Arabic words and phrases in the text in addition to the English 
translations.  
The previous three chapters have established the theoretical framework of 
this thesis, its position in the contemporary scholarship on feminist theory, 
protest movements, and digital activism, and the qualitative research methods it 
has employed.  In four chapters that remain, this thesis will analyze examples of 
female cyberactivism and online protest movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Morocco during the Arab Spring revolutions beginning on December 17, 2010.  
These chapters will explore how female activists embodied resistance online, 
comparing and contrasting the diverse ways Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan 
female activists used digital technologies.  Throughout, this thesis will contend 
that digital technologies and social media facilitated the emergence of new 
networks of female activists online and enabled female activists to carve out new 
spaces to articulate agency and issue demands for gender parity during the Arab 
Spring protests.     
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Chapter 4: The Tunisian Dignity Revolution 
 
 
 
“Sidi Bouzid is burning,” Tunisian female cyberactivist Lina Ben Mhenni 
tweeted and posted on her blog A Tunisian Girl December 19, 2010.  Her blog 
post, written in French and English, accompanied a screenshot of the viral video 
documenting Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation two 
days prior.  She concluded the post with a premonition for the days to come: 
“Faced with a government indifferent to the sufferings of the citizens, the various 
components of the civil society and the country’s elites should act.  Talking about 
the matter for a few days is not enough.”11  Tunisian citizens, men and women of 
all ages, answered her call to protest, proclaiming that they would no longer 
suffer degradation from the government.  Bouazizi’s frustration and humiliation 
reflected the grievances many Tunisians felt and their anger with President Ben 
Ali’s government.  Following Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, protests 
                                                        
11 “Sidi Bouzid is burning.” A Tunisian Girl. 19 December 2010. Web. Accessed 15 November 2013. 
<http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.com/> 
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spread throughout Tunisia calling for the return of Tunisian dignity.  They 
demanded basic human rights and dignity; thus, the revolution was self-named 
the Tunisian Dignity Revolution.  On January 14, 2014, Tunisian President Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country after more than two decades of authoritarian 
governance.   His departure seemed to indicate that the protests—offline and 
online—had achieved their goals and reclaimed dignity and agency for the 
Tunisian people.  Thus, this chapter asks: what role did cyberactivism play in the 
Tunisian revolutions?  How did female activists use digital technologies?  And, 
did the usage of digital technologies enable Tunisian women to participate in the 
online and offline protests in new ways and in new spaces?   
Lina Ben Mhenni illustrates the instrumental role female cyber activists 
held in the Tunisian Dignity Revolution12  (also known as the Jasmine 
Revolution).  Writing under her own name, Mhenni spent the weeks following 
Mohamed Bouazizi’s immolation participating in and documenting the protests 
on her blog A Tunisian Girl.  Using Twitter hashtags such as #sidibouzid and 
#dignity and #revolution, she connected with Tunisian activists and extended to 
an international audience.  Mhenni used multiple platforms to disseminate her 
message, with over 80,000 followers on her Facebook page and 40,000 followers 
on Twitter.  In many ways, Ben Mhenni acted as the spokesperson of the Tunisian 
revolution, connecting cyber activists with international journalists and 
protestors on the ground.  She ensured that the government and state media 
could not censor the events occurring within Tunisia.  Bloggers from Egypt, 
                                                        
12 Reflecting the wishes of Tunisian female bloggers and activists I interviewed, I will refer to the 
Tunisian protests as the Dignity Revolution in this chapter.   
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Bahrain, Yemen and Libya followed her posts, taking notes on the tactics she 
used and the descriptions of the protests.  Egyptian activists responded with 
solidarity protests in Cairo and Alexandria (Egyptian Chronicles, January 2011).  
Many tweeted back at her or responded to her posts with the #SidiBouzid and 
#Tunisie or #Tunisia.  Lina Ben Mhenni is one of the many examples of the many 
Tunisian female cyber activists who participated in the Tunisian Dignity 
Revolution from December 17, 2010 until a new government and constitution was 
formed in February 2011.  Their protests online translated into offline activism 
and carved new public spheres for women to inhabit.  
This chapter introduces my first country case study, focusing on the role of 
Tunisian female cyber activists from November 2010 to May 2011.  It reflects the 
specific events that occurred and the roles and identities women alternately 
inhabited and deployed in the Tunisia Dignity Revolution, differentiating these 
protests from those that occurred in Egypt and Morocco.  In response to the 
questions asked above, this chapter contends that Tunisian female activists used 
digital technologies to document the protests, mobilize activists, and build from 
existing cyber and feminist movements to create new networks of female activists 
online.   This chapter is divided into three sections: Digital Activism in Tunisia, 
Gender Relations Offline and Online, and Tunisian Female Cyberactivists.  The 
first two sections inform and enrich my discussion of Tunisian female cyber 
activists in the final section, connecting their actions to the historical, political, 
cultural, and religious discourses within Tunisia.  I begin by establishing a brief 
overview of Tunisian women’s presence online before December 2010 and gender 
relations within Tunisia.  Then, I locate the Tunisian feminist movement 
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historically and in the present day, connecting Tunisian feminism with the 
participation of Tunisian females online.  Finally, I move to a close reading of 
several female cyberactivists, among them Lina Ben Mehnni.  I examine how 
Tunisian female cyberactivists translated online activism into physical protests, 
inhabiting new public spheres during the revolution.  In particular, I look at how 
they differed from or compared to female cyberactivism in Egypt and Morocco.  
By situating female activism within the larger context of Tunisian gender 
relations and the Tunisian feminist movement, I hope to understand how their 
actions reflected or subverted Tunisian gender norms and whether or not the 
dignity revolution created a new space for women’s voices and performance of 
agency.  Within the context of this thesis, Tunisian female cyberactivists illustrate 
the diverse ways female activists deployed digital technologies, show how the 
constructed gender binary manifested online, and introduce the importance of 
blogging and tweeting in French, English, Modern Standard Arabic and 
colloquial Arabic to speak to a multilingual, international audience.  Furthermore, 
Tunisian female cyberactivists documented and disseminated Tunisian’s 
revolution, influencing the ways Egyptian and Moroccan activists used digital 
technologies to protest.   
 
4.1 “Hacktivism”: Digital Activism in Tunisia 
 
In the past decade, digital media technology and social networking sites 
have infiltrated everyday Tunisian life.  While digital divides continue to exist, 
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separating disconnected rural areas13 from internet hubs in the urban centers, 
mobile phones have begun to bridge this communication gap in the last decade.  
In 2010, 33.9% of Tunisia’s population possessed internet access, which ranks 
higher than the world average of 30.2% and the Middle East average of 31.7%.14  
The most recent internet data survey in 2012 estimated that 39.1% of the 
Tunisian population is online, indicating a rapidly growing internet population.  
Social media and social networking sites in Tunisia remain the most popular 
websites despite persistent government censorship.  At the time of the protests in 
late December 2010, an estimated 18% of Tunisian’s population had Facebook 
accounts.  Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain collected data during the 
protests with The Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, 
utilizing the Twitter archiving service TwapperKeeper to capture tweets from the 
Twitter Search API (2013).  The data Hussein and Howard collected provides an 
image of Tunisian participation online preceding and during the protests.  Their 
focus on tweets rather than twitter users allowed them to follow the connective 
flow or reverberation of information across country borders.  They analyzed more 
than 3 million tweets with the hashtags #Tunisia, #sidibouzid, and #egypt.  This 
data documented the location as well as the participants tweeting.  They 
determined that the metropolitan cities of Tunis and al-Hammah transformed 
into blog and twitter hubs during the protests—i.e. most Tunisians tweeted and 
logged online from those cities.  From these results, Howard and Hussain have 
                                                        
13 It should be noted that Tunisia is considerably smaller in size than Egypt and Morocco. Thus, 
the population is concentrated in urban centers and smaller discrepancies separate the urban and 
rural areas.   
14 Internet World Stats: Tunisia. Minwatts Publishing Group: 2012.  Web. Accessed December 18 
2013. <http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm#tn> 
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concurred that Tunisia’s revolution was ‘cognitive liberation’—in other words, 
that Tunisian digital communication networks were beyond state control.   
In addition to the social networking sites Facebook and Twitter, Tunisian 
men and women turned to blogging services such as Wordpress, Tumblr, and 
Blogspot during the protests (Kallander, 2013).  Gender divides affected Tunisian 
women’s participation on these blogging services before the revolution in 2010.  
A comprehensive report published in 2009 by Bruce Etling, John Kelly, Robert 
Faris, and John Palfrey at the Internet and Democracy project mapped the Arab 
blogosphere’s connectivity by identifying active cybercitizens and tracing their 
interactions with other cybercitizens and websites.  Using Arabic language 
speakers to code the thousands of blogs they surveyed by demographic 
information (age, gender, etc.), they found that a large percentage of the 
Maghreb/French Bridge (or Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) bloggers self-
identified as male (almost 90%) (Etling, Kelly, Faris, & Palfrey, 2009).  In 
addition, their research suggested that blogs in the Maghreb focused on political 
and civil society subjects, “this cluster [themes discussed in the blog] calls 
attention to human rights more than any other topics, although poetry, art, and 
literature are also important” (Etling, Kelly, Faris, & Palfrey, 2009). Their 
findings differ from Howard and Hussein’s study, which found that an estimated 
41% of Tunisians on Facebook were women and women made up 30% of all 
Tunisian Twitter accounts (2013).  These differences can be explained by the 
greater accessibility of Facebook and Twitter in Tunisia, the increases of Tunisian 
female participation online during the 2010-2011 protests, and gender 
underreporting or misreporting on the blogosphere.  Despite persistent gender 
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divides online, many women, such as Aya Chebbi of Proudly Tunisian, created 
blogs during the revolution and turned their Facebook and Twitter pages into 
online platforms for activism.    
Tunisians deploy three principle languages online—primarily French and 
Arabic with some English as well.  In general, the language Tunisians bloggers 
use online denotes their audience as well as their educational background.  As 
noted by Krista Moore, French colonial policy influences the Tunisian language 
landscape (Moore, 2010).  Thus, Tunisians prioritize French over Arabic and 
demarcate French as ‘sophisticated’ and ‘educated,’ whereas Arabic is ‘Islamist’ 
and ‘backwards.’  Diasporic bloggers tend to prefer French and English to Arabic. 
This limits the audience of Tunisian blogs and social networking sites, skewing 
external perceptions of the country according to the bloggers who write in French 
and English.  Foreign Western journalists will often choose secular sources who 
write in English or French over Islamic bloggers who blog in Modern Standard or 
Tunisian colloquial Arabic.  On the other hand, Al Jazeera prefers Islamic sources 
and has shown bias towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, showing the 
influence of the Qatar government.  Lynch writes that, “Most Western attention 
to Arab blogging has focused on what Ethan Zuckerman has termed ‘bridge-
bloggers’” (2007).  Arabs participate in bridge-blogging when they write in 
English and act as interpreters of their communities to Western audiences. 
Therefore, language acts as digital divide both in and out of the country, 
determining what information foreign governments and news organizations pick 
up.   
 Starting in the late 2000s, Tunisians 
social networking sites and blogs for political activism and grassroots organizing.  
Traditional Blogs encompass a vast array of genres (personal, political, travel, 
etc.) and internet sites, not limited to Wordpress, Tumblr, and Blogspot.  Most 
Tunisians in this study post on Blogspot or W
sites such as Twitter post small pieces of digital content such as texts, pictures, 
links or videos.  Activists generally use microblogging as a snapshot of their blog 
or Facebook page, linking posts from their blogs to Twitter.  
are blogging communities composed of various bloggers.  
 From the header of their website, it reads: Nawaat: 
The Tunisian site Naawat (
than 300 posters and 50 active bloggers sharing and exchanging ideas about 
Tunisian politics (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2012
Tunisieblogs (http://tn
Tunisian blogs, organizing them chronologically in a steady stream of 
information.  From December 2010 to March 2011, 
posts rose from 1607 per month to 2444.   
(http://globalvoicesonline.org
voices marginalized by the mainstream media, wh
post on.  They have a vast international audience, with contributors posting in 
over 35 languages from 167 countries.
(http://www.tunisia-live.net
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began utilizing four primary
ordpress sites.  Microblogging 
Aggregate blogs 
 
don’t hate the media, be the 
media. 
www.naawat.org) founded in 2004 contains more 
).  Established in 2006, 
-blogs.com) gathers blog posts published on hundreds of 
Tunisieblogs aggregate blog 
Global Voices 
) is an international blogging community featuring 
ich many Tunisian bloggers 
  Tunisian activists created Tunisia Live 
) in the aftermath of the Dignity Revolution to 
 types of 
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connect Tunisia to the world by providing “accurate, verified and balanced 
information about Tunisia in English.”  Facebook Pages can also be classified 
as a microblog or a social network.  After Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, 
Tunisian Facebook pages such as Takriz (https://www.facebook.com/takrizo) 
practiced discursive activism and served as a platform to organize marches and 
events.   
 Grassroots digital activism in Tunisia rose to prominence in the decade 
preceding the revolution.  Blogger, activist, and founder of the Arab Techies 
Collective and co-Organizer of The Arab Bloggers Conferences, Sami Ben Gharbia 
discussed on Nawaat the impact of digital activism in Tunisia on September 17, 
2010, three months before Bouazizi’s self-immolation.  His words highlight the 
importance digital networks held before the thought of revolution or the so-called 
Arab Spring existed:  
In the Arab world, the use of digital tools for social and political 
change was not driven by hype or a professional or media interest. 
On the contrary, it was the result of needs driven by a strong 
commitment to defending Human Rights. Those needs are a direct 
result of an established authoritarian environment and a lack of an 
open space where activists could practice their citizenship. Digital 
activism has been “invented” and rose out of necessity to fill the 
very gap that was left by traditional civil society constituents 
(Gharbia, 2010).  
 
In the article, Gharbia noted the complex dilemma of Arab bloggers caught 
between authoritarian regimes filtering and repressing content and growing 
attention from Western public agencies and NGO’s such as the International 
Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and Freedom House 
hosting training workshops.  Led by the U.S. State Department’s U.S.-Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Western governments and the NGOs named 
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above funded digital activist trainings prior to the Arab Spring.15  For example, 
the Middle East and North African Bloggers Network launched by the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs was loosely affiliated to the U.S. 
Democratic Party (Gharbia, 2010).     
 During the protests, government censorship corresponded to important 
political events.16  For example, after Mohamed Bouazizi’s death and when 
President Ben Ali fled the country:  
Before Ben Ali resigned, more than a thousand people in Tunisia 
were Tweeting each day about political change in that country.  
Immediately after his resignation, Twitter service declined 
precipitously, with activists in the country reporting that security 
forces were interfering with communication networks.  When the 
service returned to normal, Twitter activity peaked again, with a 
thousand Tweets a day in Tunisia and street protests drawing tens 
of thousands of people. (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, & 
Marzaid: 2011: 13) 
 
Many Tunisian online activists faced physical threats for their activism, 
demonstrating how the physical world can infiltrate and impact virtual space.  
Internationally renowned Tunisian blogger Slim Amamou was arrested for his 
internet activity on January 6, 2011.  He alerted his followers of his arrest by 
checking in at the Ministry of Interior on Avenue Habib Bourguiba using the 
geolocation app FourSquare.17  Lina Ben Mhenni of A Tunisian Girl also 
experienced government censorship, posting on her blog that her Facebook page 
had been taken down and her email hacked on January 4, 2011.  According to 
                                                        
15 Nixon, Ben. “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings.” The New York Times. 14 April 2011. 
Web. Accessed 18 November 2013.   
16 The government blocked Twitter pages about Sidi Bouzid after the hashtag #sidibouzid spread 
among Tunisian users and became netizens in neighboring countries and through the world.   
17 Five days later, Amamou accepted a position in the government as the Minister of Youth and 
Sports.      
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Reporters Without Borders18, the Tunisia government blocked more than 100 
Facebook pages about the protests on that day, including the popular Facebook 
page “Mr. President, Tunisians are setting themselves on fire” that had over 
12,000 members when it was blocked.  Cyber activists worldwide responded to 
the restrictions.  The international hacking website Anonymous 
(www.anonnews.org) responded by launching coordinated attacks on various 
government sites.  In early January, they posted a declaration supporting the 
Tunisian’s dignity revolution and cyber activists:  
Anonymous has heard the claim for freedom of the Tunisian people. 
Anonymous is willing to help the Tunisian people in this fight 
against oppression…This is a warning to the Tunisian government: 
attacks on the freedom of speech and information of its citizens will 
not be tolerated (Anonymous). 
 
Anonymous’ support of Tunisian bloggers demonstrates the spread of 
information via social networking sites and blogs as well as the importance of 
these technological tools in connecting the international audience with events 
happening within Tunisia.   
As the above paragraphs demonstrate, digital media, specifically social 
networking and media sites, rose in importance in Tunisia in the years leading up 
to the protests.  In general, men have dominated the blogosphere and on social 
media and networking sites.  Today, more Tunisian women are blogging than 
before the revolution, but their online and offline marginalization needs to be 
further understood and deconstructed.  By unpacking the historical, cultural, and 
social constructions of gender in Tunisia, this chapter investigates whether the 
                                                        
18  “Internet censors move into top gear in response to widespread unrest.” Reporters Without 
Borders. 4 January 2011. Web. Accessed 10 February 2014. <http://en.rsf.org/tunisia-internet-
censors-move-into-top-04-01-2011,39213.html>  
 66
Revolution of Dignity encouraged women to participate and facilitated space for 
female activism online.  The subsequent section explores the gender binary in 
Tunisia, examining how offline gender divides have emerged online. 
 
4.2 Gender Relations Online and Offline: 
 
Tunisian gender relations on social networking and media sites reflect the 
complex gender binary permeating Tunisian society.  This section unpacks the 
relationship between gender relations online and the Tunisian gender binary, 
arguing that gender divides become more permeable online, blurring the 
boundaries of what is deemed acceptable Tunisian gender performance.  
Postcolonial studies highlight the influence of French colonial policies on the 
present-day Tunisian gender binary.  Until 1950, French colonial gender relations 
demarcated separate spheres and Islamic women.  This binary relationship 
constructed a hierarchy of secular, French culture over Islamic, Tunisian culture.  
The transition to a sovereign state in 1956 complicated these relations, as 
President Habib Bourguiba led the Tunisian government in establishing a policy 
of state feminism and political emancipation for Tunisian women.  In 1956, 
Tunisia adopted the Personal Status Code (PSC), which abolished polygamy and 
established women’s equality in marriage, divorce and child custody. These 
represented the most advanced legal rights for women in the Arab world at the 
time; however, the government’s emphasis on women’s rights was a political 
strategy.  During his rule from 1957 to 1987, President Bourguiba used women’s 
rights to strengthen the nation and secure the regime’s political, civil and cultural 
power.  He marginalized Islamic discourse in the process, portraying the state as 
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progressive against allegedly backwards Islamic thought.  State feminism under 
Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali deployed the issue of women’s rights to silence 
the regime’s critics, internationally and nationally (Johansson-Nogués, 2013).  
The state absorbed women’s rights and feminist organizations, refusing to let 
autonomous organizations exist and discriminating against them when they did 
by withholding funds, police harassment, censorship, etc.  For example, Khadija 
Cherif, a long-time feminist activist, secretary general of the International 
Federation of Human Rights and a former president of the Association 
tunisienne des femmes democrats, spent time under house arrest for her activism 
in autonomous women’s rights organizations.19    
Although state feminism advanced the legal rights of women in the family 
code by highlighting the importance of female and male citizens to the state, it 
failed to ensure economic autonomy for women and gender parity in political, 
social, and cultural rights.  A 2009 comparative study of Arab countries 
conducted by Freedom House ranked Tunisia first in the major categories that 
contain women’s rights, such as “autonomy, security and freedom of person,” and 
“political and civic voice.”  Nonetheless, women continue to remain 
underrepresented in the political sphere and higher ranks of Tunisian businesses.  
At the end of Ben Ali’s rule in 2011, there were four women in the 45-member 
government and 27.6% of the members elected to Parliament in 2009 were 
women; in 2010, women represented 27% of judges and 31% of lawyers.  It 
should be noted that despite significant growth, this is percentage of women’s 
                                                        
19 Bennhold, Katrin. “Women’s Rights a Strong Point in Tunisia.” The New York Times. 22 
February 2011. Web Accessed 1 February 2011. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/middleeast/23iht-letter23.html?_r=0>  
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participation in politics is high for the region and more than the current 
percentage of women elected to Congress in the United States according to the 
Center for American Women and Politics (18.5% in the House and 20% in the 
Senate).  Despite demands of gender parity in government by women’s rights 
organizations and protestors during the 2010-2011 Tunisian Dignity Revolution, 
in 2013 women only held between two and three posts in government and 27.2% 
of members of Parliament are women—under the 30% quota established by the 
new constitution.20   
State feminism complicated gender relations implemented under colonial 
rule.  By emphasizing nation-building and the citizen-women, the government 
created a national ideal for women and a valued femininity of secular, 
professional and highly educated women of middle or higher classes.  These 
women spoke French and aspired to professional jobs, but only in accordance 
with the state’s policies. The state often stigmatized Islamic women, 
demonstrated when Ben Ali banned the hijab in government jobs and at the 
universities.  Tunisia’s feminist movement remains divided along the constructed 
binary relationship between Islamic and secular.  Post-revolution, feminist 
organizations and radical feminist groups such as Femen adopted an anti-
Islamist and anti-Islamic stance.  Islamic feminism is in its infancy in Tunisia, 
unlike other countries in the MENA region; consequently, the binary between 
Islamic and secular dominates the gender relations in the Tunisia.  
                                                        
20 International Federation for Human Rights. “Tunisia.” Arab Women Spring. 13 August 2013. 
Web. Accessed 13 January 2014. <http://arabwomenspring.fidh.net/tunisia> 
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The Tunisian legal code continues to block Tunisian women’s access to 
justice in incidents of gender violence. Cultural stigmas and blaming the victims 
for gender violence (including rape, domestic violence and sexual harassment) 
lead to under-reporting and prosecution (Freedom House, 2009). Several 
women’s rights organizations and bloggers documented an increase in sexual 
harassment and gender violence by the regime after Mohamed Bouazizi’s death 
on January 4th.  In the final days of the protest, security forces responded to 
women’s participation in the protests with systematic sexual violence 
(Association tunisienne des femmes democrats, FIHD). Johansson-Nogués 
argues that the presence of women in the streets pitted the state’s idealized 
femininity against state masculinity, thus resulting in the implementation of state 
sanctioned gendered violence (2013).   
The target for the gendered violence was mostly (devalued) women 
in poorer areas, but it can be inferred that the regime was trying to 
send a clear, systematic message of dissuasion to the emphasized 
woman lest they be next in line for such acts.  However, the speed at 
which the regime unraveled perhaps explains the fact that the 
phenomenon did not become more widespread inside Tunisia 
(Johansson-Nogués, 2013). 
 
Female bloggers noted the rise of gender violence in mid to late January, 
culminating in sexual harassment after the January 29 march for women’s rights.  
According to the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Islamist 
men harassed the women protesting, chanting at them “return to their kitchens.”  
This altercation increased Tunisian women’s fears that the absence of Ben Ali 
created a vacuum for Islamist parties to retract many of the political equalities 
they had gained.   
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The Tunisian gender binary shifted online as digital technologies 
empowered women to protest the regime removed from physical gender violence.  
At the beginning of the protests in December 2010, females made up an 
estimated 41% of Tunisia’s Facebook population and accounted for 30% of users 
on Twitter (Howard & Hussein, 2011). It is difficult to approximate how many of 
those females participated in cyberactivism, using Facebook, Twitter and the 
blogosphere to organize protests and spread information online.  Furthermore, 
women may represent more than the figures presented above, disguising their 
gender with male pseudonyms or posting anonymously.  A majority of male and 
female cyberactivists speak in the language of gender parity and human rights, 
emphasizing the idea of a liberal, progressive Tunisia. Aggregate blogging sites, 
such as Nawaat (http://nawaat.org/portail/ ) function as a platform for men and 
women to post information about the political situation in Tunisia.  Such sites 
enabled greater participation of women bloggers online.  Exiled four years prior 
to the revolution for her activism, Amira Yahyaoui used her Twitter (@Mira404) 
to protest during the revolution.  During and after the revolution, Yahyaoui 
demanded the need for gender parity in the constitution, a common theme 
among female bloggers.  After Ben Ali fled Tunisia, she was one of the few women 
who contributed to drafting the 2011 constitution.  Her NGO, Al Bawsala, utilizes 
Twitter and Facebook to monitor the constitutional assembly and advocates for 
human rights.  In a October 14, 2011 interview with Jadaliyya, Amira Yahyaoui 
stated that women participated as organizers and demonstrators and placing 
gender equality as central to discussions of Tunisian politics.21   
                                                        
21 Benoit-Lavelle, Mischa. “From Blogging to Writing the Conversation.” Jadaliyya. 14 October 
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The preceding paragraphs inform the subsequent analysis of the subset of 
Tunisian female cyber activists.  Due to a recent history of prolific online activism 
and a thriving civil society, feminist activists expanded existing networks and 
create new ones during the protests.  The Tunisian gender binary manifested 
online and was complicated by the delineating dialectic between Islam and 
secularism in Tunisia.  However, this binary evolved in different ways online, as 
women carved out greater spaces for them to articulate and perform agency.  In 
many ways, the gender binary became permeable, allowing women to act with 
greater freedom and power despite government censorship.  The next, and last, 
section of this chapter applies this argument to inform an analysis of female 
cyberactivism during the Tunisian dignity revolution.     
 
4.3 Tunisian Female Cyberactivists 
 The remainder of this chapter turns to the role of Tunisian female 
cyberactivists during the Tunisian Dignity Revolution from November 2010 to 
Mid-May 2011.  This analysis will be enriched by the previous discussion of 
Tunisian online activism, the use of digital technologies in Tunisia, and the 
historical, cultural, religious and political history of Tunisian gender relations.  A 
subset of seven Tunisian female cyberactivists and bloggers will be analyzed, 
including Wallada22, Didon, Mon Massir, Aya Chebbi of Proudly Tunisian, 
Khedija Arafaoui, Arabasta3, and Lina Ben Mhenni of A Tunisian Girl. In 
addition, this section discusses the actions of Tunisian feminist organizations 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2011. Web. Accessed 13 December 2013.  
22 The italicized names indicate the titles of blogs.  Many of the female activists I surveyed did not 
give their full names.   
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online, organizing protests, and documenting gender violence perpetrated by the 
government and by Islamist demonstrators.  The activists named above deploy 
several languages online—Modern Standard Arabic, French, English, and 
Tunisian colloquial Arabic—performing multiple identities through language.  In 
many ways, online activism allowed Tunisian female cyberactivists to perform 
their gender and protest without fear of gender violence experienced in the 
physical protests.  This analysis is organized into four subsections: 1) Creating 
New Feminist Networks and Reverberations Online; 2) Tactics: Citizen 
Journalism and Discursive Activism; 3) Gendered protests; and 4) Negotiating 
Multiple Identities Online.  These subsections ask: Why did Tunisian female 
activists turn to online activism?  How did they utilize social networking and 
microblogging sites?  And, how did online activism transform into the physical 
protests that brought down Tunisia’s long-standing authoritarian president?  
 
Tactics: Citizen journalism and discursive activism 
 Activists expressed a range of motivations for blogging.  Many female 
activists, among them Tunisian cyberactivist Lina Ben Mhenni, acted as citizen 
journalists and spread information to regional actors and international news sites.  
Others documented the protests with video, photos and short posts and alerted 
Tunisians about protests and marches or when and where violence was occurring.  
Blogs replaced news sites when the Tunisian media and international news 
sources failed to document the unfolding protests.  Citizen journalism, or the 
collection, dissemination, and analysis of news and information by the public 
online, proliferated as activists took it upon themselves to act as watchdogs of the 
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regimes abuses.  The actions of these Tunisian female cyberactivists, exemplified 
by Mhenni, elucidate a question Dhiraj Murthy has posed, “whether twitter has 
transformed ordinary individuals into citizen journalists whom the news reading 
public follows or whether their voices are merely subsumed by traditional media” 
(2011: 2).  The remainder of this chapter will contend that the subset of Tunisian 
female cyberactivists surveyed became citizen journalists that the public and 
international journalists followed for updates on the Tunisian protests.  Lina Ben 
Mhenni operated multiple media 
platforms, including A Tunisian 
Girl23, a Facebook page24, and a 
Twitter account 
(@benmhennilina).   
She demonstrated discursive activism and acted as a citizen journalist online, 
uploading photos, videos and summaries of the protests onto her media sites.  On 
December 25, 2010, Mhenni summarized the first protests in English and French, 
“After what happened in Sidi Bouzid, calls were launched to organize 
demonstrations and protests in different regions in Tunisia.”  Thousands of 
Tunisians and international actors accessed her page during the peak of the 
revolution between January 4th and 14th (Howard and Hussain, 2013).  Tunisians 
activists and foreign journalists dubbed Mhenni a “Twitterati” for her prolific 
postings online despite government attempts to hack her Facebook, Twitter and 
blog.    
                                                        
23 A Tunisian Girl http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.com/ 
24 Facebook Page for A Tunisian https://www.facebook.com/atunisiangirl/ 
 Traffic increased on Lina Ben Mhenni’s blog 
Facebook profile, and her Twitter page as the protests continued, spiking in early 
January 2011.  After January 4
between five and 20 comments; more followers responded to her posts when they 
she shared them on Facebook and Twitter in addition to hosting them on her blog 
A Tunisian Girl.  The format of her blog does not docu
other blogging websites, but by comparing responses to her blog posts with likes, 
comments, and reshares on her Facebook and Twitter pages, it is clear that 
viewership increased as the protests in Tunisia grew and news of the uprisin
reached regional and international news sites.  
two days after President Ben Ali fled the country, demonstrates the influence of 
her posts.   Foreign journalists, Tunisian human rights orga
bloggers responded to this post on her blog, numbering 19 comments in total.
The screenshot above illustrates the content of this post, written and entitled in 
English “The Future is Ours,” with the list of comments following it.  After the 
image of the young man killed in protests the day before, Mhenni wrote, 
“Tunisians are protecting their country. Tunisians are protecting each other. 
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A Tunisian Girl, 
th, comments and responses to her blog ranged 
ment page views unlike 
A blog post on January 16, 2011, 
nizations, and fellow 
her 
g 
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Tunisians fought to obtain their freedom and I believe that Tunisians won't let 
anyone steal this victory. So let's work together. The future is ours.”  She posted a 
link to this entry on her Facebook page and on Twitter, ensuring that it reached 
the largest audience.   This entry is an example of ‘bridge-blogging,’ which 
Mhenni intersperses with posts in Arabic and French on her blog.       
Mhenni was one of the few Tunisian bloggers who used his or her own 
name, thus she was one of the first to be censored during the protests.  The 
Tunisian government hacked her Facebook and Twitter page in early January.  
Undeterred, she posted a screenshot of her hacked Facebook page to her blog 
under the title You Can’t Stop Us From Writing.  In an interview with Voice of 
America on January 4, 2011, she stated in English,  “Everything is blocked 
here…I use a proxy to access my blog, my Facebook profile, and…they censored 
my Twitter account.  It is not accessible in Tunisia.”  As the revolution progressed, 
cyberactivistss and bloggers appeared less concerned with censorship and 
fighting “Anmar” the government hacker, than with protesting against Ben Ali.  
Arabasta3 posted in Tunisian colloquial Arabic on 7elblog on January 14, 2011, 
urging the blogging community to start writing and speaking out on radio and 
television, “our martyrs did not die only to end censorship on the Internet….Are 
you Tunisian?...then speak up.”  Her post marks the transition from 
cyberactivists attacking the government online to their physical participation in 
the streets of Tunis, Sidi Bouzid and many other Tunisian cities.   
Digital technologies enabled Tunisian female cyberactivists to insert their 
voices into new spaces during the Dignity Revolution.  Before the revolution, a 
female identified cyberactivist writing as, “Mon Massir” discussed Arab feminist 
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literature (such as the works of Fatima Mernissi) on her blog interspersed with 
her personal reflections on culture, society, philosophy and art.  However, during 
the revolution, her posts changed tenor from personal to political activism.  She 
urged Tunisians to log online and join the protests, writing in Arabic on 
December 28, 2010, “Go to Facebook and twitter to be informed about the events 
in Tunisia.”25   As one of the 17 most influential bloggers according to Howard 
and Hussein (2013) based on her widespread audience and influence online, Mon 
Massir took the opportunity the protests offered to mobilize her audience to 
protest.   
 
Creating New Feminist Networks and Reverberations Online:  
New feminist networks and cyberactivists emerged to take prominence during 
the revolution.  Young Tunisian activist Aya Chebbi saw the protests as an 
opportunity to begin blogging and to expand her Twitter and Facebook activity.  
She kept a photo journal of the protests on Flickr, explaining that she wanted to 
document the protests with images and contribute to the revolution in any way 
she could.26  Entitled “La Femme Tunisienne au cœur de la Révolution,” the 
photos depict women of all ages in the streets, demanding democracy and 
government free of corruption.  In the months following Ben Ali’s removal from 
power, she created an English and French language blog entitled Proudly 
                                                        
25 Transl. from French: “Rendez-vous sur facebook et twitter pour être informés sur les 
manifestations en Tunisie.” <http://massir.typepad.fr/mon_massir/2010/12/index.html>  
26 Aya Chebbi told me in an interview February 5, 2014 that she was unable to publish a blog 
under Ben Ali’s rule because her father was a general in the Tunisian army.  
 Tunisian27, believing the revolution opened new spaces for women to protest and 
voice their opinions without fear of gender violence.  
popularity, numbering over 35,000 page views at the end of 2013 with h
viewed posts discussing the revolution and gender equality in Tunisia.  
that before the revolution, she was unable to keep a blog online for fear of 
political reprisal against her and her f
demonstrates the role Chebbi held in the protests, documenting women’s 
participation and blogging about women’s rights online.  
In this photo posted on Chebbi’s flickr page, two veiled Tunisian women wearing 
fashionable, conservative Muslim dress raise their f
in Tunis.   Chebbi focused on portraying women of all ages in the Dignity 
Revolution, fighting against their daily degradation and subjugation at the hands 
of a corrupt government alongside Tunisian men.  This photo portrays 
information flowed between the streets and the web, opening a two
where women could inhabit the streets and the internet simultaneously.  Chebbi 
                                                       
27 Although Aya Chebbi posts in French and English on her blog, the name of her blog is only in 
English.  
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documented Tunisian women’s participation, using the web to project her 
interpretation of the protests.   
Discursive activism online engendered new networks of connectivity 
during the revolution.  Female activists used blogs, twitter and Facebook to rally 
Tunisians to participate.  They organized marches and protests demonstrating 
against the regime and for women’s political enfranchisement.  This activism 
engendered social movements and protests online and offline, illustrating the 
expansion of physical space into the digital realm.  Online movements such as 
“7ellblog”28 (translated from Tunisian colloquial to “Launch a blog”) launched by 
female blogger Arabasta3 in November 2010 encouraged Tunisians to begin 
blogging in Tunisian colloquial Arabic despite the regime’s censors:  
This makes, for those who love statistics, 13 blogs in one day: Yes 
the Tunisian youth have things to say. They want to speak and to 
express themselves! We encourage this group of pioneers and we 
are longing to see this number becoming bigger and bigger 
(Arabasta3, November 17, 2010)29. 
 
A Tunisian Girl’s Lina Ben Mhenni also participated in this movement, posting a 
link to Arabasta3’s page on Facebook, her blog and twitter with the hasthag 
#7ellblog.  This movement helped increase female participation online despite 
government censorship, providing women a space to continue articulating 
protest as gender violence increased on the streets.  From the time the movement 
began in November to the end of the protests in February 2011, Arabasta3 had 
posted lists encompassing several hundred new blogs.   
                                                        
28 Transliterated Arabic is often written with numbers to symbolize letters that do not exist in 
English.  For example, the 7 indicated in “7ellblog” can be both the soft “ha” (ح) letter and the 
hard “kha” (خ) in Arabic.   
29 Translated from French. “Ce qui fait, pour les doués de calcul, 13 blogs en une journée: oui, la 
jeunesse tunisienne a des trucs à dire, elle veut parler et s'exprimer! Nos encouragements à ces 
pionniers et en attendant de voir ce nombre se multiplier encore et encore.”  
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Feminist activists and organizations primarily used Facebook, Twitter, and 
email to communicate when and where protests would be held.  Khedija Arafaoui, 
a women’s rights activist, stated in French in an interview with Campaign for 
Equality: 
Civil society also used Facebook to send information. Although civil 
society had no access to the media, it never stopped addressing the 
issues, organizing meetings to discuss them, looking for ways to 
help, informing the world about the situation, getting in touch with 
the families, sending petitions to the government, providing help. 
 
Arafaoui’s statement echoes the sentiment Arabasta3 posted on January 14, 
reflecting the limitations of blogging.  Blogging and cyberactivism was effective 
when it translated into physical action, transcending the spatial divisions of cyber 
space.  Feminist activists used the web as a tool to communicate and connect with 
regional and international feminists, spreading female reverberations 
online.  However, as with the case of cyberactivism and blogging, their discursive 
activism targeted traditional media and was used to organize physical protests.   
These examples represent a sample of the increased participation of 
women online.  They depict the diverse ways Tunisian women protested online, 
why they turned to digital activism, and the flow between online activism and 
offline activism.  As the uprising continued from December 2010 to January 2011 
and female cyberactivists subverted government censorship, local, regional, and 
international viewership increased.  In Egypt, female activist and blogger Zeinab 
Mohammed posted links to Lina Ben Mhenni’s blog A Tunisian Girl in early 
January, encouraging Egyptian activists to protest outside the Tunisian embassy 
in solidarity.  Furthermore, as the uprisings continued and local, regional, and 
international audiences grew, female cyberactivists and feminist activists began 
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devoting more posts to gender violence and demands for gender parity in the new 
government.  The following section analyzes the gendered issues Tunisian female 
cyberactivists posted, Tweeted and wrote on Facebook about as the revolution 
unfolded.      
 
Gendering the protests:   
 As the protests grew and gender violence in the streets increased, Tunisian 
activists online increased their discussion of gender issues.  Posts from Lina Ben 
Mhenni’s A Tunisian Girl and the feminist organization Tunisian Association of 
Democratic Women indicate gendered violence in the streets began on January 
14.  Mhenni wrote in English:  
It all started with the horrible assaults on the peaceful people who 
were on sit-in in la Kasbah outside the Prime Ministry.  The 
peaceful people who were simply asking for democracy and dignity 
were beaten, violently chased away from the sit-in area and even 
arrested (A Tunisian Girl, February 2, 2011).     
 
Blog posts also documented the harassment of women during the January 29th 
march.  Proudly Tunisian devotes more space to gender issues in her blog.  She 
noted the rise of gender violence two years after the revolution, “Following the 
departure of the former president Ben Ali, Tunisia has entered an emergency 
situation. A few days after he left, we started hearing about rape, kidnapping and 
violence against girls and women.”  Mhenni wrote on A Tunisian Girl in English 
that she was attacked on the streets during the January 29th protest:  
My group and I was attacked by unknown persons holding sticks 
and shouting: you destroyed the country, our houses are smelling 
tear gas because of the people of the sit-in of la Kasbah....The police 
was violent too…(A Tunisian Girl, January 29, 2011) 
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By writing in English, she directed her post at the international audience and 
journalists following her blog, posting a link to this blog post on her Facebook 
page and Twitter account.  Her account of the protests attempts to raise 
awareness over the ongoing violence in Tunisia when the world had turned its 
attention to the Egyptian revolutionaries occupying Tahrir Square.  Mon Massir 
also took part in the march, writing on January 30, 2011, “They [Islamist men] 
shouted, cursed, and were racing towards us screaming and attacked the 
demonstrators. Some men who accompanied us made a barricade.”30  These 
protests and the reaction to them are noteworthy because of the relative absence 
of any mention of gender violence and sexual harassment in the Tunisian 
blogosphere before.  In addition, they speak to the perceived binary between 
Islamists and feminism or women’s 
rights in Tunisia discussed in the 
previous section.    
 Women’s rights in Tunisia did not 
appear tagged in posts until after Ben Ali 
left the country.  Feminist leaders such as 
Khadija Cherif begin organizing and 
protesting for women’s equal rights in the new constitution after the return of 
banished Islamist leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, from Paris.  Similarly, there was 
little mention of protesting being a transgression of the public/private divide 
associated with the gender binary in other Islamic countries like Egypt.  A 
                                                        
30 Transl. from French: “Ils criaient, insultaient, et fonçaient vers nous en hurlant et se sont 
attaqués aux manifestants.  Certains hommes qui nous accompagnaient leur ont fait barrage.” 
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Tunisian Girl mentioned the presence of women and men in the streets from the 
outset of the protests, and women are visible in the photo albums of the protests 
she posted on her Facebook page, shown in the image above.   
A comment by Organisation de l'État libre et laïque de la Tunisie 
(Organization for a Free and Secular Tunis) on A Tunisian Girl’s February 2, 2011 
blog post stated only in English, “We are foremost Tunisian Women and Men 
who stand for peaceful & tolerant coexistence with every political, social, religious 
and sexual orientations! We STAND and DEMAND ABSOLUTE Equality between 
genders!”  The Tunisian feminist NGO’s comment was directed towards the same 
international audience that frequented Mhenni’s blog.  Written on February 4, 
2011, this comment was a call to solidarity and draws attention to the duality 
between liberal-secular feminism and Islamic feminism, reflecting the 
uncertainty over women’s rights in a post-Ben Ali post-state feminism Tunisia.  
Posts by Tunisian female bloggers at the beginning of the protests carried a tone 
of solidarity and “insann” or humanness.  They wrote about “our future” and “our 
Tunisia.”  In addition, #womensrights and #genderequality did not trend online 
in Tunisia in comparison to #sidibouzid, #Tunisia, and #optunisia, demonstrated 
by the lack of significant data on #womensrights and #genderequality.  On the 
other hand, Howard & Hussain note that #sidibouzid and #Tunisia began 
trending after Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010 and 
spiked when Tunisian President Ben Ali stepped down on January 14, 2011 
(2013).   From the subset of Tunisian female activists this thesis has analyzed and 
Howard and Hussain’s quantitative research on the Tunisian protests, it appears 
as if the concern over government censorship and protests against Ben Ali’s 
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regime, which affected bloggers of all genders, received more coverage and blog 
posts than women’s rights and gender issues. 
   
Negotiating Multiple Identities Online:  
Tunisian female cyberactivists performed multiple identities on the web 
and on the streets.  The Dignity Revolution provided them a space to articulate 
these often conflicting identities in solidarity with their fellow protestors.  On 
January 23, 2011, Tunisian female blogger Didon asked on her blog31 in Modern 
Standard Arabic, “What do the Tunisian people want from the revolution?”  Her 
question reflects the uncertain hope activists felt in the weeks following Ben Ali’s 
departure.  After detailing the many reasons Tunisians wanted and celebrated the 
revolution, she concludes, “I am Tunisian and I do not speak Arabic and I am not 
Muslim, but this day is enough, enough for me so that I will proud of all criteria 
to belong to this special people.”32  Didon demonstrates how the revolution 
challenged and changed her perceptions of what it meant to be Tunisian.   
Johansson-Nogués’ understanding of how state feminist policies 
discursively constructed Tunisian femininity can be used to provide a more 
nuanced analysis of Tunisian female cyberactivists’ gender performance.  She 
states that secular, professional and highly educated women of middle or higher 
classes symbolized the valued Tunisia femininity.  The female bloggers surveyed 
in this chapter reflect this valued femininity and uphold Johansson-Nogués’ 
theory that gendered violence resulted from this femininity, challenging the 
                                                        
31 Didon: http://didonzahra.blogspot.com/  
32 Translated from Modern Standard Arabic.  
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government’s hegemonic and patronizing masculinity.  Tunisian female bloggers 
performed first as Tunisians.  That is not to say that their female identity was 
secondary to their national identity.  Rather, that they articulated diverse 
identities at different points in time, responding to changing protest dynamics 
and gender relations.  When perceiving a threat to their progressive identity as 
Tunisian women—leading the Arab world in legal and political rights—they would 
position themselves as female Tunisians.  Reflecting on the Dignity Revolution, 
Aya Chebbi wrote in English on her blog Proudly Tunisian:  
….I am proud to say that Tunisian women were and still actively 
participating in the revolution. Women were among the first who 
rise up high revolutionary slogans and have been part of all crucial 
moments. We have been the protesters, the journalists, the 
photographers, the volunteers, the elections observers, the bloggers, 
the campaigners…despite the violence we go through from the bus 
station till arriving to the demonstration square (Proudly Tunisian, 
December 4, 2012).33  
 
This excerpt describes the diverse identities women articulated besides their 
gender in the revolution—protestors, journalists, photographers, volunteers, 
election observers, bloggers, and campaigners.  Thus, similar Tunisian female 
bloggers did not so much as attempt to subvert existing gender norms as to 
perform them—acting out the valued femininity and using it to take a stand and 
protest in solidarity together.  
 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion: Disseminating the Revolution 
 
                                                        
33 This post was also published in similar formats by Aya Chebbi on WLUML (Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws), Safe World for Women, and World Pulse. 
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Wallada, who is ranked as the second most influential blogger in Tunisia 
by Howard and Hussain’s 2013 study34, posted in Tunisian colloquial Arabic on 
January 20th, 2011, “The people made the revolution.” Her words, shown in this 
screenshot,  
 
echoed the thoughts of countless Tunisian female cyberactivists, expressing their 
elation at the change of government and the perceived shift of power from the 
government to the people.  Tunisian female cyberactivists represented a diverse 
group of citizens.  They spanned from within Tunisia to the diaspora, posting in 
French, English and Arabic.  They were activists, citizen journalists, feminists, 
academics, etc.  Their audience ranged from local to national and international 
actors.  Feminist activists and organizations were also prolific online, specifically 
on Facebook and Twitter organizing their followers.  More Tunisians were active 
on Facebook and Twitter than on the blogosphere; the most prominent activists 
posted on all three media formats.  
This chapter has contended that Tunisian female cyberactivists played 
integral roles in the Tunisian revolution, which began after Tunisian street 
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi committed an act of self-immolation in the city of Sidi 
Bouzid on December 17, 2010.  Female cyberactivists built from existing 
networks of online activism protesting government censorship and a prolific 
                                                        
34 Howard and Hussain identified 17 of the 450 blogs as the main information gateways for the 
Tunisian blogosphere ; 3.6 percent of the Tunisian national blogosphere (2012: 129)  
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history of feminism to organize demonstrations, mobilize protestors, and 
articulate resistance to President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime.  Throughout, 
this chapter has argued that although social media may not have caused the 
revolutions, it created a space and provided the tools for female activists to 
generate content and insert themselves in the protests.  After the fall of President 
Ben Ali, female cyberactivists and feminist organizations used the new spaces 
they had carved out to articulate demands for gender parity in the creation of a 
new constitution and government.   
In response to Amy Aisen Kallander’s article questioning the role of 
cyberactivists and bloggers in the Tunisian revolution (2013), this chapter argues 
that even this small subset of seven Tunisian female cyberactivists demonstrates 
the importance of digital networks in providing a platform for offline activism to 
be launched.  Tunisian women played a central role in the creation of a virtual 
public sphere as well as demanded greater access, representation, and 
participation in the physical public sphere (Radsch & Khamis, 2013).  Digital 
activism and documentation of the protests by activists such as Lina Ben Mhenni 
was the reason that Egyptian and Moroccan activists had live footage of the 
protests and the strategies the Tunisian activists used.  Importantly, today more 
women utilize digital technologies than before the Dignity Revolution, and 
independent feminist networks have grown in the absence of state governed 
organizations—from the radical international feminist group Femen to the 
Association tunisienne des femmes democrats.  Aya Chebbi stated in a recent 
interview that after the revolution, spaces opened in blogging and allowed young 
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Tunisians to discuss issues like the constitution.35  Her words demonstrate that 
blogging and posting online can be a way of bringing marginalized voices into the 
forefront of political action, acting as a catalyst for the future.  The subsequent 
chapters on the Egyptian and Moroccan uprisings will explore how the 
experiences of Egyptian and Moroccan female cyberactivists paralleled or 
differed from the experiences of Tunisian female cyberactivists.   
                                                        
35 Patel, Khadija. “The Voices of Young Africans: Aya Chebbi.” Daily Maverick. 20 November 
2013. Web. Accessed 15 December 2013.   
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Chapter 5: Embodied Resistance: Continuing 
the Revolution in Egypt 
 
 
I walked the streets with men and women, of all sorts of 
backgrounds.  Never have I felt as sense of belonging like then, like 
now.  I was happy just to be in the streets sitting in close proximity 
with thousands of strangers, snuggled in a warm cocoon, 
liberating Tahrir Square, marking it as ours (Mona Seif, January 
30, 2011).   
 
 In May 2010, a group of 15 Arab female bloggers met through two 
workshops in Cairo and Amman.36  They agreed to each write one post under the 
same theme each month.37  For the first post entitled ‘My City’, Egyptian 
journalist and cyberactivist Mona Seif wrote about Cairo on her blog ma3t.  On 
July 23, 2010 she wrote, “I wanted to walk you through the streets of crazy 
downtown, share you with you my music as i blur out everything on our way and 
turn it down into hazy spots of colors.”  But, she continued, “I can’t do this now. 
My city is different, my city is mourning, and I can only share this with you.  
Khaled Said, a young Egyptian, was tortured and murdered by the police.”  Six 
months later, Seif joined millions of other Egyptian women and men in the 
streets of Cairo chanting in the streets and demanding the end of the regime 
“Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam38.”  
                                                        
36 Group of Arab women bloggers who met in July 2010 created a shared Twitter account to 
contiue virtual interactions @women bloggers. Accessed 10 December 2013. 
<<https://twitter.com/womenblogs>> 
37 Pryds Helle, Merete. Transl. Bell, Andrew. “Women Bloggers Meet in Cairo.” WoMen Dialogue. 
7 July 2010. Web. Accessed 10 December 2013.  
<<http://www.womendialogue.org/magazine/women-bloggers-meet-cairo-0>> 
38 Transliterated from Egyptian colloquial Arabic, meaning “the people demand the end of the 
regime.”  
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The evening before the protests, Mona Seif posted, “We participated in 
January 25th.” Her blogpost, written in Egyptian colloquial, urged Egyptians to 
take to the streets, invoking the memory of Khaled Said and countless other 
Egyptian citizens humiliated, beaten and killed by the police. At the bottom of the 
post, Seif provided links to the #Jan25 page on Twitter, Wael Ghonim’s appeal 
posted on the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page, and to the mission 
statement of the Front to Defend Egyptian Protesters39.  She encouraged her 
followers to follow her and other activists on Twitter (@monasosh) for updates 
on the protest and its locations in Alexandria and Cairo.  Mona Seif continued to 
blog, tweet, post on Facebook and participate in the revolution.   
During this time, her followers 
increased and she drew the 
attention of international 
journalists who began following 
her twitter for updates on the 
events occurring in Tahrir Square.  Her actions online and offline demonstrate 
how online activism multiplied and grew to occupy the heart of Cairo in Tahrir 
Square.  The actions of Mona Seif and her fellow female cyberactivists during the 
Egyptian Revolution from January 25 to February 14, 2011 elucidate questions 
into the relationship between digital technologies, protest movements, and 
gender in the Arab Spring.  This chapter seeks to understand how Egyptian 
                                                        
39 Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim was the anonymous admin of the “We are all Khaled 
Said” Facebook movement.  In his autobiography, Revolution 2.0 (2012), he discusses how he 
wrote the appeal and posted it online to encourage Egyptian citizens to protest.  Egyptian youth 
activists created FDEP with Ghonim’s support to monitor the protests and provide legal support 
to protestors subject to police brutality.   
Screenshot of Mona Seif's tweets on 
February 2, 2011 from Mona Seif’s blogpost 
My Revolution: Bloody Wednesday on 
December 31, 2011.   
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female cyberactivists deployed digital technologies, asking: What was the 
influence of their digital activism.  And, did social media networks and digital 
technologies facilitate Egyptian women to claim greater agency in the public 
sphere?    
 This chapter will examine the role of Egyptian female cyberactivists in the 
Egyptian revolution.  Through a qualitative analysis of female reverberations 
online, it will conduct close readings of six Egyptian female cyberactivists’ online 
profiles during the height of the Egyptian revolution from January 2011 to March 
2011.  In doing so, this chapter locates the actions of Egyptian female 
cyberactivists within the theoretical framework and argument of this thesis, 
examining how female cyberactivism in Egypt differed from or reflected female 
participation online in Tunisia and Morocco.  The chapter begins with a brief 
background of the gender relations and the growth of the feminist movement in 
Egypt, unpacking the gender binary. Then, it turns to a discussion of women’s 
participation online leading up to the revolution.  Finally, it concludes with an 
analysis of six Egyptian female cyber activists who participated online and offline 
in the Egyptian protests beginning January 25th 2011.  These close readings ask: 
how did female cyberactivists utilize digital technologies?  Did online activism 
transition to offline protests, and if so, how?  What identities did these female 
cyberactivists perform and on what digital platforms?  Did digital technologies 
and social media networks create liberating potentialities for Egyptian women 
during the revolution and after?  In response to these questions, this chapter will 
argue that during the Egyptian revolution of dignity from January 25 to February 
14, 2011, Egyptian female cyberactivists transcended gender divides online and 
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offline and carved new spaces to articulate agency in the public sphere through 
their online activism.  Specifically, this chapter will contend three main points: 1) 
Egyptian female cyberactivists inhabited multiple digital platforms to articulate 
specific gendered messages using English, Modern Standard Arabic and Egyptian 
colloquial Arabic; 2) Egyptian female cyberactivists used digital technologies to 
share information between cyber space and the protests in the streets, connecting 
online activism to physical demonstrations; 3) Egyptian female cyberactivists 
used virtual space to simultaneously mobilize followers to protest and reflect on 
their own experiences of revolution.   
 
5.1 Unpacking the Egyptian Gender Binary  
 As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the unstable category 
gender is discursively constructed in and through language (Butler, 1990).  Thus, 
when examining the gender binary and roles in Egypt, it is important to unpack 
the intersecting discourses constructing Egyptian masculinity and femininity.  
Egypt’s Sunni Muslim population follows the Salafi school of thought with a 
minority of Muslim Egyptians identifying as Shi’a or Sufi.  Islamic values shaped 
Egyptian culture and women’s place in society.  British colonialism in the 1800s 
challenged Islamic values and displaced Islamic gender roles with a British 
understanding of masculinity and femininity.  Colonial hegemonic masculinity 
dislocated Egyptian men, Muslim and Christian, creating an opposing narrative 
that reasserted Islamic masculinity.  This narrative reified the ‘Muslim woman’ as 
a symbol.  On one hand, colonial powers fetishized the ‘Muslim woman’ and saw 
her veil as sign of Islamic oppression, barbarism, and intolerance.  In contrast, 
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Islamic forces saw the ‘Muslim woman’ as a symbol of piety, a barrier to the 
corruption of secularism.  An Egyptian lawyer Qasim Amin, considered by many 
in the Arab world to be the first feminist, wrote influential several texts including 
Liberation of Women (1899) at the beginning of the 20th century.  His work 
outlined the position that President Nasser and later President Mubarak would 
adopt in their state feminism, believing that the political rights of women were 
necessary to “bringing the nation out of darkness” (Ahmed, 1992).     
Even though Egypt achieved independence in 1956, the question of 
‘Egyptian women’s rights’ and oppression under Islam continued to be shaped by 
the conflicting discourses of secular Western thought and Islamic thought 
(Ahmed, 1990). Women gained political emancipation at independence in 1956 
under the rule of President Abdel Gamal Nasser and his Arab Socialist Union 
party.  Nasser also attempted to reform the Egyptian Personal Status Law (PSL) 
to give women more rights; however, Islamic clergy opposed his moves and saw 
this as the further erosion of Western colonialism and secularization.  Over time, 
this tension between liberal-secular and Islamic discourse in Egypt constructed a 
gender binary that blends Western patriarchal thought and secularizing values 
with Islamic piety and traditional ideals.  Postcolonial Egyptian nationalism 
further complicated this binary, making a model Egyptian citizen-woman.  The 
valued Egyptian femininity evolved to be a middle-to-upper-class, pious, 
respectable university student or mother-worker employed in the country’s 
export industries (Johansson-Nogues, 2013).   Thus, under Nasser and 
subsequent Egyptian presidents, the intersection of Islamic thought and the 
Egyptian government’s so-called secularism created a valued femininity that 
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merged Islamic and neoliberal values.  This combination of Islamic patriarchal 
values with Western patriarchal norms subjugated women, yet at the same time, 
expected them to participate in the economic workforce.   
Egyptian feminism negotiated these conflicting yet intersecting discourses, 
often reasserting the gender binary in this process.  Until the last thirty years, 
feminism remained an elite discussion.  Starting in the first decade of the 1900s, 
the dialogue between the Egyptian Feminist Union and the Muslim Women’s 
Association reflected the struggle to articulate a cohesive Egyptian feminism.  
Influenced by Western feminists, Huda Sharwai founded the Egyptian Feminist 
Union in 1923, a political feminist organization that advocated secular reforms 
and women’s political enfranchisement.  Zeinab al-Ghazali formed the Muslim 
Women’s Association in 1935 after disagreeing with many of Sharwai’s views, 
specifically in her preference of Western secular thought over Islamic practices.  
Al-Ghazali opposed Sharwai’s embrace of Western culture as superior to Islam, 
searching for an alternative feminism that articulated female subjectivity and 
affirmation within a native, vernacular, Islamic discourse (Ahmed, 1992).    
These two organizations shaped Egyptian feminism until the 1940s, when 
a new generation of young Egyptian women challenged the elitism of the 
Egyptian Feminist Union.  It is important to note that this divide paralleled 
socioeconomic lines, with upper class, educated Egyptians supporting secular 
reforms and Western ideals and lower class women choosing a path of female 
subjectivity within Islam.  In 1951, Doria Shafik, who was one of the first women 
to receive an education at the Sorbonne in 1920s paid for by the Egyptian 
Ministry of Education, led a demonstration of over a thousand Egyptian women 
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into the Egyptian parliament (Ahmed, 1992).  Once there, she stopped 
proceedings and implored parliament to consider the issues and demands of 
Egyptian women.  Her actions caused the Egyptian government under British 
protectorate to grant women the write to vote and run for parliament in 1951 
(Nelson, 1996).     
Since the 1970s, the secular-liberal/Islamic binary and the gender binary 
has been challenged in the theoretical and political project of feminism.40  While 
some political feminist activists continue to pursue their goals in opposition to 
Islam, many Egyptian feminist activists and scholars have problematized the 
unquestionable universality of Islamic patriarchal oppression. Contemporary 
feminist scholarship examines how feminist projects have adopted religious 
discourse to achieve gains for political and legal equality (Abu-Odeh, 2004).  The 
Islamic Revival41 changed the dialogue surrounding women’s role in Islam, as 
Muslim women from Iran to Morocco took more active roles in their religious 
traditions.  In the last three decades, Egyptian feminist organizations have turned 
to Zeinab al-Ghazali’s vision of female subjectivity formed through Islamic 
practice.  Many Muslim women now practice what they term ‘Islamic Feminism’ 
or the marriage of Islamic ethics to feminist discourse and ideals.  A prominent 
Egyptian NGO, Women and Memory Forum, aims to reread Arab tradition and 
cultural history in order to create a new cultural and social awareness that 
supports women’s social roles.  It conducts research, programs and events such 
                                                        
40 Chandra Mohanty’s article “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses” (1984) led to a shift in feminist theory and the emergence of third wave feminism that 
moves away from the colonizing aspects of first and second wave feminism.   
41 Islamic Revival refers to a revival of the Islamic religion throughout the Islamic world that 
began sometime in the 1970s.  It is characterized by greater religious piety and a growing 
adoption of Islamic culture.   
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as a conference held in spring 2012, Feminism and Islamic Perspectives: New 
Horizons of Knowledge and Reform.  This conference sought to merge women’s 
demands with the Islamic perspective, as the founders write on their website, 
“The main incentive behind Islamic feminist research is the activation of Islam’s 
‘just’ and ‘fair’ principles for the production of gender-sensitive knowledge within 
an Islamic frame of reference.”42  Women and Memory Forum is one of many 
examples that erode the division of liberal-secular and Islamic, through the 
creation of new modes of feminism and understanding of Egyptian woman’s 
gender roles. 
On the eve of the 2011 Egyptian protests, the constructed roles of Egyptian 
masculine and feminine identities in society remained divided between notions of 
what it meant to be an Islamic Egyptian versus a secular Egyptian.  Despite 
Egyptian men’s assertion of Egypt as a modern state, they still treated women’s 
presence in the streets as a transgression.  Gendered violence, in particular street 
harassment and sexual assault, reminded Egyptian women of this supposed 
transgression daily.  Men owned the street; women were allowed to do business 
in the street but not to linger.  Renowned and controversial feminist writer and 
journalist Mona Eltahawy attacks rape culture and sexual harassment in Egypt 
on her twitter (@monaeltahawy) and in her articles.   
Digital technologies such as social networking sites and mobile phones 
have offered a way for women to protest and combat these issues.  For example, 
                                                        
42 “Feminism and Islamic Perspectives: New Horizons of Knowledge.” Women and Memory 
Forum. March 17-18 2012. Accessed Nov. 4, 2013.  
<http://womenandmemory.org/islamicfeminism/> 
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the organization, Harrasmap, devised a method to use crowd source43 technology 
from mobile phones to map sites of sexual harassment.  They identified highly 
trafficked spots, contacted business owners around the area, and constructed a 
safety network for women. The following section will examine the proliferation of 
digital technologies and social media in Egyptian social movements over the past 
decade. It asks, how do Egyptian gender relations manifest online?  Do Egyptian 
women enjoy greater agency and freedom of movement through their usage of 
digital technologies and social media networks?  In response to these questions, 
the following section will argue that Egyptian female cyberactivists have used 
digital technologies and social media networks to engage in discourse online and 
create new spaces for women to perform their gender and express agency in the 
public sphere.   
 
5.2 Gendering Online Activism in Egypt: We Are All Laila  
Under President Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-year rule, government censorship 
silenced political protest against the regime; however, in the past decade several 
social movements emerged online and offline that created an active and engaged 
protest culture by the eve of the so-called Arab Spring revolts. Social networking 
sites served as a space semi-removed from state violence and censorship.  The 
grassroots coalition for change Kefaya44, the April 6th Movement, “We Are All 
Khaled Said” Facebook page and other civil society organizations laid the 
                                                        
43 Crowdsourcing refers to the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting 
contributions the online community.  Harrasmap relies on texts, tweets, and emails from victims 
to document areas where sexual harassment is prevalent and perpetrators of sexual harassment.    
44 Kefaya (Egyptian Arabic for “enough”) is the unofficial name for the Egyptian Movement for 
Change that began in 2004 and gained national attention in the 2005 constitutional referendum 
and presidential election campaigns.     
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foundation for the revolution through their discursive activism online.  Egyptians 
have cultivated one of the most prolific web presences in the Middle East.  12 
million Egyptians subscribe to Facebook using an Arabic interface launched in 
2010 (around 15% of the population.)   An estimated 37% of the 80 million 
population have internet access (30 million people), and Egyptians represent 13% 
of MENA twitter users (Internet World Stats 2012; Arab Social Media Report 
2013).  Social media enabled opposition leaders to shape their discourses of 
contention, frame issues, and distribute unifying symbols (such as the image of 
Khaled Said) and transition protests from virtual spaces to physical spaces (Lim, 
2012).  Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive who created “We are All 
Khaled Said” Facebook page and movement, highlights the importance of online 
activism for organizing and mobilizing the #jan25 protests in his autobiography 
Revolution 2.0 (2012).  With these social networking tools, and the decades of 
activism that preceded the #jan25 protest, Egyptian activists united under one 
demand, “The people demand the end of the regime.”   
As early as 2006, female bloggers gathered on the Egyptian blogosphere to 
interrogate the nature of feminism, cultural and religious gender roles, and to 
discuss how to transform traditional notions of femininity and masculinity in the 
virtual and physical world.  Egyptian bloggers created the “We Are All Laila” 
campaign in 2006 to dedicate one day each year to raising awareness and 
discussing the concerns of women in Arab society.  The name “Laila” comes from 
the landmark novel The Open Door (1960) by Egyptian writer Latifa Al Zayat and 
represents all contemporary Egyptian women and the struggles they endure in a 
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repressive society that elevates the dreams and desires of men over women.45  A 
2007 study conducted by Dr. Mohamed Hossan Ismail has labeled the 
participants of the campaign as ‘cyber-feminists’, a term many of the bloggers 
identify with.  Members of “We Are All Laila” discuss a range of topics each year, 
from practicing Islamic feminism to a critique of previous feminist projects 
(Ismail, 2007).  In 2007, the study showed cyber-feminists focused on 
strengthening solidarity and relations between bloggers, rather than mobilizing 
the masses.  The Arab Spring protests shifted the purpose of women activists, 
from looking at creating feminist new networks to urging all Egyptians—men and 
women to protest. 
The shift from static web pages to dynamic or user-generated content and 
the growth of social networking has provided liberating possibilities for Egyptian 
women to perform their gender, challenge the hegemonic Egyptian construction 
of femininity, and demand gender parity.  As noted the previous chapter on the 
Tunisian protests, writing anonymously or under pseudonyms can hide the 
gender identities of men and women.  Egyptian cyber forums and online chat 
rooms have emerged as spaces for women to challenge and transgress traditional 
norms regarding gender and sexuality.  Howard and Hussain argue that digital 
media in the Arab world allows citizens to learn about gender relations in other 
countries, debate specific gender issues, renegotiate and restructure gender 
relationships, and support women-only online communities (2013).  This is 
particularly true for Egypt and its prolific history of feminism.  Courtney Radsch 
                                                        
45 Admin. We are all Laila. 10 September 2006. Web. Accessed 10 December 2013. <http://laila-
eg.blogspot.com/2006/09/1.html>  
 notes that digital media also fostered conn
providing them a space and tools for gender politics.  Specifically, the social 
networking sites and microblogs Twitter and Facebook enabled activists to iterate 
revolutionary language and protest through retweets, sharin
They increased the reach of the original post, disseminating it throughout the 
web, at news media sites, and international journalists.  
Egyptian female cyberactivist Nadia El
media while p
Nonetheless, digital divides exist in Egypt today.  In the Arab world 
women represent only a third of users (Arab Social Media Report 2013), whereas 
worldwide women outnumber men 
Stats).  In Egypt, roughly one third of the five million Facebook users are female.   
The 2013 Arab Social Media Report produced by the Dubai School of 
Government’s Governanc
constructing gender digital divide.  The online survey conducted from mid August 
to mid October 2011 targeted men and women from all 22 Arab countries and 
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ectivity and solidarity for women, 
g, favoriting etc.  
 
-Awady tweets about the importance of social 
rotesting in Tahrir Square on January 26, 2011.
58% to 42% on Facebook. (Inte
e and Innovation program notes some of the factors 
 
 
rnet World 
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received 469 full responses with 60% of those from women.  According to their 
research, survey respondents in Egypt identified ‘societal and cultural limitations’ 
as the top barrier, with privacy and security, ICT literacy, access to ICT, 
confidence in social media and education as secondary barriers.  Respondents 
demonstrate some ambivalence in the report; 78% of Egyptians agreed that social 
media can advance women’s rights yet at the same time 40% of respondents at 
the regional level believed social media can present new concerns for women at 
the civic level.  However, the report also argues that despite the gender digital 
divide, social media and online activism can empower women to be active 
participants leading and organizing protests.  
 It is also important to note that Egyptian female participation online is not 
limited to political protest and activism.  Egyptian women also use blogs as 
diaries to share personal stories.  These sites also provide spaces women to 
perform their sexuality and gender in a way physical space had not allowed them 
too.  Young men and women bloggers often posted under pseudonyms on 
Facebook, skating censorship and creating new opportunities for sexual 
exploration that would not be traced back to them.  Often, the purpose of the blog 
can be discerned from which networking site and what language the subject uses.  
For example, Egyptian women using colloquial Egyptian Arabic on a Tumblr blog 
generally use their blog for personal reflection and thought, including personal 
pictures or online images and reposts.   Many of these women participate in what 
the blog aggregate and citizen journalist website Global Voices Online46 has 
                                                        
46 York, Jillian C. “Hijablogging in Vogue.” Global Voices.  1 March 2009. Web. Accessed 
November 29 2013. <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/03/01/global-hijablogging-in-vogue/> 
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termed “Hijablogging,” which is an international blogosphere movement where 
women discuss online veiled fashion, lifestyle, experience, and the political and 
religious issues surrounding veiling.  Egyptian women posting in the English 
language participate in what Ethan Zuckerman as termed “bridgeblogging.47” 
These women tend to be academics or journalists targeting international 
audiences and news sources.  They use blogs as spaces to publish their 
perspectives on political issues or to act as citizen journalists circumventing the 
state media.     
 This section has argued that the proliferation of digital technologies and 
social media networks have blurred the boundaries between public/private space 
in Egypt and enabled Egyptian women to articulate diverse identities and to 
demand political, social, cultural, and religious gender parity.  The following 
section will examine whether this argument also applies to the actions of 
Egyptian female cyberactivists during the Egyptian revolution beginning on 
January 25, 2011.  Through an in-depth analysis of six Egyptian female 
cyberactivists who participated in the Egyptian dignity revolution, it will contend 
that Egyptian female cyberactivists used digital technologies and social media to 
insert their voices and bodies into the public sphere, subverting the Egyptian 
gender divide and exhibiting multiple modalities of agency.      
 
 
 
                                                        
47 As discussed in the previous chapter on Tunisia, Arab female cyberactivists employed 
bridgeblogging to draw international attention and news media to the protests.  This was a 
strategy to communicate and subvert government censorship and state media.   
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5.3 Embodying Gendered Resistance Online 
 The remainder of this chapter will focus on close-readings of six Egyptian 
female cyberactivists.   These female cyberactivists represent a rich array of 
viewpoints, political activity, and online presence; however, they are by no means 
representative of all Egyptian female cyberactivists.  Among the bloggers omitted 
include Dalia Ziada, Mona Eltahawy, Mona Seif and Nadia El Saadawi.  Dalia 
Ziad is a political and human rights activist who co-founded an Egyptian political 
party and ran for parliament after the revolution.  She has won numerous awards 
for her blogging from the news organizations such as the Daily Beast and 
Newsweek.  Feminist writer and journalist Mona Eltahawy used her twitter and 
clout as an internationally respected journalist to highlight sexual harassment 
and gender violence during the protests.  News journalist Mona Seif braved the 
protests every day to capture, document and upload content online providing 
hourly updates of the protests.  Renowned feminist writer and physician Nawal 
El Saadawi, 79 years old at the time of the protests, camped out in Tahrir Square 
day and night, providing coverage of the protests for international news media 
sources such as Democracy Now.  These women held instrumental roles in the 
Egyptian dignity revolution, mobilizing Egyptians to protest via Facebook, 
documenting the clashes between the police and the protestors in Tahrir via 
Twitter, and highlighting the incidents of gender violence and sexual harassment 
that occurred in blogs and news articles.  However, due to space and time 
constraints, this chapter will limit its analysis to the six Egyptian female 
cyberactivists described below.   
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This section will begin with April 6th activists Asmaa Mahfouz and Esraa 
Abdel-Fattah, examining their role as Egyptian “Facebook girls” organizing for 
the January 25, 2011 National Police Day demonstration (#Jan25).  From 
Mahfouz and Abdel-Fattah’s demonstration of female discursive activism online, 
this section will turn to an analysis of internationally renowned bloggers Zeinab 
Mohammed, Nadia El-Awady, and Arwa Saleh Mahmoud.  Mohammed, El-
Awady, Mahmoud used their blogs to document the protests through citizen 
journalism, live-tweeting and blogging the revolution.  Finally, it will conclude 
with Islamic feminist and cyberactivist Fatma Emam, unpacking her experience 
protesting and the role of Islamic feminism in the revolt.  These female 
cyberactivists witnessed diverse experiences protesting, blogging and posting in 
Egyptian colloquial Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic and English to perform 
multiple identities online.   
Throughout, these close-readings ask: How and when do these female 
activists use digital technologies and social media?  What gendered messages do 
they transmit?  How do these Egyptian female cyberactivists articulate agency 
online and offline?  And, what comparisons can be made with the actions of 
Tunisian and Moroccan female cyberactivists?  In response to the questions 
posed above, this section will bring in the previous discussions of Egyptian 
gender relations and the rise of digital technologies to inform the analysis of 
these six Egyptian female cyberactivists.  Ultimately, it will argue that digital 
media technologies and social networking sites enabled women to inhabit new 
spaces offline and online during the Egyptian revolution, transcending the 
demarcation of public and private in Egypt.  In these spaces, they deployed 
 diverse identities and articulated multiple modalities of agency that inserted their 
presence into the public sphere.    
 
 
 
 
 
A Call to Action: Asmaa Mahfouz and 
 
Many Egyptian female activists realized the significance of their bodily 
presence and used their presence to challenge and rally Egyptian citizens.  As 
founding members of the Egyptian April 6
and Esraa Abdel-Fattah have interacted on all forms of media
YouTube, blogs, etc.  International media sites such as Al Jazeera, BBC and Open 
Democracy dubbed Mahfouz and Abdel
online activism leading to the #Jan25 protest.  
Esraa Abdel-Fattah’s Twitter Profile @Esraa2008 with 328,000 follo
Their movement participated in creating the #Jan25 protest in Egypt with the 
“We are all Khaled Said
to protest on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.  Asmaa Mahfouz posted her first 
                                                       
48 On April 6, 2008, Mahfouz and fellow bloggers Ahmed Maher and Ahmed Salah organized 
support for a workers strike in the industrial town of El
Facebook to mobilize Egyptian citizens to protest.  The movement became known as the April 6
movement and continued to be active online until they collaborated with Wael Ghonim and 
Kefaya to hold the National Police Day protests January 25, 2011.   
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Esraa Abdel-Fattah
th protest movement48, Asmaa Mahfouz 
—Facebook, Twitter, 
-Fattah “Facebook Girls,” for their prolific 
 
” Facebook page.  In addition, they issued their own calls 
 
-Mahalla El-Kubra.  They turned to 
 
 
 
wers. 
th 
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video blog (vlog) 49  on January 18, 2011, a week before the protest was to occur 
on January 25.  Esraa Abdel-Fattah identifies as an Egyptian political activist, 
although she took a brief hiatus after her detainment by the police in 2006.  In an 
interview with The Cairo Review of Global Affairs January 27, 2011, she stated, 
“We used social media to organize ourselves in a very active way. To publicize the 
event the way we want, and to make coverage for the events that happened in the 
street. And when we broadcast what happened, at the same time we encouraged 
them to join us in the street.”  Besides her activism, Esraa acted as a bridge 
between Al Jazeera and the protests, tweeting updates as the protestors moved to 
occupy Tahrir Square after the January 25th protests.     
In her first video posted to her Facebook page on January 18, 2011, Asmaa 
Mahfouz appeared in the fashionably conservative attire of professional 
Egyptian Muslim women and wearing a hijab.  Mahfouz spoke in impassioned 
colloquial Egyptian Arabic and challenged her audience to participate in the 
protests, stating, “If you think yourself a man, come with me on January 25th.  
Whoever said women shouldn’t go to protests because they’ll be beaten, let him 
have some honor and manhood and come with me on January 25th.”  Egyptian 
activists, including among them Wael Ghonim (creator of the “We are all Khaled 
Said” Facebook page) credit Mahfouz with inspiring Egyptian citizens to take to 
the streets on January 25th and march to Tahrir Square.  In the days following, 
her video circulated online on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.  Egyptian 
viewers from within and without the country responded to her Facebook post 
                                                        
49 Asmaa Mahfouz vblog January 18, 2011. YouTube. Accessed November 7, 2013.  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk> 
 with reshares, likes, comments and images of themselves, their family or even 
their children with the words “
Asmaa Mahfouz reiterated her call to arms in another vlog posted to her 
Facebook page.   
Asmaa Mahfouz’s vlog on January 18, 2011
urging Egyptian women and men to protest in #Jan25 demonstration.
By facing and speaking to the camera, Mahfouz projected a feminine 
image on the protests, inscribing her body as the “Egyptian revolutionary woman.”  
Lasting four minutes and thirty
veiled Mahfouz holding a sign to her che
protest to bring down Mr. Mubarak’s regime. In a 2011 interview with the New 
York Times, she stated that her desire to be visible and reach as many people as 
possible inspired her to produce the video. Importantly, her ‘
translated as her desire to be visible as a Muslim, female subject, demonstrated 
by her hijab.  Mahfouz located her position as a girl
the opening lines of the video, “I posted that I, a girl, am going to Tahrir Square 
and I will stand alone.”   Her use of the identifier ‘girl’ rather than ‘woman’ can be 
read as both a challenge to Egyptian men and notions as well as an appeal to 
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I will go to Tahrir on #Jan25.”  On January 24, 
 
-two seconds, the January 18th video shows a 
st saying that she would go out and 
desire to be visible’ 
—rather than a woman
 
 
—in 
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cultural notions of ‘the mother’ or ‘daughters.’  By identifying as a female, 
Mahfouz revealed her conscious desire to transgress the separation of private 
‘women’s space’ and public ‘men’s space.’  Articulated via the Internet, her 
message transcended spatial boundaries, reaching beyond the Tahrir Square, to 
the rest of Cairo and all of Egypt through Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.  
International news organizations such as Al Jazeera and Democracy Now took 
her video, translated her message into English, and posted subtitles on the video, 
making it accessible to English speakers as well.   
Throughout the video, she directed her message at Egyptian men, using 
gendered language with the Arabic masculine ‘you.’50  This choice of subject 
iterates Mahfouz’s gendered message and her challenge to Egyptian men.  
Halfway through the video, she stated, “If you think yourself a man, come with 
me on January 25th.  Whoever said women shouldn’t go to protests because 
they’ll be beaten, let him have some honor and manhood and come with me on 
January 25th.”  She reiterated the challenge to male masculinity in the following 
sentence, “If you have honor and dignity as a man, come. Come and protect 
other girls in the protest.”  These statements complicate a Western feminist 
analysis connecting agency with subjectivity.  As Mahmood asks in Politics of 
Piety (2005), how can a challenge that reasserts traditional gender roles (such as 
masculinity, men as the protector) articulate the feminist subject?  In many ways, 
the examples described above iterate a hyperperformance of Egyptian gender 
roles and norms.  Mahfouz over-emphasized her own femininity while at the 
                                                        
50 While I consulted a YouTube clip with subtitles and the Democracy Now news transcript, I also 
listened to Mahfouz’s vlogs and transcribed them in Arabic then translated the quotes I chose to 
use into English.  I did so in order to ensure I analyzed her language with accuracy.   
 108
same time insinuating it has more ‘honor’ and ‘duty’ than male masculinity.  
Thus, her actions can be read as subverting the gender binary from within it.    
 When viewing Asmaa Mahfouz’s vblogs and reading her blogposts, Twitter 
posts, Facebook, etc, it is important to view her as responding to and inhabiting 
multiple discourses.  She articulated resistance to state power (represented by 
Mubarak) through her deployment of feminist activism within the constructed 
Egyptian and Islamic gender binary.  When she identified as the ‘daughter of 
Egypt’ or as a ‘mother,’ she expressed resistance through appropriating these 
norms and saying ‘Look, here I am, in the streets’ and challenging the separation 
of public male spaces and private female spaces.  When she stated, “let him have 
some honor and come with me,” she appropriated the religious and cultural 
discourse surrounding Islamic values of honor to encourage Egyptian citizens to 
protest.  On the surface, her videos sees to only protest Mubarak’s regime; 
however, a closer analysis reveals their embodied resistance to constructed 
categories of gender in Islamic Egyptian culture.     
Asmaa Mahfouz and Esraa Abdel-Fattah transgressed the boundary 
between public/private space through their online activism.  Employing activist 
language, they used digital media as a tool to inform and convey messages as 
well as challenge certain gender perceptions.  In their activism, they articulated 
multiple identities, resisting both President Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian 
regime and Egyptian and Islamic gender roles. Mahfouz claimed the right to 
stand in the streets next to her fellow Egyptian citizens, male and female, in her 
video blogs—a claim Abdel-Fattah echoed in her Facebook posts and Twitter 
accounts.  By using Facebook to upload a vblog, Mahfouz projected her body and 
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marked it as a revolutionary symbol, similar to the images of Khaled Said beaten 
body on the “We are all Khaled Said Facebook” page and video of Tunisian street 
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolation.  However, she emphasized her role 
as a living feminine symbol, calling herself the ‘daughter of Egypt’ or the 
‘Facebook Girl.’  Esraa Abdel-Fattah and Asmaa Mahfouz claimed their place in 
Tahrir Square and in Egyptian society through these digital technologies, 
transmitting their message to all Egyptians online.  The following sections 
introduces Egyptian female cyber activists Nadia El-Awady and Arwa Saleh, 
moving from calls to action issued by feminine bodies online to female 
experiences and narratives of protest.   
 
Narratives of Protest: The Inner Workings of My Mind and Al Hurr 
 Nadia El-Awady created the Wordpress blog The Inner Workings of My 
Mind in 2009.  She used it as a space to post science journal articles she had 
written, to document her travels and to reflect on the role of Islam in her life.  An 
Egyptian raised in America, El-Awady discussed the conflicting identities she 
navigated growing up in her blog posts.  In her video blogs, she appeared in a 
hijab, but also mentioned that she had distanced herself from her conservative 
Islamic background.  Her posts have ranged from discussions of faith—she wore 
the face veil for 8 years—to asserting her independence and the independence of 
all women within and through Islam.  At the time of the revolution in 2011, she 
was living and working in Egypt after attending university there. While aware of 
the #Jan25 event created on Facebook by the “We are all Khaled Said” page, El-
Awady and her friend and fellow blogger Arwa Saleh Mahmoud of Al Hurr 
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doubted the turn-out as well as the ability of those she describes as “privileged, 
educated activists” to affect change.  Mahmoud reflected in English on her blog 
on February 20, 2011 “As I later found out, we were like many other skeptical 
Egyptians who were going out of a fading sense of duty. We knew there was 
nothing else we could do if we wanted any change.”  Yet, on January 25th, 2011, 
Nadia El-Awady found herself in a taxi heading to the protests in downtown 
Cairo with Arwa Saleh Mahmoud.    
 She documented her experiences in English with photos and videos 
uploaded to YouTube via her blog and includes links to both her blog post and 
her YouTube account on her Facebook page.  In addition, she also archived all of 
her tweets from January 25 to February 12 2011 on her blog.  Individuals from all 
over the globe followed 
El-Awady’s twitter 
account and blog; one 
Filipino living in the 
Netherlands even wrote 
a blog post about the 
impact her twitter 
narrative had on him and 
the 8100 other followers 
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she had.51  El-Awady’s tweets and videos depicted the protests’ escalation from 
January 25th-29th.  The picture below was uploaded on January 25th  via twitpic 
with the tweet, “Downtown Cairo now #jan25;” the image had five retweets, 2 
favorites, one Google Plus share and two Facebook likes.   These videos compose 
the majority of her initial posts, with an average of several thousand views for 
each video by December 2013.  Taken from a mobile phone, the videos captured 
her voice and reaction to the protests and exhibitions of violence she witnesses.  
A video she uploaded on January 25th 7:02 pm depicts the women’s participation 
in the protests; it films a crowd of people chanting [indiscernible, but something 
like 1,2, the people want…].  In this 48-second clip, the fist of a veiled woman in 
front of her shoots into the sky next to blue screens from mobile phones and 
cameras capturing the moment.  The camera shakes slightly as El-Awady’s voice 
joins the Egyptians around her chanting in Egyptian colloquial Arabic, “Ash-shab 
yurid isqat an-nizam” (the people want to bring down the regime).   
Nadia El-Awady’s videos and posts from the Egyptian Day of Rage on 
January 29th, 2011 exposed the rising violence of the protests, caused by police 
forces firing with real and not rubber bullets.  El-Awady and Mahmoud first 
encounter tear gas on the march to Tahrir when the police use it to prevent 
protestors to entering the square:  
 Already our faces are covered with scarves to protect as best as 
possible from the gas. Arwa seems to yell, “RUN!” I run away from 
the police and through the horrid cloud of gas forming behind us. 
As I run, I need to take deeper breaths, but I can’t because that 
means breathing in the tear gas. When I do breathe, it feels like acid 
                                                        
51 Butalid, Carlo. “The Egyptian Revolution from Nadia’s Eyes.” Carol’s Think Piece: Reflections of 
a Filipino in the Netherlands. 11 February 2011. Web. Accessed 26 February 2014.  
<http://butalidnl.wordpress.com/2011/02/11/the-egyptian-revolution-from-nadias-eyes/> 
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is being poured down my throat. When I hold my breath as I run, I 
almost black out and faint. I continue on, my heart pounding (The 
Inner Workings of My Mind, March 11, 2011) 
 
Another time, Arwa Salah Mahmoud and her took shelter from the tear gas and 
the shooting in a building with many other people.  El-Awady filmed Mahmoud 
in Arabic and English explaining the events going on around them as others 
protestors seeking refuge add commentary, “People are taking shelter.  Police and 
protestors are both taking shelters.  Where is the enemy here? I really don’t 
know.”52  The next videos showed El-Awady and Mahmoud running from tear gas 
and gunshots; the camera lens pointed towards the ground and shaking back and 
forth as they ran down the streets amidst yells and the ricocheting of gunshots 
and the sirens screeching. Although the two Egyptian women experienced various 
forms of violence in the streets, El-Awady continued to videotape and protest 
until street thugs broke her camera in the first days of February.     
Both Arwa Saleh Mahmoud and Nadia El-Awady emphasized their ability 
to slip in-between the police forces and protestors, switching identities in order to 
pass through unmolested:  
 …Nadia and I were able to penetrate even to the side of the police, 
changing our occupations and purposes of being in the street as we 
went along depending on who asked us. One minute we were 
journalists, the other we were trying to get home (Al Hurr, 
February 20, 2011).  
 
Their freedom of movement during the daytime protests did not carry over into 
the night. El-Awady wrote that it was still necessary to walk home at night 
escorted by several male friends as a curfew was instated and random acts of 
                                                        
52 El-Awady, Nadia. The Inner Workings of My Mind. “Arwa explains whats happening in 
building” 2 February 2011. Web. Accessed January 29 2014.  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=S3je0YwYlzE> 
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looting and violence began occurring in downtown Cairo.  However, those acts of 
violence differed from the prevalence of gender violence and street harassment 
directed at women before the revolution began.  The women noted the absence of 
sexual harassment for those 18 days in their blogs.   In the tweet shown below, El-
Awady applauds the lack of gender violence on January 25, “Thousands of young 
men and no harassment to be seen.  I love you Egypt #jan25.”    
 
 Nadia El-Awady and Arwa Saleh Mahmoud articulated multiple identities 
in their online narratives.  Acting simultaneously as journalists, protestors, 
women, and Egyptian citizens, they witnessed first-hand the power that the 
crowds gained as they marched towards Tahrir Square.  Writing in her reflection 
on February 20th, Mahmoud recounted, “The crowds were finally able to enter 
Tahrir….The further the protesters advanced the more cheerful they became, and 
soon they were joined by thousands more coming into Tahrir from all directions. 
Tahrir had become theirs” (Al Hurr, February 20, 2011).  Their blog posts and 
reflections marked the transition they underwent in those 18 days—from 
skeptical observers and archivists of activism they became active participants.  
El-Awady’s video translated into citizen journalism and kept her followers 
(numbering 70,000 in 2014) informed of the protestors’ advances.  Arwa Saleh 
Mahmoud acknowledges the power shift the protests engendered in the final 
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words of her reflection, “Something very big had happened in my country. The 
people were no longer afraid, the regime was” (Al Hurr, February 20, 2011).   
 Nadia El-Awady and Arwa Saleh present detailed narratives of their 
participation in the Egyptian Revolution protests from January to February 2011.  
Their use of digital technologies while protesting enabled them to document and 
share the events as they were happening online.  They acted as citizen journalists 
to move in and out of the protests and participated in the demonstration marches 
to Tahrir Square.  For example, El-Awady’s 8,100 Twitter followers used her as a 
source to know when and where the protests were occurring.  The next section 
offers a different example on the use of digital technologies and social media for 
citizen journalism in the Egyptian revolution.  Egyptian cyberactivist Zeinab 
Mohammed live-tweeted (@zeinobia) and blogged (Egyptian Chronicles) her 
participation in the revolution, documenting the events unfolding in Tahrir 
Square and the streets of Cairo when the state media refused to do so.   
 
 
Citizen Journalism: Egyptian Chronicles (Zeinab Mohammed) 
On January 19, 2011, Zeinab Mohammed of Egyptian Chronicles wrote, 
“Anyhow after a week we shall see what is going on the 25th of January 2011 and 
whether it will be remarkable like the 25th of January 1952.”  An Egyptian 
journalist, Mohammed’s blogposts intertwined citizen journalism and discursive 
activism, interspersed with videos, tweets, and links to other bloggers’ sites and 
news articles.  Later, on, she included the applications Twitter and Google created 
specifically for activists in the Arab revolutions “Speak to Tweet” and “Cover it 
 and Arabic, her blog reached a diverse audience with 76,009 views as of February 
13, 2014.   
Zeinab Mohammed demonstrates both the importance of citizen 
journalism to the Egyptian Revolution as well as the necessity of inhabiting 
multi-media platforms to disseminate information
YouTube, Flickr, and traditional
blogosphere and expanded into the streets, reflected by the images of protests she 
posted and the reception her blog posts and 
and English she appealed to internationa
language reveals that she is conscious of the impact of the Tunisian revolution 
and the power structures her discourse disrupts.  She wrote in English and Arabic 
on January 25th, 2011:  
The protests have not started b
“Insh Allah” [Godwilling] because it showed how much the regime 
is scared from the people, the regime freaked out after knowing that 
thousands accepted the protest invitation online not even offline.  
Thanks to our Tunisian brother our regime began to fear us more 
and more.  That scared regime is actually a weak one that has no 
confidence in itself, sooner or later it will fail (
January 25, 2011). 
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Live,” shown in the image on the right.
apps uploaded a live stream of her tweets 
simultaneously to Twitter, Blogspot, and 
Facebook.  She identified as, “just Egyptian girl 
who lives in the present with the glories of the 
past and hopes in a better future for herself 
and for her country.”  Writing in both English 
—posting on twitter, Facebook, 
 media sites.  Her connectivity traced across the 
tweets received.  By posting in Arabic 
l, regional, and local audiences.  Her 
ut I will say that the day is successful 
Egyptian Chronicles
 
  These 
, 
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In the statement above, she identified a power dichotomy between the regime—
Mubarak’s government—and the ‘people.’  However, the Egyptian citizens 
occupying virtual and physical space disrupted the power dichotomy—revealing 
that the people can and do have power.  Thus, for Mohammed, the impending 
#Jan25 protest in Tahrir Square threatened the hierarchy of political and 
governing power in Egypt as the Tunisian protests in the cities of Sidi Bouzid and 
Tunis destabilized the Tunisian regime’s power.   
Mohammed, like many cyberactivists, believed in the power of Facebook 
and online activism for inciting protests.  She referenced the January 25th 
protests invite created by the “We are all Khaled Said Facebook” page several 
times, writing three days before protest began:  
The January 25th protest is getting serious attention more and 
more. More Facebook pages and groups are calling for the #25 Jan 
and more political groups are going to participate in the huge event.  
They are about 17 groups.  Many are praying that it be the start of a 
new thing in Egypt. Now if you are interested in following the 
protest on twitter to know its updates then follow this hash tag 
[#jan25] (Egyptian Chronicles, January 22, 2011).   
 
In the above quote, Mohammed connected the upcoming protests to online 
activism and grassroots organizing, using the hashtag #jan25 on Twitter and in 
her blog and posting about the Egyptian Facebook pages organizing the protests.  
She also noted earlier in the post that thousands of Egyptians had joined the 
event created by the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page.  Multiple digital 
media platforms appeared in each of her posts, reflecting the importance of 
deploying many digital technologies to reach as many people as possible.   
 Zeinab Mohammed live tweeted Mubarak’s speech addressed to the revolutionaries 
 From January 25
Tahrir with photos and video, documenting the events as th
blog, twitter, Facebook page and email.  Her posts reflected the fervor unfolding 
events, as hundreds of thousands of Egyptians thronged the streets of Cairo, 
clashing with police and thugs hired by the government.  She attempted to 
describe the sounds, smells, and passion of the people
universalizing word ‘we’ or ‘ours.’  Her voice flowed back and forth from first 
person to third person as she reflected on her own experiences or appeals to the 
‘Egyptian’ ‘us’ experience.  V
performing protest songs interspersed her political dialogue.  Yet, as February 
11th approached, her language and the frequency of her posts reveal that the 
revolution was approaching an apex, writing on Februar
the way!!”  Using the “Cover it Live” app, she live blogged Mubarak’s speech on 
February 10, 2011; this app includes the comments and responses to her tweets as 
well.  Thus, when Zeinab Mohammed tweeted, “Mubarak: God bless Egyp
peace upon you #Mubarakspeech,” a commenter responds, “the whole speech so 
far is a affront to those, who give their time, days and nights, their blood, and 
even their lives for this revolution…” The screenshot above depicts this 
interaction.  At the end of this live blog, Mohammed announced that February 11, 
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February 10, 2011. 
th to February 11th, Mohammed narrated the protests in 
ey happened on her 
—repeating the 
ideos of couples marrying and famous singers 
y 10th, “a possible coup in 
 
t and 
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2011 will be a ‘Day of Rage’ in Tahrir Square in response to Mubarak’s speech and 
urged everyone to protest.     
 The actions of the Egyptian female cyberactivists Asmaa Mahfouz, Esraa 
Abdel-Fattah, Nadia El-Awady, Arwa Saleh Mahmoud and Zeinab Mohammed 
depicted in the previous three sections illustrate how Egyptian women used their 
blogs, Facebooks and Twitter accounts to document the protests and to 
encourage Egyptian citizens to protest.  They posted in Egyptian colloquial Arabic, 
Modern Standard Arabic, and English to connect with Egyptians in the country 
and to inform the international audience of the unfolding uprising.   The final 
section of this chapter shifts from narratives of protest and citizen journalism.  It 
introduces Fatma Emam, an Egyptian women who blogs under the name 
Brownie.  Emam turned to her blog to reflect on the challenges the protests 
placed to her identity as an Islamic feminist.  Her internal struggles depict the 
conflicting identities Egyptian women deployed online and in the streets 
throughout the revolution.     
 
Narratives of Protest, Gender and Islam: Brownie 
 As stated in the previous three sections, digital media can foster 
connectivity and solidarity for women, enabling them to inhabit private, public, 
and cyber space simultaneously.  This final close reading analyzes Fatma Emam’s 
blog Brownie, examining how her cyber activism during the Egyptian 2011 revolt 
created a space for women to perform multiple, conflicting identities and forge 
coalitions between secular and Islamic feminists.  As a research assistant for 
Cairo NGO Nazra for Feminist Studies, Emam writes within the context of 
 119
Egyptian feminism and gender politics.  Her blog posts explore the intersection of 
faith and gender that shape her life.  For example, on her first day Emam 
participated in the protests, she wrote about her experience afterwords:  
I was very self-conscious, I found it too hard to unite with the 
masses. One example when the prayer time came, I did not pray, 
because I was afraid that the prayer were lead by the Muslim 
brotherhood, which was proved that the prayers were not political 
and felt annoyed by the chants of the seculars calling to the prayer 
because it is Islamisation of the revolution (Brownie, February 9, 
2011).   
 
In this post, Fatma Emam expressed her sense of displacement and alienation 
within the protests.  Her response to the protests differed from the expressions of 
overwhelming nationhood felt by female bloggers such as Zeinab Mohammed of 
Egyptian Chronicles.  Emam pointed to the confusion over prayer’s place in 
Tahrir, highlighting her uncertainty over the role of political Islam represented by 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the revolution.   
 On February 9th, 2011 Fatma Emam wrote in English how she believed 
that the revolutions in Egypt were not just a revolution against Mubarak and the 
status quo, but a revolution against the patriarchy embedded within the regime 
and reflected in Egyptian culture:  
The revolution is not only in Tahrir, it is in every Egyptian house, it 
is the revolution of fighting the patriarch as Hind said.  In this 
revolution the women fought for their private and public life and 
this is the core of our feminist struggle as Mozn said (Brownie, 
February 9, 2011).   
 
Her post referenced the historical and cultural division of private and public life.  
It noted that, while no longer explicit, this division continues to permeate 
Egyptian society.  In many ways, Fatma Emam’s posts echo Asmaa Mahfouz’s 
challenge to Egyptian masculinity in her January 18 and January 25 vlogs.  
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Although Mahfouz does not identify as a feminist, she employed similar language 
about gender parity.  Both women claimed their right to protest in the streets and 
challenge the relegation of Egyptian women to the home.  Emam implicated the 
Muslim Brotherhood for enshrining these patriarchal values dividing society and 
subjugating women, thus explaining her uneasy feelings towards their presence 
in Tahrir Square before Mubarak stepped down.  But at the same time, she 
identified as an Islamic feminist, “As an Islamic feminist, I disagree with this, I 
believe in a secular state…in this state everyone express his/her beliefs” (Brownie, 
February 9, 2011).  Consequently, she refuted the Muslim Brotherhood for their 
distortion of the Islam she practiced and viewed as complementary to feminist 
ideals.     
 Throughout the protests, Fatma Emam used her blog to unpack her 
experiences during the Egyptian revolution rather than employing it for citizen 
journalism, documenting human rights violations, or organizing for events.  Her 
posts reflected her encounters with the protests in Tahrir Square as well as the 
participation of the women and men around her.  On February 4th, nine days 
after the protests began, she professed her surprise with the participation of 
women in the protests—not that they were present—but the ways in which they 
participated:    
…I am proud to say that The Egyptian women are playing an 
extraordinary role in the revolution, they are fighting for private 
and public rights, they are claiming their rights as equal citizens in 
this country.   
 
When I was in Tahrir, I saw young and old women, veiled and non-
veiled women, and political oriented women and non political 
women.  
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I saw them side to side to the men, they did not listen to the 
traditional calls that Tahrir is not a place for women.  
 
I saw the Egyptian women doing untraditional roles in organizing, 
strategizing. Spreading the information and leading the revolution. 
They were everywhere writing new line of the herstory of women 
(Brownie, February 4, 2011).  
 
In the excerpt taken from her blog above, Fatma Emam located the Egyptian 
uprising as a revolutionary event for Egyptian women and their “herstory.”  Again, 
she noted that women were fighting for “private and public rights” and were 
issuing claims for gender parity in Egyptian politics and society.  Echoing 
Mahfouz once more, she highlighted the presence of women in a place—Tahrir 
Square—not traditionally demarcated for them.   
 Emam’s experience of the Egyptian revolution from January 25, 2011 to 
February 14, 2011 reflect the fears, anxieties, excitement, and anticipation that 
faced Egyptian female cyberactivists.  Her posts provide an insight into the 
complex and conflicting emotions that guided these women in their actions.  Her 
voice shifted in the post illustrated above on February 4th, from wary of the role of 
political Islam in the protests to proud of and inspired by the actions of the 
Egyptian women protesting throughout Cairo.  Fatma Emam’s blog demonstrates 
how Egyptian female cyberactivists merged the personal and political in their 
lives, carving out new spaces in the public sphere to protest and voice their 
agency—both online and in Tahrir Square.    
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5.4 Conclusion: Revolutionary Echoes  
The above sections offer only a snapshot of the vast and dizzying array of 
the Egyptian blogosphere and the role Egyptian female cyberactivists played in 
the Egyptian dignity revolution from January 25 to February 14, 2011.  These six 
female cyberactivists, Asmaa Mahfouz, Esraa Abdel-Fattah, Nadia El-Awady, 
Arwa Saleh Mahmoud, Zeinab Mohammed, and Fatma Emam, represent but a 
few of the myriad Egyptian women who participated in the revolution.  
Employing a wide range of digital technologies, they participated in diverse ways 
in the online and physical protests.  Some, like Asmaa Mahfouz, Esraa Abdel-
Fattah, and Zeinab Mohammed, were involved with the organization of the 
#Jan25 protest on the National Police Day.  Others, such as Nadia El-Awady and 
Arwa Saleh Mahmoud, found themselves headed to the protest reluctantly and 
with the certainty that January 25, 2011 would be like any other demonstration in 
Egypt—crushed by the police.  And many, such as Fatma Emam, wrestled with 
their decision to protest, inhibited by fear of the violence and suspicious of how to 
perform their feminist piety in the midst of secular Egyptians and political 
Islamists.   
Despite these differences, this chapter has argued three main points: 1) 
Egyptian female cyberactivists inhabited multiple digital platforms to articulate 
specific gendered messages using English, Modern Standard Arabic and Egyptian 
colloquial Arabic; 2) Egyptian female cyberactivists used digital technologies to 
share information between cyber space and the protests in the streets, connecting 
online activism to physical demonstrations; 3) Egyptian female cyberactivists 
used virtual space to simultaneously mobilize followers to protest and reflect on 
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their own experiences of revolution.  Thus, this chapter concludes that the digital 
media technologies and social networking sites these six Egyptian female 
cyberactivists used enabled them to inhabit new spaces during the Egyptian 
revolution, transcending the demarcation of public and private in Egypt.  
Cyberactivism provided them with liberating and emancipatory possibilities, as 
Radsch notes, “…cyberactivism was fundamentally about linking virtual dissent 
with physical protest, influencing the mainstream media, setting the media and 
public policy agenda, and framing the debate about political rights and civil 
liberties, including the role of women” (2012).  Thus, through Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, Wordpress, Blogspot, etc., Egyptian female cyberactivists claimed their 
place to participate in the Egyptian revolutions and carved new spaces to 
articulate agency.  These women deployed a multiplicity of femininities and 
identities throughout the protests, from the revolutionary woman depicted by 
Asmaa Mahfouz, the citizen journalist illustrated by Nadia El-Awady, to the 
Islamic feminist demonstrated by Fatma Emam.      
Although the Egyptian revolution differed from its predecessor, the 
Tunisian Dignity Revolution from December 17 to January 14, 2011, the actions of 
Egyptian female cyberactivist parallel their Tunisian female cyberactivists 
counterparts.  Through digital technologies and social networking sites, these 
Egyptian and Tunisian women connected physical protests with online activism, 
bringing marginalized discussions of sexuality, gender, sexual harassment, 
women’s political power, social, cultural, and religious gender norms to the 
forefront.  Facebook and Twitter connected women, enabling them to share other 
websites and information, to organize information using hashtags (#), and to 
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direct information towards outside sources, such as international media, 
journalists, etc using the @ sign.  Tunisian and Egyptian female cyberactivists 
deployed their identities online, subverting established gender roles, and 
embodying resistance to the regime as well as the patriarchal norms embedded 
within its discourse.   
The subsequent chapter will introduce the final country case study of 
Morocco.  Protest movements in Morocco differed greatly from those in Tunisia 
and Egypt.  From the millions storming the streets and demanding the overthrow 
of the regime in Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco’s temperate demands for civil 
reform and end to government corruption seem small in comparison.  However, 
the 2011 Moroccan protest movement achieved significant gains for women’s 
rights and saw the emergence of new networks of feminist activism and female 
reverberations online and in the streets.  This chapter will argue that Moroccan 
female activists used digital technologies to carve new spaces to articulate agency 
and demand gender parity, echoing the actions of Tunisian and Egyptian female 
cyberactivists.   
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Chapter 6:  Morocco: The 20th of February 
Movement 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moroccan female protestors holding the letter ‘F’ to symbolize the importance of 
Facebook in the protest movement in Rabat on March 20, 2011, photo taken from 
Reuters/Adam Tanner 
As millions of Tunisians and Egyptians took to the streets and political 
upheaval reverberated across North Africa in 2011, toppling Tunisian President 
Ben Ali in January and Egyptian President Mubarak in February, Morocco’s 
young political activists and thriving civil society groups gathered online and in 
the streets to challenge the ruling government.  The 2011-2012 Moroccan protests 
differed from the violent upheaval experienced in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 
focusing on moderate civil society action and constitutional reform.  Although 
Moroccan activists did not demand the end of the regime or the removal of King 
Mohammed VI, they succeeded in drawing attention to government corruption, 
Image removed for copyright reasons. 
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highlighting political, social, cultural, and religious gender inequalities, and 
bringing marginalized voices into the public sphere.  Prompted by the Facebook 
group “Freedom and Democracy Now53” created on January 27, 2011, a group of 
women and men youth activists issued a statement and posted a video directed at 
King Mohammed VI.  Among other demands, the thirteen activists stated on 
their Facebook page:  “We declare to organize a demonstration on February 20th, 
2011 beginning at ten in the morning in all Moroccan cities, stand in front of the 
states representations of central authority54.”  In the video they posted on the 
“Freedom and Democracy Now” Facebook page, Moroccan women and men 
faced the camera and appealed to Moroccan citizens to protest government 
corruption on February 20.  Echoing Asmaa Mahfouz’s challenge to Egyptian 
citizens on January 18, 2011, these Moroccan activists projected bodily images for 
Moroccans to identify with and rally around.  Thirteen female and male activists 
speak in their native Darija (Moroccan colloquial Arabic)55 or Amazigh (Berber), 
“I am a Moroccan and I will take part in the protest February 20th.”  The video 
circulated online, garnering hundreds of thousands of views on YouTube.  
Thousands of Moroccans responded to this video and advocacy campaign, joining 
a coalition of university students, youth groups, women’s right groups, and other 
civil society actors protesting throughout the country on February 20, 2011.  
Unlike the preceding Tunisian and Egyptian chapters, which analyzed the 
online activity of individual female cyberactivists, this chapter will focus on the 
                                                        
53 Translated from Modern Standard Arabic, the language of governance in Morocco.  I will 
unpack this relationship further later on in this chapter.  
54 “Freedom and Democracy Now.” Translated. Web. Accessed January 20 2014. 
<https://www.facebook.com/groups/MLEDM/> 
55 Mouvement20fevrier. “Campagne 20 février.”  YouTube. 13 February 2011. Web. Accessed 
January 20 2014.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_LF0JqnMzw.   
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role of Moroccan female activists in the 20th of February movement and the 
creation of new networks of online female activism from this movement.  In 
addition, this chapter will also examine the influence of Moroccan feminism and 
the relationship between language and power in the Moroccan 2011 protests.  As 
Moroccan sociologist Zakia Salime has argued in a recent article exploring the 
role of Moroccan feminism in the 20th of February movement, “feminism has not 
only penetrated the social imagery of a new generation of activists, but has also 
informed their practices” (2012).  Therefore, this chapter will also investigate 
whether Moroccan female activists’ language expressed, as Salime argues, 
feminist terminology and observe the ways in which gendered language and 
feminist terminology affects Moroccan female cyberactivists’ demands for 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights.  Thus, this chapter poses several 
key questions: How did Moroccan women perform their activism and demands 
for gender parity in the 20ll protests?  What role did digital technologies play in 
their activism?  What languages did Moroccan female cyberactivists deploy and 
for what purpose did they do so?  And, what conclusions can be drawn about the 
role of female cyberactivism during the 2011 protests given the previous evidence 
presented on Tunisian and Egyptian female cyberactivism?    
In order to response to the questions detailed above, this chapter first 
locates its analysis of Moroccan female cyberactivism in the history of protest 
culture and political reform and the use of digital media in Morocco preceding 
the revolution, focusing specifically on women’s rights issues.  Then, it moves to 
(de)construct the gender binary in Morocco through a linguistic analysis guided 
by the Moroccan feminist theorist Fatima Sadiqi, examining how the gender 
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binary has been constructed through language, religion, and the division of 
urban/rural and public/private space. This section connects the Moroccan gender 
binary and political, cultural, linguistic, and religious gender inequalities with the 
pervasive sexual harassment and gender violence Moroccan men perpetrate 
against women in the streets.  Finally, this chapter turns to an analysis of the role 
of Moroccan female activists in the February 20th movement from February 2011 
to January 2012.  This final section has two main arguments.  First, it contends 
that online activism, specifically videos, subverts the demarcation of languages 
with power (French and Modern Standard Arabic) and languages without power 
(Moroccan colloquial Darija and Berber) in Morocco. Second, it argues that the 
2011 Moroccan protests facilitated the creation of new networks of female 
cyberactivism, projecting marginalized Moroccan female bodies and voices into 
the public sphere.  In conclusion, this chapter locates the role of Moroccan female 
activists in the February 20th movement and the growth of female networks 
online during the 2011 protests within the context of this thesis, comparing and 
contrasting it to the actions of the Tunisian and Egyptian female cyberactivists 
discussed in the previous two chapters. 
Throughout, this chapter will argue that digital technologies and social 
media enabled Moroccan female cyberactivists to subvert constructed gender and 
language divides and create new networks of female reverberations online during 
the 2011 Moroccan protests.  Furthermore, their use of digital technologies and 
social media paralleled the actions of Tunisian and Egyptian female cyberactivists 
despite the modest scope of the Moroccan protest movements.  
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6.1 Protest Culture and a History of Reform  
 Morocco has suffered from government censorship and restricted freedom 
of speech since the beginning of King Hassan II’s rule in 1961.  The government’s 
restrictive policies extended into the reign of his son, King Mohammad VI ((Zaid 
& Ibrahime, 2011).  From 1999 to 2009, the Moroccan government imprisoned 
approximately thirty journalists for writing articles criticizing the regime or 
documenting human rights abuses in the Western Sahara.  However, supporters 
of King Mohammad VI contended that under his rule, reforms have been 
implemented democratizing Morocco.  Protest culture in Morocco directs its 
attention to limiting the scope of the King’s powers and increasing the 
implementation of democratic reforms.  Similar to Tunisian activists, many 
educated Moroccans express a sense of superiority about the progressive state of 
their country in comparison with the rest of the MENA region or Africa overall.  
Over the last 10 years, four political campaigns have emerged to dominate the 
protest culture: human rights and transitional justice for victims of political 
repression; promoting the rights of women; officially recognizing the Amazigh 
language and culture; and demanding independence for the Western Sahara 
(Desrues, 2013).  King Mohammad VI has responded to these campaigns with 
varying levels of reform, the greatest of which reformed the family law code 
known as the Muduwana, described below.    
 Collective activism at a local level and coalition building with a diverse 
array of actors has characterized protest culture in Morocco.  These civil society 
actors shape the conversation around protest culture and political activism, 
acting as an intermediary between the government and the local populations.  
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Consequently, while public protests about the high cost of living, unemployment 
for recent graduates and government corruption occur, they do not have as great 
of a grassroots impact (Desrues, 2013).  Political activists have taken a greater 
role in managing and organizing protests in the past decade, acting as an 
interpreter of the people’s demands and working to coordinate with civil society 
networks.  The active yet limited character of Moroccan protest culture explains 
why the February 20th movement did not escalate to an overthrow of the regime, 
as occurred in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. 
Morocco’s February 20th movement differed from the revolutions 
unfolding in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Algeria.  Youth activists responded to 
similar root causes, such as high unemployment and persistent government 
corruption; however, the protests took the form of collective civil action.  This can 
be attributed to Morocco’s hybrid political regime, where legal restrictions and 
authoritarian power govern an active civil society and thriving democratic 
institutions.  In addition, under the reign of King Mohammad VI, who has ruled 
since 1999, Morocco has witnessed a growth in protest culture (Salime, 2011; 
Rahman, 2013).  Many Moroccans welcomed the reign of King Mohammad VI 
after the death of his father Hassan II, who oversaw the transition of Morocco 
from a colonial protectorate to nation in 1961.  Mohammad VI promised to close 
the secret prisons and end the repressive practices and human rights 
persecutions of his father.  Desrues notes (2013) that the case of Morocco during 
the Arab Spring raises several issue, such as the conditions for the possibility of 
collective action within authoritarian regimes and the reciprocal influence 
created by the interaction between collective action and political regimes.  The 
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February 20th Movement activists demanded a series of reforms in the 
government, including democratizing the political regime, an end to corruption, 
governance of public affairs, and access to health services, education and 
employment for the population.     
Following the initial protests, spontaneous marches and protests 
continued throughout 2011.  King Mohammad VI addressed the protestors’ 
demands on March 9th, announcing constitutional reform and pledging to 
relinquish some of his prerogatives to elected representatives.  February 20th 
activists saw the king’s concessions as far short of their demands, and renewed 
the protests in March.  Record protests occurred in the streets throughout the 
country on March 20, numbering around 37,000 according to the Moroccan 
Ministry of Interior.  Moroccans for Change posted a video of the march in 
Casablanca, showing the main avenues thronged with people calling for reform of 
the regime.56  The Moroccan people elected a new parliament that instituted 
political reforms and drafted a new constitution checking the King’s power in the 
summer of 2011 (Moghadam, 2013).  Activists remained unconvinced of the 
reforms and continued to organize protests, using mobile phones and digital 
media to monitor the elections and uploading videos of government officials 
tampering with the ballots.57  Large marches and protests occurred until the end 
of 2011, with smaller protests continuing still today.  Moroccan activists continue 
to debate the long-standing effects of the reforms and the 20th February 
                                                        
56 Moroccans for Change. “Casablanca protests March 20.” YouTube. 20 March 2011. Web. 
Accessed. 21 January 2014. 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Okz1Profps0&feature=plcp&context=C31bb132UDOEgsToP
DskL4f4cldGfZRpwRm4KNhiFS> 
57 Mamfakinch. “Referndum Maroc.” YouTube channel. Web. Accessed 21 January 2014. 
<http://www.youtube.com/user/ReferendumMaroc/videos> 
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movement due to persistent government corruption and slow implementation of 
governmental reforms.      
 Minority protest movements, such as the LGTBQ movement, atheist 
movements (Council of ex-Muslims in Morocco) and radical feminist 
organizations like Femen encounter political suppression in Morocco.  During the 
spring semester of my junior year in 2013, I conducted an independent study 
project in Morocco.  I spoke with several activists who chose to remain 
anonymous.  They expressed skepticism as to the lasting results of the February 
20th movement and the government’s promises.  Members of the Moroccan 
Femen organization remain marginalized and criminalized by the government.  
One male activist who I spoke to reiterated his fear for the safety of his life as the 
founder of the Council of ex-Muslims in Morocco and role as a male supporter of 
Femen58.  To subvert the government, he posts under pseudonym on Facebook 
and Twitter.  Young activists from the February 20th movement created SlutWalk 
Morocco, later renamed Woman Choufouch (Choufouch is transliterated from 
Moroccan colloquial Darija and is the saying commonly used by Moroccan men 
harassing women in the streets), to continue protesting for gender parity and to 
address sexual harassment and gender violence.  They note the failure of feminist 
events such as SlutWalk Morocco to be held in May 2013 and the persistence of 
street harassment and sexual assault. 
 As the proliferation of digital technologies and social media flooded 
Morocco, activists increasingly turned to online platforms in order to subvert 
                                                        
58 Hinda Pres. “Moroccan men support Femen Activists-Imad Iddaine Habib.” YouTube 
Arabic/English. 21 April 2013. Web. Accessed February 10 2014.   
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mpyXcPwKNw>  
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government censorship, reach out to activists across the Moroccan countryside, 
and mobilize demonstrations against the government.  The following section 
depicts the rise of digital technologies in Morocco in the past decade and 
connects this increased use to Morocco’s active civil society and history of protest 
culture.  Combined, these sections contend that the intersection of new digital 
technologies with a thriving activist network and an established civil society and 
feminist movement propelled the February 20th movement forward, creating the 
largest protests Morocco had seen since the end of the French protectorate in 
1957.       
  
6.2 Social Media and Digital Technologies in Morocco  
According to Freedom House, Moroccan access to the internet grew from 
21 percent of the population in 2007 to 55 percent in 2012 (2013).  Mobile phones 
and smart phone usage has also increased, with a penetration of 119.7 percent in 
201259.  Digital divides exist between the urban and rural populations, and 
surveys note the coverage discrepancies between these areas.  Although rural 
inhabitants constitute over a third of Morocco’s overall population, most do not 
have access to phone lines and high speed internet and struggle with a high 
illiteracy rate.  The government has introduced internet subsidies to keep internet 
relatively affordable, and cybercafés abound in the country.  In 2011, the 
international Open Society Foundation published a comprehensive report 
                                                        
59 Percentages over 100 are common when used to measure mobile phone penetration, 
accounting for individuals who own multiple phones.  Owning multiple phones is common in 
Morocco and easily achieved as Moroccans can buy cheap phones and minutes from any street 
vendor.  
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documenting the persistence of digital divides in Morocco.60 The report 
highlights the geographical distances limiting rural communities access to digital 
technologies as well as the marginalization of Berber language speakers online.  
However, digital media technologies also provided spaces for Berber and 
Moroccan colloquial language speakers to protest the regime and carve new 
spaces for their voices to be heard.   
Before the Arab Spring protests, government censors monitored online 
content, frequently blocking YouTube, Facebook and Twitter or websites 
adopting controversial or minority views.  An anti-terrorism bill passed after the 
Casablanca 2003 bombings armed the government with the power to arrest 
journalist and filter websites indiscriminately (Salime, 2011).  Issues such as Sub-
Saharan migration, the Western Sahara, and atheism triggered government 
monitors.  In addition, many online users employed self-censorship on topics 
considered ‘sacred’ and thus untouchable, such as the King and Islam.  After the 
February 20th movement, the Moroccan government began a concerted effort to 
remove blocks to pages for the Amazigh minority, Islamists and the disputed 
territories of the Western Sahara (Freedom House).  Online users profess 
suspicions about the neutral role of internet providers such as Maroc-Telecom, 
believing they may cooperate with the government and use their service to gather 
intelligence about Moroccan citizens online (Global Voices).  Although the 
government no longer blocks major sites such as Google Earth, it has begun to 
                                                        
60 Zaid, Dr. Bouziane & Ibahrine, Dr. Mohamed. “Mapping Digital Media: Morocco.” An Open 
Society Foundations Report.  May 30 2014. Web. Accessed 26 January 2014.  
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prosecute online activists and bloggers for their posts (Open Net Initiative61).   
Social media and social networking sites have made substantial in-roads in 
Morocco.  Moroccan youth use them for everything, from finding romantic 
partners without parental supervision to political activism.  An interesting trend 
emerging online is the practice of Moroccan men and women adopting 
pseudonyms online and creating several Facebook profiles in order to meet 
multiple partners, thus subverting conservative, social and religious norms 
restricting sexuality.  Facebook is the most visited website in the country, and 
users grew by 490 percent from 860,000 to more than 5 million users from 2009 
to 2012 (Freedom House).  According to the Open Net Initiative, blogs grew in 
popularity in 2006 due to government subsidies of internet access and the 
greater availability of Arabic-language blogging platforms such as Maktoob and 
Jeeran.62  In 2011, the Open Society Foundation report mentioned above 
estimated that the local blogosphere contained around 30,000 blogs at the time 
of the February 20th protests.  While this estimate seems small in comparison to 
Morocco’s population (over 33 million), it reflects the prevalence of Facebook and 
Twitter over blogs as well as the difficulty to assess all but the most active blogs 
online.  The graph below depicts the user age distribution of Facebook users in 
Morocco, with 65% of Moroccan users ages 18-34.   
   
                                                        
61 OpenNet Initiative. “Internet Filtering in Morocco.” 6 August 2009. Web. Accessed 26 January 
2014. <https://opennet.net/research/profiles/morocco> 
62 Mahdi, Adam. “Blogs becoming increasingly popular in Morocco.” Magharebia. 9 November 
2006. Web. Accessed 26 January 2014.  
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Spot on Public Relations, “Middle East & North Africa: Facebook Demographics,” 
May 2011 
 
During the protests, bloggers offered a controversial view differing from 
pro-government traditional state media.  Mobile phones and cameras helped 
activists document the events on the streets and upload them online, challenging 
the state’s version of the events.  For example, although the July 2011 
constitutional referendum passed with 98% of the vote, Moroccan activists video-
taped government officials tampering with the ballots and uploaded these videos 
online to Facebook, YouTube and the website Moroccans for Change.  Social 
media and networking sites took on the role of watchdogs of the regime, 
replacing the traditional media as fact-checkers (Global Voices Online).  Civil 
society members and social movements (including feminism and Islamism) 
turned to social media and networking sites to inform, mobilize, and build 
coalitions.  Thus, political activism increasingly turned to digital media platforms 
to disseminate information and rally support (Zaid & Ibrahime, 2011).  However, 
as was mentioned above, digital divides restricted the impact of these 
technologies to Moroccans with access.  
 Since Web 2.0’s launch in the 1990s, activists have increasingly turned to 
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blogs and online forums and petitions to create momentum for campaigns.  
Organizations used websites to post petitions raising awareness about human 
rights issues such as Morocco’s occupation of the Western Sahara.  The One 
Million Signatures campaign in 1992 was a prominent web petition for women’s 
rights in Morocco, seeking to gain support for proposed legal and constitutional 
reforms (Salime, 2011).  As social networking sites increased in popularity and 
accessibility, activists turned to Facebook and Twitter to create pages, connect 
with activists and start online campaigns.  In 2009, youth activists created the 
“I’m Moroccan, I’m a 9%” Facebook page and campaign responding to 
government censorship of a poll measuring Moroccans’ support of the king.  Even 
though the poll results stated 91% supported the king’s rule, the government 
censored the results because the Moroccan Arab and Berber ethnic majority63 
and the ruling government consider King Mohammed VI, whose spiritual title 
translates as the “Commander of the Faithful64,” to posses divine authority 
derived from the Prophet Mohammed that should not be polled or measured in 
any way (Rahim, 2012).  Moroccan university students created a similar 
Facebook online movement in late 2009, this time to organize a public Ramadan 
fast break in the city of Mohammedia entitled the “Alternative Movement for 
                                                        
63 Arab Moroccans and Berber Moroccans make up 99.1 percent of the population, with the 
remaining .9 percent composed of Sub-Saharan African migrants, European immigrants, and a 
small Sephardic Jewish population.  Although the Berber population has been largely assimilated 
into the dominant Arab culture, they are an indigenous people and their culture is often 
marginalized within Arab Morocco.   
64 Interestingly, King Mohammed VI’s title “Amīr al-Mu'minīn,” which translates to “Commander 
of the Faithful” affects the legal definition of a Moroccan citizen.  The monarchy defines the 
“faithful” as Muslim and Jewish subjects and excludes all other religious and non-religious 
subjects from citizenship.   
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Individual Freedoms.”65  In both movements, women took an active role online, 
although gender issues did not dominate the pages’ dialogue or the mission 
statements.  The online network of activism facilitated the 20th of February 
movement’s birth on the “Freedom and Democracy Now” Facebook page.   
 These online protest movements grew out of Morocco’s history of reform 
and thriving protest culture described above, which I also witnessed while 
studying abroad and conducting my independent research project in Rabat and 
Casablanca Spring 2013.  The next section builds from the intersection of digital 
technologies and protest movements to contextualize the role of gender relations 
in Moroccan society.  It looks primarily at the interaction of gender, language, 
and space in Morocco, arguing that Moroccan hegemonic masculinity imposed by 
French and Modern Standard Arabic in public spaces marginalizes Moroccan 
women speaking colloquial languages in private spaces.  When considering that 
digital technologies and social media create a third space, separated from the 
public/private divide, this section asks: how do women deploy their language and 
gender online?  And, do digital technologies and social media provide liberating 
possibilities for Morocca women to subvert the public/private and demarcation 
of urban/rural languages?  
 
6.3 Gender Relations: Unpacking the Gender Binary and 
Sexual Harassment in Morocco 
 
The intersection of the post-colonial nationalist movement, Islam, Sufism, 
economic development policies and feminism created complex and pervasive 
                                                        
65 “Threats for Breaking Morocco fast.” BBC News. 19 September 2009. Web. Accessed 17 
February 2014.  
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gender divide in Morocco.  For a nuanced understanding of these gender 
relations and their impact on protest culture and the 20th of February movement 
specifically, it is necessary to focus on the interaction of language, gender, and 
urban/rural space.  Renowned Moroccan feminist and sociologist Fatima 
Mernissi has written extensively on this subject, marking the transition from a 
clear public/private divide of space in women’s lives to the feminization of the 
public sphere and workforce (1988, 1992 & 1995).  Her work informs 
contemporary scholarship on gender relations in Morocco and the Maghreb 
region, including Moroccan Berber Fatima Sadiqi’s article “Language and gender 
in Moroccan urban areas” (2008).  As a Senior Professor of Linguistics and 
Gender Studies at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez, Sadiqi’s work 
exposes the marginalization of the Berber language and colloquial Arabic in 
Morocco.  This section engages Sadiqi’s work and references my previous 
research on Moroccan feminist discourse to unpack Moroccan gender relations at 
the time of the 2011 protests.  It connects the erosion of the gender divide with 
the rise of invasive sexual harassment and persistent gender violence in the 
streets of Morocco.   
Sadiqi interweaves a linguistic analysis of the relationship of language and 
the distribution of power in Morocco with the cultural representation of gender.  
While globalization and development policy blurred the dichotomous 
relationship between urban/rural and public/private, the remnants of these 
dichotomies persist in the cultural representation of Moroccan women and 
language.  She notes the demarcation of languages of power associated in the 
urban spheres and institutions--Modern Standard Arabic (MSA or Fus’ha) and 
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French—and those deprived of power in the rural settings: Moroccan Arabic (MA 
or Darija) and Berber (Amazigh) (2012).  Importantly, these geographic divides 
exist within the city as well, with the traditional sectors of urban populations 
known as the Medina kadima (old city) coded as “rural” and “private.”  As women 
began to appropriate the urban languages in the public sectors, she writes that, 
“languages that were historically cast as male (also “urban,” “public,” and 
“powerful”) are being democratized and feminized (also “rural,” “private”)” 
(2008).  Consequently, the gender binary shifted as constructed language 
boundaries expanded and women inserted themselves in the workforce, political 
and academic life.   
Sadiqi bases her findings on field research completed between 1995 and 
2004, using interviews, a questionnaire, and follow-up observations.  These 
findings suggest that women will switch languages66 when in mixed groups or 
when they wish to exhibit greater prestige.  Women will use the ‘urban’ languages 
of French and Modern Standard Arabic when wanting to impress or increase 
their appearance of power and knowledge.  Sadiqi calls this code-switching67 a 
form of linguistic agency, allowing women to “manipulate the various values that 
are attached to each language such as education, modernity, prestige, ethnic 
identity and intimacy in specific contexts, in order to score “gains” in the 
conventional enterprise” (2012: 157).  Her findings rely on her assumption that 
Moroccan women respond to societal circumstances in ways that exhibit rather 
than inhibit their agency, inserting their femininity into the dominant male 
                                                        
66 Sadiqi found three gender-sensitive types of code-switching: (i) the switching of Berber and MA, 
(ii) the switching of MA and French, and (iii) the switching of Berber and French.   
67 In socio-cultural linguistics, code-switching occurs when a speaker alternates between two or 
more languages or dialects in a single conversation.   
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paradigm.  This understanding of how women deploy language to perform their 
gender contextualizes the textual and video examples I will analyze later on.  In 
addition, it highlights the choice of February 20th activists to use their native 
Berber or Modern Arabic in the videos and articles they post online.  
However, women can also appropriate “male” languages in ways that 
exclude others from power as the fractured Moroccan feminist movement 
exemplifies.  Clear language divides exist in Moroccan feminism, demarcating 
liberal-secular feminists who speak French and Modern Standard Arabic from 
Islamic feminists or Islamic women’s rights groups who speak Modern Standard 
Arabic and colloquial Darija.  These divides originate from the interaction of 
religion, gender and language, “The strongest power-related aspect of Modern 
Standard Arabic is its intrinsic relation to Islam, the official religion of Morocco” 
(Sadiqi, 2008: 159).    Secular feminist organizations choose to speak in French 
rather than Modern Standard Arabic or colloquial Darija, adopting what they 
term progressive stance on women’s rights that excludes Islam and thus Modern 
Standard Arabic and colloquial Darija.  On the other hand, Islamic women’s 
organizations in general prefer Modern Standard Arabic and colloquial Darija.  
Few organizations speak or write in Berber.  The demarcation of secular feminist 
and Islamic feminist language limits the impact of women’s rights and feminist 
organizations to urban, educated women, further marginalizing rural populations.  
Choice of language affects the rural population’s knowledge of reforms—such as 
the Muduwana—and cultural practices, resulting in the continued practice of 
child marriage and spatial segregation of women in the homes.   
While studying abroad in Morocco, I conducted research on the impact of 
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migration and transnational ideas on the Moroccan feminist movement.  I 
explored the flows of information and various forms of feminism that influenced 
Moroccan feminist discourse.  I interviewed and visited several feminist and 
Islamic women’s organizations in Rabat, Casablanca and Al-Jadida68 as well as 
Islamic feminist scholar Dr. Asmae Lamrabet, speaking in a combination of 
Modern Standard Arabic and English.  Dr. Lamrabet discussed how language 
reinforces the dichotomy of rural/urban in Moroccan feminism and international 
women’s rights and development policies.  Liberal-secular feminist organizations 
such as the Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) wrote in 
French on their website, pamphlets and when speaking.  In fact, the women I 
interviewed from this organization were dismayed I did not speak French and 
wished to converse in MSA and Darija during our interview.  My presence as a 
white, American woman choosing to speak languages they perceived as rural or 
provincial shocked them.  They were accustomed to dealing with white 
Europeans and Americans who could only speak or chose to speak in French and 
occasionally English.   
 As noted above, the feminization of the work force has eroded the 
demarcation of public and private gender spaces in Morocco.  Women’s presence 
in the streets no longer transgressed cultural and religious norms.  However, 
femininity and masculinity and male and female sexuality remain taboo topics 
influenced by the cultural separation of public and private. Street harassment of 
Moroccan women by Moroccan men has emerged from the interaction of the 
                                                        
68 Al-Jadida is a small seaside town an hour and a half from Casablanca by train.  The University 
of Al-Jadida is located there.   
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feminization of public space, threatened masculinities, and restricted sexuality.  
As in Egypt, harassment and gender violence pervades Moroccan street culture, 
affecting all women regardless of dress.  Many Moroccan men whom I met 
justified their words and actions as expressions of praise and an appreciation of 
beauty; Moroccan women did not share this opinion.69 
 Scholars such as Deniz Kandiyoti contend that sexual harassment has 
more to do with relationships of power then sexuality (1996).  Therefore, 
Moroccan men take part in street harassment in response to the challenge an 
urban, mobile female population poses to the patriarchal family structure and 
male authority.  Moroccan women react to street harassment in a variety of ways, 
from wearing modest clothing and donning the hijab when in the streets to 
interacting verbally with the harassers.  Women’s movements and campaigns 
began targeting street harassment through videos that portray the woman’s 
experience of harassment after the 20th February movement.  In the past year, 
twenty-four Moroccan female journalists produced a documentary through the 
international human rights organization Global Girl Media entitled in English 
Breaking the Silence about Sexual Harassment: Moroccans Speak Out!70  
Victims of rape and sexual harassment share their stories in the hopes of 
changing the conversation about sexual harassment, moving the blame from the 
women to the man and societal and governmental structures that enable such 
actions.71  
                                                        
69 York, Jillian C. “Morocco: Four Perspectives on Sexual Harassment.” Global Voices. 1 
September 2009. Web. Accessed 30 January 2014.  
70 Sourgo, Youssef. “Moroccan women speak out about sexual harassment.” Moroccan World 
News.  27 November 2013. Web. Accessed 30 January 2014. 
71 Errazzouki, Samia. “Morocco’s 20 February Movement: Two Years Later.” Jadilyya. 7 March 
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Given that the categories of sex and gender are discursively constructed 
through cultural practices and language (Butler, 1990), Moroccan women can be 
understood to deploy specific languages at select times and in certain spaces to 
alter the performance of their feminine gender.  This can result in a subversion of 
gender binaries and an appropriation of “male” power, or it can (re)inscribe the 
dichotomy of rural/urban established during colonization and post-colonization.  
Thus, the women in the rural areas are marginalized from the political power of 
language and the progression of women’s political and cultural rights.  For the 
purpose of this chapter and this thesis as a whole, Sadiqi’s argument illuminates 
the power dynamics implicit in the languages Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan 
female cyberactivists deployed online during the Arab Spring revolutions.  Digital 
technologies and social media provide a space that blurs the boundaries between 
public and private spheres, allowing marginalized languages, bodies, and voices 
insert themselves in the dominant discourse.  The following section applies this 
understanding of the intersection of language, gender, social media, and digital 
technologies to an analysis of the February 20th movement.   
 
6.4 The February 20th Movement and Woman Choufouch  
 The February 20th movement broke from previous exhibits of protest 
culture in Morocco, moving away from established NGOs and civil society actors.  
Youth activists and university students powered the movement.  Salime argues 
that despite the absence of feminist and women’s rights organizations presence in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2013.  Web. Accessed 14 November 2013.  
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the 2011 protests, feminist terminology informed the February 20th movement’s 
demands and language.  In order to explore this claim, this section presents an 
in-depth analysis of a video produced by 13 Moroccan activists and posted on 
Facebook and YouTube, examining their language and gender performance.  
From this analysis, it turns to an examination of the online anti-sexual 
harassment movement Woman Choufouch created by February 20th female 
activist Majdouline.  The previous three sections on the history of protest culture 
and reform, the rise of digital technologies, and the construction of the Moroccan 
gender binary through language and space inform this analysis.  Throughout, this 
section asks: Did digital technologies facilitate Moroccan female activists to claim 
greater agency and subvert the demarcation of public/private space and 
masculine and feminine languages during the February 20th movement in the 
2011 protests?     
 Posted on February 8th, 2011, the YouTube video filmed by a male activist 
from Salé introduced the February 20th movement to Morocco through the 
images of 14 activists—nine young men, 4 young women, and one elderly woman.  
Each activist begins by saying “I am Moroccan and will take part in the protest 
February 20th.”  They speak in their native Berber or Darija (Moroccan Colloquial, 
MA) describing their reasons for protesting.   
 First Female Activist Speaking in the February 8th, 2011 Campaign Video 
By choosing to speak in a colloquial or ‘rural’ and ‘feminine’ language, these 
activists iterate their challenge to the current powe
his crowning in 1999 to 
nation in Darija, choosing to use French or MSA.  February 20
highlighted the government’s suppression of these languages with their inclusive 
dialogue, posting in Berber, colloquial Darija, Modern Standard Arabic and 
French on their Facebook pag
advocacy videos directed by the Moroccan male activist from Salé. 
The 20th February movement’s video on February 8, 2011 opens with the 
first young woman, stating her reason for protesting, “I am Moroccan
joining the protest February 2oth because I want a free and equal Morocco for all 
Moroccans.”72  The second image, a male, echoes the same sentiment, “….I am 
joining the protest February 20
can see Salime’s claim that the male and female activists performed demands of 
gender parity even though they did not identify as feminist.  The other women 
                                                       
72 Mouvement20fevrier. “Campagne
January 20 2014.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_LF0JqnMzw
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for the February 20th Movement 
r structure in Morocco.  From 
2011, King Mohammad VI had never addressed the 
th activists 
e and in the opening and closing sequence of their 
th so that all Moroccans will be equal.” Here, we 
 
 20 février.”  YouTube. 13 February 2011. Web.
.   
 
 
 
 and I am 
 Accessed 
 147
share similar demands:  
Second female: “….so education will be accessible for 
everyone not only the rich” 
Third female: “…so that I can learn to read and write 
Amazigh.” 
Fourth female: “…so I can battle corruption in my country”73  
 
With these statements and the languages they convey them in, these women 
deploy their identities to encourage Moroccans to protest and march for their 
right to vote.  They speak with familiarity, confidence and ease, looking into the 
camera with the knowledge that they belong in the streets protesting.  Their 
message does not challenge the citizens to vote, rather they identify with the 
Moroccan audience, inviting them to participate in the February 20th 
demonstrations in front of Moroccan government buildings because they are all 
Moroccan and share the same future.  The activists collaborated to produce their 
script, guided by the director from Salé (Moroccans for Change).  In this way, the 
video echoes the solidarity tone of voice taken by feminist organizations, yet their 
‘we’ attempts to include the Islamic feminists, rural, illiterate Moroccan women, 
and LGTBQ Moroccans that the Moroccan feminist ‘we’ excludes.   
The video advocacy campaign online encouraged supporters to post with 
the hashtag #Feb20 and to change their Facebook profile pictures to the memes 
and logos the Febraury 20th activists created.  On February 2, 2011, “The 
February 20 Movement” Facebook page had 3,000 users (Reuters, 2011), by 
February 20th the group members had risen to 20,000.  Sara El Idrissi, a 
Moroccan blogger and political activist writes in a blog post for openDemocracy, 
                                                        
73 For this video, I relied on translations posted by the activists and a subtitled version of the video.  
Although I can speak conversational colloquial Darija after studying abroad, I do not possess the 
skills to translate it.   
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“a group of young Moroccan activists, myself included, used social media to 
spread calls for a protest on February 20, 2011…as a democrat and a feminist, I 
responded to the call for the 20 February demonstration”  (El Idrissi, 2012).  She 
continues in the post, writing that female activists participated in the forefront of 
the 20th February movement.  Women acted as the spokeswomen and 
contributed to all levels of organizing, networking, and protesting.  Two women 
activists, Zeinab and the woman in the photograph below spoke in several of the 
campaign videos directed by the male activist from Salé (who came to be known 
as the Che Guevera of Salé).  These women, one veiled and one unveiled, 
implored Moroccan citizens to protest in the weeks following the February 20th 
campaign.  In an interview with World Review, twenty-six year old veiled Zeinab 
states her reason for protesting, “I believe I am here to serve and if I have the 
means to, it makes it that much more important to serve, it makes my 
responsibility bigger.”   
Activists from the February 20th movement launched Moroccans for 
Change, an online blogging and news forum, in early February.  Laila Lalami 
worked with them, blogging about the protests from the University of California, 
Riverside where she teaches creative writing.  Laila has also been featured on The 
Nation, acting as in intermediary for the activists and the U.S. and European 
press.  She provides an account of the protests that counters the Moroccan state 
media.  In an article for the Nation written on February 27, 201174 that was 
shared via Twitter 86 times and had 176 Facebook likes, Laila compared Fadoua 
                                                        
74 Lalami, Laila. “Fadoua Laroui: The Moroccan Mohamed Bouazizi.” The Nation. 27 February 
2011. Web. Accessed 14 January 2014. <http://www.thenation.com/blog/158878/fadoua-laroui-
moroccan-mohamed-bouazizi> 
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Laroui, a twenty-five year old Moroccan women who committed self-immolation 
in early February, with Tunisian street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi.  She 
bestows Fadoua with the title of a martyr, writing:  
The people who remember her most today appear to be the activists 
of the February 20 movement in Morocco. But what does 
meaningful constitutional reform—the central demand of the 
February 20 movement—have to do with the case of Fadoua 
Laroui? Nothing, some people might say. And yet: in a state in 
which all citizens are equal under the law, Fadoua Laroui would 
have been able to appeal her case and receive justice. 
 
Her account immortalizes Fadoua and attempts to position her as a symbol of the 
February 20th movement.  Moroccans for Change, run by the Moroccans in the 
diaspora, and the Freedom and Democracy Now Facebook, maintained by 
members of the February 20th movement in Morocco, pages follow her lead.  In 
the weeks following Fadoua’s self-immolation and Laila’s article, the February 
20th activists invoked her name and the memory of her martyrdom in the streets 
and shared the video of her self-immolation online.  However, their actions failed 
to reach beyond the network of activists, cyber activists, and human rights 
advocates already involved in the movement, demonstrated by the lack of 
knowledge populations outside of the urban centers had about Fadou’s self-
immolation.  Fadoua does not become a Mohammad Bouazizi because the story 
of her martyrdom does not reach all of Morocco, unlike Tunisia, where the viral 
YouTube penetrated urban and rural areas.  In part, this is due to Morocco’s vast 
size in comparison to Tunisia’s small geographical expanse.   
 Members of Moroccans for Change and Freedom and Democracy Now 
echoed the February 20 movement’s demands for gender equality in Moroccan 
law and society.  These female activists (and some males as well) worked with 
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SlutWalk Canada to create a SlutWalk Morocco campaign—which later rebranded 
itself as Woman Choufouch.  Canadian Feminist activists founded SlutWalk in 
April 2011, protesting against blaming women’s appearance for rape and sexual 
assault and demanding an end to rape culture.  Female blogger According to 
Hind75, who was awarded the Maroc Web Award for Best Female Blogger in 2012, 
interviewed Majdouline, the founder of Woman Choufouch76, in English for her 
blog in response to the criticism the movement received online.   
 
Heading from the Woman Choufouch Facebook Page 
According to Hind writes, “The truth is that I am supportive of the walk because 
my inner twenty year old thinks it is… totally… A-W-E-S-O-M-E.  As simple as 
that!”  Both Hind and Majdouline were twenty years old at the time of this 
interview in 2011 and define themselves as feminists and human rights activists; 
they took part in various levels of the February 20th movements. Their 
conversation, posted as a blog post on According to Hind, reveals the role women 
played in the February 20th protests as well as the impact the protests and the use 
of cyber activism had on furthering grassroots gender advocacy in Morocco.   
                                                        
75 Touissate, Hind. According to Hind. Web. Accessed 20 November 2013.  
<http://accordingtohind.wordpress.com/> 
76 Majdouline. “Woman Choufouch” Facebook. Web. Accessed 10 October 2013 
<https://www.facebook.com/pages/Woman-Choufouch/105487879580033>  
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   Majdouline locates the inspiration of SlutWalk Morocco, which 
highlighted persistent sexual harassment and gender violence in Morocco by 
organizing online and offline demonstrations of Moroccan women so that they 
could walk in the streets regardless of their apparel, in transnational feminist 
movements and the open dialogue facilitated by the February 20th movement.  In 
response to Hind’s question about the mission of her organization, she wrote in 
English:  
To abolish the taboo about rape, sexual assault & sexual 
harassment; & to spread awareness across the country. “No” means 
“no” and there’s a huge difference between “to flirt” with someone & 
between “to harass” or “to sexually assault” someone. It’s time to 
stop perpetrating this dangerous confusion. 
 
Majdouline situates her work within the discourse surrounding sexual 
harassment and gender violence.  For example, she references the pervasive rape 
culture in Morocco and its intersection with Islam and cultural norms, using the 
word “taboo” and emphasizing the distinction between flirting, harassment and 
sexual assault. This discourse dissipated after the 2004 Muduwana reforms but 
has since reemerged in the 20th February movement.  Several other women’s 
rights awareness and advocacy campaigns followed Woman Choufouch, 
including Global Girl Media’s Morocco program and the campaign Breaking the 
Silence. While these campaigns contain feminist terminology and discourse, they 
are not affiliated with established Moroccan liberal-secular feminist 
organizations.  
 Hind and Majdouline both stress the importance of digital technologies, 
specifically social media and networking sites, for their activism.  Majdouline 
describes the origin of SlutWalk Morocco, “…it started with me just posting a 
 and had incited discourse on countless pages, including Moroccans for Change 
and Freedom and Democracy Now.  Majdouline acknowledges that the page, its 
mission, and its name have faced criticism.  In response, she discusses her pans 
to rebrand the page, yet expresses her reservations for changing the name, “Yes, 
we are working on it! We want this to be a Moroccan version of SlutWalk and we 
want it to be 100% Moroccan, suiting 
values. But to tell you the truth, it’s hard to find a name as catchy as “SlutWalk”!
Here, Majdouline reveals the power intertwining the relationship of language and 
gender Sadiqi asserted in “
In spite of the great context
women, these women are far from being passive victims of 
patriarchal dogmas; using the various choices they are offered, 
various types of women express their agency 
empowering linguistic strategies in various contexts of language use
(Sadiqi, 2008: 162).
 
Majdouline appropriates a transnational feminist concept “SlutWalk” and 
imports it into Morocco, keeping its name and the signification that carries.  This 
name challenges perceptions of women in Moroccan society.  However, by 
modifying the name and entitl
Majdouline legitimizes the movement and disrupts the idea of women’s rights are 
foreign—or that women transgress public spaces.  Loubna Hanna Skalli wrote in 
                                                       
77 Toussaint, Hind. “SLUTWALK Morocco: The Interview.” 
Web. Accessed 17 December 
morocco-the-interview/   
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Facebook status saying ‘Slutwalk morocco, 
who’s in.’” At the time of Hind’s intervie
in the summer of 2011, the Facebook page 
had registered over one thousand
our society, our community’s beliefs
Language and gender in Moroccan urban areas”:
-linked heterogeneity among Moroccan 
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a 2012 Jadaliyya article that the Moroccan colloquial word “Choufouch” is a 
word all women walking the streets in Moroccan know, “…it is the word that 
harasses them in the every corner of the public space from mean of all ages.  It’s 
meaning ranges from ‘what’s up?’ ‘look here!’ to more sexually loaded overtones 
of ‘shouldn’t we try?’”   Their group seeks to subvert the meaning of “Choufouch,” 
asking in their Facebook profile picture on the previous page, “and shouldn’t we 
be looking for a solution?” to end sexual harassment.  Majdouline and fellow 
members of her group post on the Woman Choufouch Facebook page in multiple 
languages—MSA, Darija/Ma, French, and occasionally English.  They deploy 
these languages selectively, attracting a wide range of audiences.   
 The February 20th movement and Woman Choufouch illustrate how 
Moroccan female activists employed social media networks and digital 
technologies to mobilize protests online that translated into street 
demonstrations.  Although these movements were limited to Moroccan urban 
centers, they demonstrate how female activists used marginalized languages 
online to subvert the public/private demarcation of space and languages with and 
without power.  Moroccan women appropriate masculine words like ‘Choufouch’ 
to undermine and reclaim the word as their own.  From social networking sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs, Moroccan female activists articulated 
diverse identities, performed a multiplicity of femininities, and demanded an end 
to sexual harassment and social, political, cultural, and religious gender parity.   
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6.5 Conclusion: Virtual Body Politic  
What do the actions of Moroccan female cyberactivists reveal about the 
relationship between digital technologies, gender, and the Arab Spring protests?  
And, how does an understanding of the intersection of gender, language, and 
space in Morocco elucidate the conflicting and complex identities Moroccan 
female cyberactivists deployed at specific times and in new spaces during the 
2011 protests?  This chapter has demonstrated that despite the lack of 
revolutionary upheaval in Morocco, female activists took advantage of digital 
media technologies and social networking tools during the 2011 protests.  In 
addition, it has argued that the February 20th movement in 2011 facilitated new 
spaces for Moroccan female cyberactivists to perform their gender, gain agency, 
and draw attention to gendered issues such as sexual harassment.  Although 
Morocco did not experience the same drastic political upheaval as Egypt and 
Tunisia, the February 20th movement drew attention to government corruption 
and facilitated the participation of marginalized populations and identities in the 
public sphere.  Female activists used the discourse of reform created by the 
February 20th movement to launch new movements such as Woman Choufouch 
focusing on gender parity and women’s rights in Morocco.  These female 
cyberactivists spoke in the marginalized colloquial Arabic and Berber languages 
(Sadiqi, 2008) to subvert Moroccan linguistic power dynamics online.  Moroccan 
online and offline protest movements enabled Moroccan female cyberactivists to 
deploy diverse feminist identities and claim greater agency in their gender 
performance.  Thus, these movements facilitated the creation of a new body 
politic online.    
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Moroccan women participated in all aspects of the February 20th 
movement protests lasting from 2011 to 2012.  While the protests achieved mixed 
results and moderate levels of reform, they opened spaces for women to protest 
online and in the streets.  They demonstrated how to capitalize on online political 
activism and translate that activism into demonstrations throughout the country.  
As the protests continued, new groups of women became inspired to participate 
in the revolutions both on and offline.  According to Hind, named Best Moroccan 
Female Blogger in 2012 by the Maroc Web Award, launched her blog in the 
summer of 2011.  Slutwalk Morocco, Woman Choufouch, and the Breaking the 
Silence anti-sexual harassment campaigns emerged from the February 20th 
movement headed by female cyberactivists.  Moroccan women participated in the 
frontlines of activism and defined what languages, images, and terms they would 
be perceived through their use of digital technologies. 
In conclusion, this chapter contends that Moroccan female cyberactivists 
employed digital technologies and social media in similar ways and purposes as 
their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts.  The events in Morocco detailed above 
illustrate that, similar to Tunisia and Egypt, digital technologies enabled women 
to insert their voices and bodies into the protest discourse, participating and 
often leading protests.  Moroccan female activists used social media networks 
such as Facebook to create movements and connect with other activists inside 
and outside of the country.  During the protests, photos depict Moroccan female 
activists holding the letter ‘F’ (illustrated in the photo at the beginning of this 
chapter), symbolizing the importance of Facebook and similar microblogging 
sites for the February 20th movement.  As in Tunisia and Egypt, Moroccan female 
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activists used social networks and digital technologies to perform their gender 
and draw attention to the pervasive existence of sexual harassment in Moroccan 
society.  The discussion of sexual harassment that emerged online during the 
February 20th movement and transitioned to street demonstrations with Woman 
Choufouch demonstrates that Moroccan women are blurring the boundaries of 
between public and private and articulating a new body politic in the process. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Revolutions and Reverberations 
 On December 17, 2010 Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi poured 
gasoline over his body, setting himself on fire in front of the governor’s office in 
Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.  A Tunisian citizen captured his act of desperation and 
uploaded a video of his burning body to YouTube.  The video quickly became viral 
online, causing Tunisian citizens to take to the streets to demand justice for 
Mohamed Bouazizi and an end to government corruption.  Twenty-seven days 
after Bouazizi’s public act of self-immolation, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
resigned from office and fled the country for Saudi Arabia.  Four days later, 
Egyptian cyberactivist Asmaa Mahfouz issued a gendered video message to 
Egyptian citizens, challenging Egyptian men and calling on them to follow 
Tunisia’s example and take to the streets to demand the end of Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak’s rule.  On February 14th 2011, President Mubarak 
stepped down after thirty years of unchallenged, authoritarian rule.  At that same 
time, Moroccan youth activists were preparing for demonstrations throughout 
the country, rallying around the slogan #February20.   
Six months later, 20 Arab countries had witnessed various levels of 
upheaval, three presidents for life had been toppled, constitutional reforms had 
been enacted throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and Arabs across the 
world were ecstatic with revolutionary fervor.  The dust has yet to settle from the 
revolutions that spread from Tunisia to the rest of North Africa and the Middle 
East.  Propelled by grassroots activism, digital technologies, and social media, the 
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Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan protest movements demonstrate how 
seemingly entrenched authoritarian regimes can be subverted and overthrown 
through user-generated content.     
This thesis has focused on the role of female cyberactivism during the so-
called Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.  It has conveyed the 
experiences Tunisian, Egyptian, and Moroccan female cyberactivists encountered 
while participating and leading protests.  Working at the intersection of social 
movement, digital activism, and feminist critical theories, this thesis has argued 
that female cyberactivists deployed digital technologies and social media 
networks to insert their bodies into the dominant discourse and articulate claims 
for political, social, cultural, and religious gender parity during the Arab Spring 
revolutions.   
What was the relationship between online activism and physical protests?  
With some activists, such as Egyptian Asmaa Mahfouz, Moroccan Majdouline, 
and Tunisian Lina Ben Mhenni, the connection was apparent.  They received 
overwhelming responses to their posts that resulted in millions of Egyptians 
occupying Tahrir Square and downtown Cairo beginning on January 25, 2011, 
Tunisians demonstrating in the streets of Tunis and Sidi Bouzid, and thousands 
of Moroccan activists gathering outside the parliament in Rabat for the first 
Moroccan SlutWalk in 2012.  However, it is more difficult to measure the 
connectivity and impact of female cyberactivists such as Egyptian Fatma Emam, 
who wrote about the struggle of being an Islamic feminist during the Egyptian 
revolution.  She had a wide readership, but did not incite Egyptian citizens to 
protest nor did she issue a tweet that had thousands of favorites, retweets, or 
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comments.  Thus, when theorizing the relationship between online female 
activism and political protests, it is necessary to examine what their language 
reveals, what events were occurring at the time of their posts, and on which 
digital platforms they transmitted their message in addition to looking at the 
response to their post.  For example, in Fatma Emam’s case, she began 
documenting her protests online after joining the millions of Egyptians in Tahrir 
Square, thus physical protests preceded digital activism in her case.  On the other 
hand, Egyptian activist Asmaa Mahfouz organized the #Jan25 protests online 
with other April 6, Kefaya, and We are all Khaled Said activists before 
participating in physical protests.  As these two examples show, a clear 
correlation exists between physical and online protests, but the exact 
measurement cannot be determined by a purely qualitative study or only 
quantitative study.  Further research should be conducted that combines 
qualitative and quantitative measurement of the relationship between 
cyberactivism and protest movements.   
Four specific trends have emerged in the course of this thesis that link 
female cyberactivists from Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco.  First,female 
cyberactivists live-blogged, tweeted, and filmed their experiences protesting, 
establishing a circular flow of information that connected online activism to 
protest in the streets.  Second, female cyberactivists selectively deployed different 
languages (Modern Standard Arabic, colloquial Arabic, French, and English) to 
reach targeted local, regional, and international audiences.  Third, female 
cyberactivists established new networks of activism online, creating 
reverberations of feminist discourse that permeated the borders of countries and 
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public/private space.  Through these networks, female cyberactivists connected 
with fellow female and male protestors, reached out to international journalists, 
documented their experiences, demanded gender equality, and mobilized against 
gender violence.  Finally, female cyberactivists performed a multiplicity of 
femininities online, from modern Western conceptions of femininity to the 
intersection of Islamic piety with feminist values.  These trends existed in each of 
the countries examined in this thesis, shifting slightly depending on the specific 
characteristics of the revolutions and gender relations in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Morocco.         
In Tunisia, female cyberactivists acted as citizen journalists.  They 
documented the protests on Twitter, Facebook pages, and personal blogs in 
French, English, Modern Standard Arabic and Tunisian colloquial Arabic.  Some, 
such as international renowned Tunisian blogger Lina Ben Mhenni, acted as 
bridge-bloggers who posted in English to connect with international audiences 
and inform them of the events unfolding in Tunisia when the state media was 
silent.  As the protests continued, feminist activists began mobilizing online and 
organizing demonstrations in the streets to protest gender violence.  Female 
cyberactivists worked from  these existing feminist networks in Tunisia to issue 
demands for gender parity in the new constitution and protest against the gender 
violence that occurred during the January 29, 2011 march for women in Tunis.   
Egyptian female cyberactivists learned from and copied many of the tactics 
used by Tunisian female cyberactivists such as Lina Ben Mhenni.  Inhabiting 
multiple digital platforms, Egyptian female cyberactivists used social media to 
mobilize Egyptian women and men to protest, document the demonstrations in 
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Tahrir Square, and to reflect on their experiences protesting.  For example, 
Egyptian April 6th activist Esraa Abdel-Fattah tweeted and posted on Facebook in 
Egyptian colloquial Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic to inform the Egyptians 
following her on Twitter and Facebook where and when demonstrations would be 
held, what to do when the government tried to shut down the internet, and what 
was happening within Tahrir Square.  In addition, as Asmaa Mahfouz’s vlog 
emphasized, these female cyberactivists used digital technologies and social 
media networks to issue gendered messages and subvert the gender divide 
demarcating private and public space in Egypt.   
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco did not witness the same range of 
revolutionary violence or political upheaval; however, through the February 20th 
movements, Moroccan female cyberactivists echoed Tunisian and Egyptian 
female cyberactivists by using digital technologies and social media to insert their 
marginalized bodies and languages into public discourse.  During the 2011 
protests, Moroccan female activists created new feminist movements online that 
highlighted sexual harassment and gender violence and called for political and 
legal enfranchisement of Moroccan women.  These feminist movements 
articulated a new body politic online, one that linked the marginalization of 
Moroccan women in the private sphere with street harassment and gender 
violence in the public sphere.   
The actions of female cyberactivists in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco 
demonstrate that, despite the contentious results of the Arab Spring revolutions, 
female activists have gained new ground and claimed greater agency in the public 
domain.  Digital technologies and social media networks facilitated the 
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emergence of female activists online and in the streets.  Tunisian, Egyptian, and 
Moroccan female cyberactivists articulated a new body politic online that 
subverted established gender relations offline.  They have continued to use digital 
technologies and social media networks to interrogate political, cultural, religious, 
and social gender inequalities, and they will not relinquish the spaces they 
inhabited during the Arab Spring revolutions.   
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Appendix A: Female Cyberactivists Demographics  
 
 
Tunisia:  
 
Arabasta3: http://arabasta3.blogspot.com/  
Also blogged as 7ellblog “Launch a Blog”: http://7ellblog.blogspot.com 
Modern Standard Arabic, Tunisian Colloquial Arabic  
 
Aya Chebbi 
Blogged as Proudly Tunisian: http://aya-chebbi.blogspot.com 
Twitter: @aya_chebbi 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/emi.toutou 
French, English, Modern Standard Arabic  
 
Didon: http://didonzahra.blogspot.com/ 
Blogged under pseudonym Didon  
French, Modern Standard Arabic  
 
Fatma Riahi 
Blogged as Arabicca: http://fatmaarabicca.blogspot.com 
Twitter: @arabicca1  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/riahi.fatma.arabicca  
Modern Standard Arabic, French 
 
Khedija Arafaoui 
French, English  
 
Lina Ben Mhenni 
Blogged as A Tunisian Girl: http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.com/ 
Twitter: @benmhennilina 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/atunisiangirl  
French, English, Modern Standard Arabic, German  
 
Mon Massir: http://massir.typepad.fr/  
Blogged under pseudonym Mon Massir   
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MonMassir   
French  
 
Wallada: http://myblog-wallada.blogspot.com/  
Blogged under pseudonym Wallada  
French, Modern Standard Arabic  
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Egypt:  
 
Asmaa Mahfouz  
Blogged as Wolf-Inside: http://wolf-inside.blogspot.com/  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/asmaa.mahfouz  
Twitter: @AsmaaMahfouz 
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUFcwuco2_pYVQxps52l80g  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic 
 
Arwa Salah Mahmoud  
Blogged as Al Hurr: http://alhurr.com/  
Twitter: @arwasm 
Modern Standard Arabic, English  
 
Dalia Ziada  
Blogged as Dalia Ziada: http://daliaziada.blogspot.com/ 
Twitter: @daliaziada 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/daliaziadafan  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
 
Fatima Emam 
Blogged as Brownie: www.atbrownies.blogspot.ca 
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
 
Esraa Abdel-Fattah 
Twitter: @Esraa2008 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/EsraaAbdelFattahOfficial  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic 
 
Mona Seif  
Blogged as monasosh: www.ma3t.blogspot.ca  
Twitter: @monasosh  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
 
Nadia El-Awady  
Blogged as The Inner Workings of My Mind: 
http://nadiaelawady.wordpress.com/ 
Twitter: @Nadiae 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/nadia.elawady  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
 
Sarah Carr  
Blogged as Inanities: http://inanities.org/  
Twitter: @Sarahcarr 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/sarahmareacarr  
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
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Zeinab Mohammed  
Blogged as Egyptian Chronicles: www.egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com   
Twitter: @Zeinobia 
Modern Standard Arabic, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, English  
 
Morocco:  
 
Hind Touissate  
Blogged as According to Hind: http://accordingtohind.wordpress.com/  
Twitter: @AccordingtoHind 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/AccordingtoHind 
French, English, Modern Standard Arabic  
 
Sarra El Idrissi  
February 20th Activist 
Blogs for OpenDemocracy 
Twitter: @pittorshka 
Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, French, English  
  
Laila Lalami 
Blogged with Moroccans for Change 
English 
 
Mariamelmas9  
February 20th Activist, uploaded videos of the protests to YouTube 
Video Channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/mariamelmas9/videos  
 
Majdouline 
Founded Woman Choufouch or Slutwalk Morocco on Facebook  
Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, French  
 
Zainab  
February 20th Activist  
Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, French, English  
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Appendix B: Tables of Analysis for Female Cyberactivists in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Morocco 
 
 
Table A: First Level of Categorization 
 
Categories  Female Blogger A: Lina Ben Mhenni 
Website http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.com/ 
  
Nationality  Tunisian  
Identities Female, Citizen Journalist, Professor 
Languages French, Modern Standard Arabic, Tunisian Colloquial 
Arabic, English, German  
Linked to (ex: 
Facebook, Twitter) 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/atunisiangirl 
Twitter: @benmhennilina  
Followers 
(measures 
connectivity) 
Blog: Did not provide information  
Facebook: Over 70,000 likes 
Twitter: Over 40,000 followers  
Began Blogging 2009 
Top Five Tags Did not include these on blog 
Did they participate 
in physical 
protests?  
Yes, beginning December 19, 2010 
Personal/Political  Both  
 
Table B: Themes that Emerged from the Blogs  
 
Themes  Description 
Reasons for 
Blogging 
Citizen Journalism, Documenting and Archiving Protests, 
Personal Reflections, Diary-esque Accounts and 
Narratives of Protests, Exchange of Information 
Gender Performance Women’s Rights, Private/Public Transgression, Feminism 
Gendered Violence The feeling of threats offline and online.   
Bridgeblogging Connection with international and regional audience 
Political Issues and 
Demands 
Ex: The People Want the End of the Regime, Women’s 
Rights in the Constitution, etc.  
Tactics employed Discursive activism, mobilizing allies online, grassroots 
resistance to the government’s regime, expressions of 
nationhood and belonging  
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